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Introduction
The first-year textbook definition of economics is that it is the study of the allocation
of scarce resources. At first, this sounds like an ambitiously broad aspiration. However,
when thinking more carefully, it is not only in the areas that are commonly associated
with economics, like growth and industrial organization, in which it is important to think
about markets, incentives, and the interaction of economic agents, but also in areas that
are less often associated with economics, such as health care and kidney exchange. As
opposed to other social sciences, economics, and in particular economic theory, draws
heavily on a rich set of analytic tools to study these topics; an approach better known
from the natural sciences. Although this approach has come under increased scrutiny
in recent years, formal models help to cleanly link assumptions with their implications.
This can be particularly fruitful in areas in which a rigorous formal analysis has been
absent so far.
This thesis comprises three essays which deal with three distinct topics from the
aforementioned broad scope of economics. Each essay develops a formal model to
contribute to a better understanding of its topic. Chapter 2 analyzes mechanism design
in dynamic matching markets; Chapter 3 studies dynamic pricing under heterogeneous
social consumption externalities, and Chapter 4 analyzes redistribution in the German
health insurance system.
Chapter 2, which is based on joint work with Holger Herbst (see Herbst and Schick-
ner, 2016), deals with mechanism design. In mechanism design, a designer faces strate-
gic agents who have an informational advantage, for example about their ability or their
preferences. The designer’s task is to design a mechanism which induces a game that
has an equilibriumwhich maximizes the designer’s objective, for example his revenue or
the agents’ welfare. Over the last four decades, mechanism design has successfully been
applied in many economic contexts. The context in which we apply it in Chapter 2 is dy-
namic matching. Dynamic matching plays an important role in many markets, ranging
from more traditional markets, such as labor markets, to markets of the new economy,
such as online exchanges and even dating websites. Our specific one-sided model fits
particularly well to the examples of education in groups, group-lending in the microcre-
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dit market, formation of teams and task assignment in firms, and the establishment of
partnerships which themselves constitute organizations and firms.
In ourmodel, heterogeneous agents (for example productive and unproductive work-
ers) arrive dynamically over time to a matching market. A designer matches agents
pairwise and these subsequently produce output according to a supermodular produc-
tion function. Because agents are discounting, it is costly for agents to wait in the mar-
ket. The designer wants to maximize the agents’ welfare. In a static setting, in which
all agents are present simultaneously, positive assortative matching is both stable and
welfare-maximizing. However, the dynamic arrival of agents challenges the optimality
of positive assortative matching both from the designer’s perspective and the agents’
perspective.
To obtain a welfare benchmark, we start by studying the case when the designer
can observe the agents’ characteristics, i.e. whether they are productive and when they
arrive. As the importance of private information may vary across markets, deriving the
welfare-maximizing policy is of interest in itself. We show that if complementarities are
sufficiently strong or the value of a productive pair is not too high compared to the
value of an unproductive pair, then one of three policies is optimal: the Positive Assorta-
tive Policy, the Provident Impatient Policy, or the Myopic Impatient Policy. The Positive
Assortative Policy only matches agents with the same productivity and stores agents if
necessary, i.e. it is the dynamic version of positive assortative matching. In contrast, the
Myopic Impatient Policy matches any two subsequent agents independent of their pro-
ductivity. The Provident Impatient Policy combines elements of both policies. To solve
for the optimal matching policy in closed form without imposing any restriction on the
policy, we develop a tool, the “State Space Reduction”, which we hope is more gener-
ally applicable when dealing with an infinite, discrete state space. We show that, for
low discount factors, it is optimal to apply the Myopic Impatient Policy. As the discount
factor increases there is a gradual transition to the Positive Assortative Policy. Similarly,
there is a gradual transition from the Myopic Impatient Policy to the Positive Assortative
Policy as complementarities increase. Our findings imply that, first, the fact that Positive
Assortative Matching is welfare-maximizing in static matching models is robust to small
time frictions and, second, the breakdown of positive assortative matching in search and
matching models (cf. Shimer and Smith, 2000) can in fact be welfare-increasing. When
the value of a productive pair exceeds the value of an unproductive pair by far and com-
plementarities are weak, it can be optimal to store unproductive agents in the market
to ensure that arriving productive agents are paired immediately.
Turning to the case when agents have private information about their productivity,
we argue that the time friction also challenges incentive compatibility of positive
assortative matching. Nevertheless, we show that, in the parameter region in which
each policy is optimal, it is also implementable with a mechanism satisfying a no-deficit
condition, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and efficient exit. For our
setup there exists no general implementation result. Furthermore, the impossibility
result of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) shows that in static models with interdependent
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values, in particular matching models, it is generically impossible to implement the
welfare-maximizing policy. Thus, our positive implementation result extends to a
dynamic setting the insight of Dizdar and Moldovanu (2016) that the matching model
is a non-generic model in the sense of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). We show that if
complementarities are sufficiently strong or the discount factor sufficiently high, the
welfare-maximizing policy can be implemented with payments that are reminiscent of
those that implement the welfare-maximizing policy in the static model. In this sense,
not only are the welfare-maximizing policies robust with respect to small time frictions
but also the implementation of these policies. Moreover, we identify situations in which
the designer can implement the welfare-maximizing policy by adjusting the share that
each agent obtains in a match rather than using monetary transfers. Last, we argue that
the welfare-maximizing policy is also implementable if agents can hide their arrival in
addition to their productivity.
It was noticed as early as Veblen (1899) that when buying a good, buyers not only
care about the utility that they derive from the good itself but also about what it symbol-
izes to others. In turn, what a good symbolizes to others also depends on who buys the
good, that is, oftentimes a good is associated with its clientele. This observation is the
starting point for Chapter 3 of this thesis, which is based on joint work with Tim From-
meyer (see Frommeyer and Schickner, 2016). Economically, if buyers care about who
else buys a good, past buyers impose an externality on current buyers. This externality
can be positive if current buyers want to be associated with past buyers, or negative if
current buyers do not want to be associated with past buyers. We refer to a summary
statistic of the externality that past buyers impose on current buyers as the public rep-
utation of a seller. Whereas public reputation characterizes what a good symbolizes to
others, we call the reputation that is traditionally studied in economics private reputa-
tion because it refers to the market’s belief about private information of the seller, for
example the good’s quality. In Chapter 3, we are interested in how a seller dynamically
manages her (public) reputation and how reputation, clientele, and price dynamics de-
pend on the market’s characteristics.
Specifically, we consider a monopolist who repeatedly sells a good to a sequence
of continuum populations of heterogeneous buyers. Buyers differ in their type, which
captures their effect on the seller’s reputation. High-type buyers increase the seller’s
reputation, whereas low-type buyers decrease the seller’s reputation. Thus, in terms of
Leibenstein (1950) there are bandwagon effects with respect to high-type buyers and
snob effects with respect to low-type buyers. Because the type of a buyer is positively
correlated with his willingness to pay, the seller can choose her clientele through prices.
In a general setup, we show that reputation is valuable for the seller and that there
exists a trade-off between current-period profits and a higher reputation in subsequent
periods. On the one hand, the seller wants to set a very high price to attract a small,
exclusive clientele. This drives up reputation in the next period and consequently
increases the buyers’ willingness to pay, which in turn increases future profits. On
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the other hand, the seller wants to set an intermediate price, the static monopoly
price, to realize high current-period profits. At the optimum, the seller balances these
two effects. To study reputation dynamics more explicitly, we use a linear-uniform
specification of our model. First, we show that reputation converges to a stable level in
the long run. Intuitively, in the long run it is optimal for the seller to have a constant
reputation and a fixed clientele. Second, we show that the convergence behavior
towards the stable level depends significantly on the good’s durability. If the good is less
durable, then reputation oscillates towards the long-run reputation: A period of high
reputation is followed by a period of low reputation and vice versa. Thus, our model
predicts substantial fluctuations in prices, reputation, and clientele if the durability of
the good is low. In contrast, if the good is of comparatively high durability, reputation,
price, and clientele dynamics are monotone. If reputation is high initially, reputation
decreases monotonically to the stable long-run level, and if reputation is low initially, it
increases monotonically to the stable long-run level. These findings seem to be in line
with anecdotal evidence from various markets. For example, in the market for luxury
watches, a market characterized by comparatively high durability, we argue that the
reputation and prices of the Swiss manufacturer Rolex have steadily increased over the
last sixty years. In contrast, we observe that the reputation of producers of fashionable
apparel, a good with comparatively low durability, such as Abercrombie & Fitch and Ed
Hardy, fluctuates significantly. In the last part of the chapter, we show that a seller who
has a low reputation initially obtains higher profits if her good is of lower durability
because this allows her to increase reputation more quickly, which yields higher profits
in the future. Therefore, in this case a seller has incentives to produce a good with lower
durability. Our finding provides an additional explanation for planned obsolescence
from a reputational perspective which complements the traditional demand-driven
explanation.
The last chapter, which is based on joint work with Linda Schilling (see Schickner
and Schilling, 2016), analyzes redistribution in the German health insurance market.
As health costs increase due to technological progress, higher life expectancy, and an
aging population, the question arises of how to distribute the burden of financing the
health insurance system, and thereby redistribute income, among the population. To un-
derstand how the health insurance market redistributes income between different parts
of the population, it is key to understand how the health insurance market is organized.
Moreover, a careful inspection of the organization of the German health insurance mar-
ket is needed as there are several policy proposals on the table for changing the health
insurance market, with commentators praising the advantage of one proposal or the
other in terms of efficiency or equity. While economic theory has extensively studied
abstract health insurance markets, in particular the implications of private information,
there is relatively little work that analyzes the organizational structure of a particular
health insurance system for the purpose of evaluating policy proposals and substantiat-
ing descriptive analysis.
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Chapter 4 addresses this issue by proposing a formal model of the German health
insurance market for analyzing redistribution streams within the system and for evalu-
ating policy proposals for changing the system. In our model, a continuum population
of customers who are characterized by health and income seeks health insurance from
one of two insurers: first, a budget-balancing public insurer or, second, a more flexi-
ble, revenue-maximizing private insurer. Both insurers charge their customers fees to
finance their expenditures. Whereas the public insurer charges a fixed percentage, the
contribution rate, of income, the private insurer’s fee may depend more generally on
the customer’s income and health.
We argue first that, if health insurance is voluntary, the health insurance market col-
lapses because profitable customers choose to bear their health costs themselves. When
health insurance is obligatory, we prove existence of equilibrium. In equilibrium, the
private insurer tries to cream skim, i.e. it tries to attract profitable customers and de-
ter unprofitable customers. Redistribution occurs across health and income; profitable
public insurance customers with intermediate income subsidize all other public insur-
ance customers. The surplus from profitable, high-income customers is transformed into
profits for the private insurer and not available for redistribution. We argue, therefore,
that, if a larger part of the population is forced to insure with the public insurer, then
the entire population enjoys higher utility. Having analyzed the current German health
insurance system, we compare it to a system in which there is only one type of insurer
and insurers compete in premia, i.e. fees that are independent of income and health. In
this premium-based system redistribution occurs only across health types. Consequently,
customers with low income have a lower utility and customer with high income have a
higher utility in the premium-based system compared to the current German system.We
argue that combining the introduction of a premium-based system with an appropriate,
budget-neutral redistribution of income, e.g. through an adjustment of income taxation,
increases the population’s welfare. Turning to a more careful welfare comparison of the
current German system and the premium-based system, we identify two effects that
determine the welfare ranking of the two systems. First, redistributing income from
richer parts of the population to poorer parts of the population increases welfare. This
redistribution effect speaks in favor of the current German system in which fees depend
on customers’ income. Second, competition among insurers increases the population’s
welfare. This competition effect speaks in favor of the premium-based system in which
insurers compete on equal grounds for customers from the entire population. In the
last part of the chapter we study the properties of welfare-maximizing fee schedules by
considering a single benevolent insurer who has to finance the population’s aggregate
health costs. This analysis sheds further light on how to adjust insurers’ fees in order to
increase the population’s welfare.
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2
Dynamic Formation of Teams: When
Does Waiting for Good Matches Pay
Off??
This chapter studies the trade-off between realizing match values early and waiting for good
matches that arises in a dynamic matching model with discounting. We consider heteroge-
neous agents that arrive stochastically over time to a centralized matching market. First, we
derive the welfare-maximizing assignment rule, which displays the subtle trade-off between
matching agents early and accumulating agents to form assortative matches. Second, we
show that the welfare-maximizing policy is implementable when agents have private in-
formation about their types. The corresponding mechanism satisfies natural requirements.
Furthermore, we identify situations in which the designer can abstain from using monetary
incentives.
2.1 Introduction
We study a canonical situation in which agents that arrive gradually over time join forces
in order to generate output. Agents are heterogeneous and when forming a group their
characteristics are complements in the production function. In a static world, when all
agents are present from the beginning, positive assortative matchings are both stable
and efficient with this kind of production function.1 The dynamic arrival of agents com-
? Based on joint work with Holger Herbst (see Herbst and Schickner, 2016). We wish to thank Dirk
Bergemann, Francis Bloch, Francesc Dilme, Jan Eeckhout, Daniel Garrett, Johannes Hörner, Andreas
Kleiner, Daniel Krähmer, Stephan Lauermann, Sangmok Lee, Birgit Mauersberger, Benny Moldovanu, Sven
Rady, Larry Samuelson, Philipp Strack, Takuro Yamashita, Leeat Yariv, and workshop participants in Bonn,
Yale, the TSE Student Workshop (Toulouse), the 26th International Conference on Game Theory (Stony
Brook), the Annual Congress of the EEA (Mannheim), and the SFB Young Researchers Workshop (Munich)
for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 This is a well-established result in the matching literature. For a study of necessary and sufficient
conditions for positive assortative matchings see Legros and Newman (2002).
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bined with impatience, however, poses a challenge to positive assortativeness. If future
outcomes are discounted, the desirability of early matches increases both from a social
welfare as well as a participating individual’s perspective.
This chapter analyzes the emerging trade-off between realizing match values early
and waiting for good matches. For this purpose it tackles the question of assortativeness
in a centralized dynamic matching market. We address both the welfare-maximizing
matching procedures under complete information, and socially optimal mechanisms
when agents have private information. We develop a tool that allows us to solve for
the welfare-maximizing matching policy in closed form without imposing any restric-
tion on the policy. This provides clear insights into the effects involved. Then we prove
implementability of the welfare-maximizing matching policy when agents have private
information about their types. Furthermore, we identify situations in which the market
organizer can abstain from using monetary incentives. Finally, we address the case in
which the agents can, in addition to their private type, hide their arrival.
Applications cover a wide range of situations, including the formation of teams and
task assignment within firms, as well as the establishment of partnerships that constitute
organizations themselves. Nowadays, output within organizations is mostly created by
teams: Examples are consultancy in firms, coauthoring at universities, or team sports in
clubs. Complementarities of experts’ skill in production processes is clearly illustrated
in the well-known O-Ring Theory in Kremer (1993). Employees arrive over time when
having finished previous projects or being newly hired. Furthermore, there are various
industries in which entrepreneurs team up to found companies; an example is doctors
who found group practices to share the burden of the large investment in medical equip-
ment; complementarity arises when patients are risk-averse concerning the quality of
treatment and the dynamic friction is that doctors arrive over time in a local market. Our
framework also fits situations of education in groups, e.g. language courses, as group
member’s skills typically are complements and participants arrive over time. Finally, the
model applies to the wide-spread practice of group-lending in the market for microcre-
dits: Borrowers who cannot offer collateral obtain loans for individual projects only if
they pool default risk with peers conducting independent projects. In this case, a bor-
rower’s type is the individual default risk. Following the standard assumption that the
default risks of the group members are independent leads to the complementarity of
the individual default risks.2
Our work aims at closing the gap between static matching models and the literature
on search and matching. The growing literature on search and matching studies
matching patterns using search models. Each agent from a continuous population
meets random fellows one by one and then decides whether to match with that partner
or to continue searching. Major contributions are Shimer and Smith (2000), Smith
2 Explicit models of group-lending with complementarities in individual default risks are for exam-
ple given in the publications on microcredit group-lending by Ghatak (1999) and Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999).
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(2006), and Atakan (2006).3 While search and matching models modify the static
matching model by introducing a time and a search friction jointly, we isolate the effect
of the time friction. To that end, we study the centralized organization of matching
markets using a mechanism design approach.4
We consider a population of heterogeneous agents that differ in a binary character-
istic. Matched agents jointly produce socially valuable output according to a production
function which is supermodular in the agents’ characteristics. Once matches are made,
they are irrevocable. Following most of the literature, we assume that matchings are
pairwise.5 Agents arrive according to a Poisson process and types are drawn indepen-
dent of past arrivals. This model is flexible with respect to four key features: The degree
of complementarity of the partners’ characteristics in the output function, the relative
size of absolute values of output generated by two possible matchings of similar agents,
the probability distribution of arriving agents’ types, and the patience represented by
discounting.6
The irrevocability of matches may originate from the matched group’s need to ini-
tially make sunk investments, which make any later split economically unprofitable.
Investments may for example be capital investments in medical equipment or adver-
tisement for a newly founded company, or social investments like trust and social ar-
rangements within a group of workers. An alternative view is that pairs simply leave
the market and do not return even in case of a split.
For the sake of tractability, we assume characteristics to be binary. This enables
us to find a closed-form solution to an otherwise still unsolved optimization problem.
Apart from the insights provided by the solution to this problem, both the knowledge
of the exact shape of this solution and the solution technique developed in this chapter
may help to tackle more comprehensive problems. We refer to the type that generates
the higher output when being paired with itself as “productive”.
In the first part of this chapter, we derive the welfare-optimal matching policy when
the designer can observe both arrivals and the arriving agents’ types. As opposed to the
literature on search and matching, we do not impose any restrictions on the technology
the central organizer may use.7 This allows us to analyze the role of assortativeness from
3 See also the early contributions by Sattinger (1995), Lu and McAfee (1996), and Burdett and Coles
(1997) on two-sided matching. For a literature survey on search and matching models see Smith (2011).
4 The environment can be interpreted as small in the sense that the arrival process is discrete, represent-
ing single agents arriving. In small matching markets central organization is naturally more appropriate
than decentralized search models.
5 For an exception see Ahlin (2015).
6More precisely, the combination of the discount rate and the frequency with which arrivals are ex-
pected. While in the introduction little discounting between two arrivals is interpreted as patience, a higher
frequency of arrivals, which can be interpreted as a larger market, has the same effect.
7 In the literature on search and matching there is little work on social optimality. Shimer and Smith
(2001b) and Shimer and Smith (2001a) study socially optimal policies, however, the search friction is
taken as given.
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Positive Assortative Policy: H H H L L L H H H L L
Provident Impatient Policy: H H H L L L H H H L L
Myopic Impatient Policy: H H H L L L H H H L L
Figure 1. H stands for a productive agent, L represents an unproductive agent, and circles
indicate matches. The policies are illustrated by means of two freely chosen sets of agents. The
first set of agents consists of three productive agents and three unproductive agents. The
second set consists of three productive agents and two unproductive agents.
an efficiency perspective.We obtain the welfare-optimal policy in closed form depending
on the four key characteristics. This allows for a clear-cut analysis of the dynamic friction
on efficiency.
First, assume that the outputs produced by two productive agents and two unproduc-
tive agents do not differ too drastically. Depending on the remaining three key features,
always one of three matching policies is optimal. The Positive Assortative Policy matches
agents with equal types whenever possible and lets every agent wait otherwise. The
Provident Impatient Policy matches two similar agents with priority whenever possible,
but it also matches two unequal types if only those are left. Finally, theMyopic Impatient
Policy always matches pairs of productive agents. If the number of productive agents is
uneven, the remaining one is then matched with priority to an “unproductive” agent.
Only then remaining unproductive agents are matched. The differences between the
matching policies are illustrated in Figure 1.
The relation between patience and the optimal policies is monotone in the sense that
there are two cut-off levels: When discounting is weak, the Positive Assortative Policy is
optimal, for intermediate levels of patience the Provident Impatient Policy maximizes
welfare, and in an impatient environment it is best to apply the Myopic Impatient Policy.
The intuition for this result is perspicuous: The stronger future payoffs are discounted,
the less willing is the designer to give up immediate output for the option of realizing
gains from positive assortativeness in the future. Whereas the Positive Assortative Pol-
icy always respects these options, the Myopic Impatient Policy only maximizes current
payoff.
An immediate insight is that positive assortative matchings are not always welfare-
maximizing. This means in particular that a failure of positive assortativeness in search
models triggered by agents that are “too” impatient to wait for goodmatchesmay indeed
be welfare-enhancing.8
Considered from the opposite point of view, the result tells us that for small rates
of discounting the efficient matching pattern resembles the standard pattern from fric-
tionless matching. The dynamic model approaches the static frictionless version when
8 Examples from the search and matching literature in which supermodular output functions are not
sufficient for positive assortativeness are Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006).
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discounting becomes negligible. This implies that the result that positive assortative
matchings are efficient in static environments is robust to small dynamic frictions.
The role of the degree of complementarity of the matched agents’ characteristics is
closely related to the degree of patience. The stronger the complementarity, the greater
are the gains from positive assortativeness. Consequently, ceteris paribus, for little com-
plementarities the Myopic Impatient Policy is optimal, for intermediate levels the Prov-
ident Impatient Policy, and for strong complementarities the Positive Assortative Policy
maximizes welfare.
Surprisingly, the relation between the distribution of arriving agents’ types and op-
timal policies may be non-monotone. There are situations in which ceteris paribus the
Positive Assortative Policy is optimal for intermediate probabilities of arriving agents
to be productive but for both small and very high probabilities the Provident Impatient
Policy is optimal. For illustrative purposes, consider the state in which there is one agent
of either type in the market. When applying the Positive Assortative Policy, both agents
are matched with the next arriving peer. When the probability of arriving agents’ types
takes extreme values, abstaining from the creation of mixed matches implies that one
type has large expected waiting costs. The designer might be more willing to enforce
the Positive Assortative Policy if he knows that arrivals of both types happen such that
all agents get matched in near future.
Next, we consider the situation in which the output produced by two unproductive
agents is drastically smaller than the one generated by two productive agents. If in
addition complementarities are weak such that the Myopic Impatient Policy is strongly
preferred to the Positive Assortative Policy, different matching policies may be welfare-
maximizing. It may become optimal to store unproductive types on the market only
for the purpose of matching productive agents with them immediately upon arrival
and thereby avoiding losses from letting productive agents wait.9 The reason for the
optimality of these policies is the strongly heterogeneous waiting cost induced by the
big differences in productivity, together with discounting.
Besides the insights gained from the design of the optimal policies, there is a
technical contribution in this chapter. We solve for the welfare-maximizing matching
policy using methods from dynamic programming. As the problem has discrete but
infinitely many states, a guess and verify approach implies the need to check all
possible deviations on infinitely many states. We develop a tool to do an involved form
of induction, which we call a “State Space Reduction”. This tool enables us to solve the
problem via a guess and verify approach by only checking deviations on a small set of
states. This tool might well be applicable in a broader range of problems, in particular,
it might be used to solve the problem with richer types spaces.
9 This aspect relates to the basic thought of optimal inventory. See Arrow et al. (1951) for the funda-
mental thought and Whitin (1954) and Veinott Jr (1966) for early literature surveys.
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In the second part of this chapter, we treat implementability of the welfare-
maximizing matching policies by a designer who faces agents that have private infor-
mation and care only about their own matches’ output. Match values are split equally.
We follow Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) and consider mechanisms that satisfy “effi-
cient exit” and are interim incentive compatible. We show that the welfare-maximizing
policy is always implementable if agents have private information about their type but
the designer can observe their arrival. This holds even under the most disadvantageous
information structure for implementation: Reports are public such that agents in equi-
librium have all information about the set of agents in the market when arriving.10 Note
that in our setup no general implementation theorem applies, as agents’ values are in-
terdependent and types are uncorrelated in this dynamic setting. While with observable
arrivals the implementation of the Provident Impatient Policy and the Myopic Impatient
Policy turns out to be generally unproblematic, the possibility result is surprising con-
cerning the Positive Assortative Policy. In static environments, positive assortativeness
can be implemented using a single-crossing property with respect to each other agent’s
type. By this we mean that the gain from matching with a productive agent instead of
an unproductive one is higher for agents which are productive themselves. However, the
time friction is not only a friction to efficiency but also to the incentive constraints. When
the expected time until getting matched depends on the reported type, it might be more
attractive for unproductive agents to report being productive than it is for productive
agents. Whenever this is the case, the Positive Assortative Policy is not implementable.
However, it turns out that whenever this happens, the Positive Assortative Policy is not
welfare-maximizing either.
In addition, we show that if the complementarity of the match value function is
sufficiently strong, or equivalently the environment is sufficiently patient, the welfare-
maximizing policy can be implemented with transfers that only depend on the agent’s
reported type. This simple structure of payments is reminiscent of the one that imple-
ments the positive assortative matching in the static model. Thus, besides the optimal
policy, also the implementation in the static matching model is robust to small dynamic
frictions. We prove further that whenever this is possible, there exists a splitting rule
for the match value of mixed matches such that the optimal policy can be implemented
without transfers.
Finally, we address implementation when agents’ arrivals are unobservable to the
designer. In this case the agents’ private information is two-dimensional: It consists of
the type and the arrival time. Deviations from truthful reporting may, hence, consist of
misreports about the type combined with strategic delays of the report about the arrival.
We prove that even in this environment the optimal policy is always implementable. The
contract that implements the Positive Assortative Policy when arrivals are observable
is also incentive compatible with unobservable arrivals. Concerning the Provident
Impatient Policy and the Myopic Impatient Policy, we crucially exploit that for their
10 In our model this is equivalent to the notion of periodic ex post equilibrium as defined in Bergemann
and Välimäki (2010).
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implementation the authority does not always need to elicit information about arriving
agents’ types.
Besides the literature on search and matching, our work relates to further contri-
butions that study the efficiency of positive assortativeness in dynamic matching mod-
els. Shi (2005) considers two-sided matching with a supermodular production function
where matches get split after random durations. Shi, however, endogenizes one side’s
quality choice which turns out to make the trade-off that lies at the heart of our work
uninteresting in his setting. The focus of his paper is on an additionally introduced co-
ordination friction that cannot be overcome by the central authority. A. Anderson and
Smith (2010) analyzes the trade-off between creating a payoff-maximizing positive as-
sortative matching in the current period and having an advantageous distribution over
characteristics in the next period. Agents can be rematched each period, but the trade-
off arises as the evolution of agents characteristics depends on their current match.
Similar to our model, Baccara et al. (2015) considers a matching market with dy-
namically arriving agents that is organized by a benevolent central planner. There are
three key differences in their setup: The market is two-sided, waiting cost are homoge-
neous, and each period two agents arrive. A consequence of these differences is that the
analytical problem and hence both the solution technique and the optimal matching poli-
cies differ remarkably from ours. Furthermore, the authors do not consider implemen-
tation with private information. Instead, they are interested in a welfare-comparison
between the outcome of a decentralized organization of the market and the socially
optimal outcome.
Dynamic matching markets that are organized by a central authority are further
studied in the growing literature on dynamic kidney exchange. Such papers include
Ünver (2010), Ashlagi et al. (2013), R. Anderson et al. (2015), Akbarpour et al. (2016),
and Ashlagi et al. (2016). The objective in these papers is to minimize waiting times and
therefore maximize the number of matches respecting restrictions on feasible matches
that are exogenously given on medical grounds. Contrary to this literature, we focus on
maximizing total match value in an environment in which any match is feasible.
Fershtman and Pavan (2015) studies a centralized two-sided matching market
in which the agent’s private valuations for partners change over time. The profit-
maximizing intermediary faces restrictions on rematching agents. Besides the invariant
set of agents in the market, an important difference to our study is that agents have
idiosyncratic valuations for partners. First, this means that their paper is not about as-
sortativeness, and second, values are not interdependent.
In a broader perspective, our work adds to the literature on dynamic assignment
problems. One strand of this literature considers the assignment of dynamically arriving
agents to goods which are present from the beginning. Examples are Gallien (2006),
Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009), Mierendorff (2015), Board and Skrzypacz (2015),
Dizdar et al. (2011), and Pai and Vohra (2013). Another strand treats the assignment
of dynamically arriving goods to agents that are queuing for these goods. Examples are
14 | 2 Dynamic Formation of Teams
Leshno (2015) and Bloch and Cantala (2016). The housing literature combines these
two strands: Agents arrive over time and are matched with houses that return to the
market when the assigned agents have moved out. Examples are Kurino (2014), Bloch
and Houy (2012), and Bloch and Cantala (2013). The housing literature and our work
share the property that both matching partners arrive over time. There are, however,
two substantial differences. First, whereas in the housing literature the arriving stream
of houses is determined by the allocation, in our work it is entirely exogenous. Second,
in our environment both matching partners have preferences over partners and both
have private information.
Finally, we relate to a small literature that treats the implementability of welfare-
maximizing social choice functions in general dynamic environments. Bergemann and
Välimäki (2010) presents a dynamic VCG mechanism that implements socially optimal
social choice functions in dynamic environments with private values. Liu (2014) and
Noda (2016) develop dynamic versions of payment schemes found in Cremer and
McLean (1985) to implement welfare-optimal social choice functions in environments
with interdependent values and correlated types. Nath et al. (2015) extends the idea of
Mezzetti (2004) to dynamic settings. Their payment scheme enables implementation
of the optimal social choice in general environments if payments are made in periods
subsequent to the agent’s report. Because in our environment values are interdepen-
dent, types are uncorrelated and payments have to be made immediately upon reports,
none of the latter results can be applied.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the setup, Sec-
tion 2.3 derives the welfare-maximizing matching policies, Section 2.4 addresses imple-
mentability of the policies under private information, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
We consider agents that arrive over time to a matching market. Time is continuous, and
the time horizon is infinite, t ∈ [0,∞). Having arrived to the market, agents remain in
the market until they are matched, i.e., agents are long-lived. Agents are characterized
by the tuple (θ , a), where θ is the agent’s type and a ∈ [0,∞) is his arrival time. An
agent’s type reflects his productivity; he is either productive H or unproductive L, H >
L > 0.
Arrivals are described by a Poisson process (Nt)t≥0 with arrival rate λ. A Poisson
process is a counting process and thus describes discrete arrivals. The random variable
Nt describes the number of arrivals up to time t. Let tn be the time of the n-th arrival.
Arriving agents’ types are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution that is independent of
the process (Nt)t≥0 and i.i.d. across time; we denote the probability of the productive
type by p ∈ (0, 1). We refer to the process induced by (Nt)t≥0 joint with the Bernoulli
distributions as arrival process.
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There exists a central authority, the designer, which organizes the market. Once an
agent arrives, the designer may assign him to another agent that is in the market. After
being assigned a partner, an agent cannot be reassigned. This could be, for example,
because agents leave the market after forming a group and are thus no longer available
for the designer or because they make sunk investments that are too costly to forfeit.
Together agents produce a match value depending on the pair’s types. Formally,
m : R>0 × R>0 −→ R≥0,
θ1 × θ2 7−→ m(θ1,θ2).
In accordance with the literature, the match value function m is assumed to be sym-
metric and strictly increasing in both arguments. Given the binary type space, m can be
described by three match values mLL , mHL , and mHH , where mθ1θ2 := m(θ1,θ2).
11 We
refer to pairs where both agents have the same type as homogeneous matches; pairs
of agents with different types are termed mixed matches. We assume that the match
value function is supermodular, which in our setup boils down to 2mHL ≤ mHH +mLL .
Supermodularity implies that in a static model, where all agents are present simultane-
ously, positive assortative matching maximizes the sum of match values.12 Alternatively,
if we regard the two match partners as contributing to the match value, the types, inter-
preted as input factors, may vary from negligible degrees of complementarity to perfect
complementarity. In addition, we require that the match value of the unproductive
pair is not too small compared to the match value of the productive pair, 3mLL ≥ mHH .13
In the absence of additional payments, an agent’s utility from a match, his premu-
neration value cf. Mailath et al. (2013), equals his share of the match value. In the
first part of this chapter, the precise share and the way it is determined, endogenously
or exogenously, may be arbitrary. All agents discount future payoffs with a common
discount rate r ∈ (0,∞).
The designer seeks to maximize the expected discounted sum of match values, i.e.,
the expected sum of discounted utilities. If we assume that all agents are present from
t = 0 but only enter the market at their arrival time a, our objective corresponds to
maximizing the expected sum of utilities. In yet another, less benevolent, interpreta-
tion the designer maximizes output. For a formal description of the designer’s objective
denote by at = (a1, a2, . . . , aNt ) the history of arrival times up to time t and by θ
t =






s ) ∈ Z3≥0 be
the action taken by the designer at time s, where ϕHHs is the number of homogeneous
pairs of productive agents, ϕHLs is the number of mixed pairs, and ϕ
LL
s is the number of
homogeneous pairs of unproductive agents formed at time s. Denote by ϕ t the history
11 As will become clear from the analysis below, one could normalize only one of these three values.
12 A positive assortative matching is a pairing of all agents in the market, in which productive types pair
with productive types and unproductive types pair with unproductive types.
13 In Section 2.3.2 we analyze the case 3mLL < mHH .
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of the designer’s actions up to time t, ϕ t = {ϕs}0≤s<t . Altogether, a history up to time
t, ht , is given by ht =
 
t, at ,θ t ,ϕ t

. Let H t be the set of all histories up to time t. A
matching policy ρ is a family of functions ρ = (ρt)t∈R≥0 where ρt is defined as
ρt : H t −→ Z3≥0
ρt(h
t) 7−→ ϕt .




t ), where ρ
θ1θ2
t maps the history h
t into the number
of θ1θ2-pairs created at time t. The value generated by this policy at time t after history
ht is
vρt (h








Denote by ϑt the corresponding realized value at time t. Let x(h
t) and y(ht) be the
number of productive and unproductive types that are still available in the market given
history ht . Formally, x(ht) and y(ht) are given by14















We call a matching policy ρ feasible if it never matches more agents than available
in the market, i.e., for all t and ht ,
2ρHHt (h
t) + ρHHt (h
t) ≤ x(ht),
2ρLLt (h
t) + ρHLt (h
t) ≤ y(ht).




e−rsvρs (hs) ds], (1)
where the expectation is taken over histories with respect to the probability measure
induced by ρ and the arrival process. We refer to a feasible matching policy ρ that
maximizes (1) as welfare-maximizing. Define the expected payoff at time t after history
ht , i.e., the continuation value, from ρ
14Here we slightly abuse notation. By θi ∈ θ t we refer to the components of the vector θ t .





e−r(s−t)vρs (hs) ds|ht], (2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure induced
by the arrival process and (ρs)s≥t . We call a feasible matching policy ρ optimal if it
maximizes (2) for any time t and any history ht . Therefore, an optimal matching policy
is a refinement of a welfare-maximizing matching policy, requiring maximization of
the designer’s payoff not only ex ante but after any path of play. In particular, every
optimal matching policy is welfare-maximizing.
Recursive Formulation. As a first step, we derive a recursive formulation. Start by
noting that at every point in time, after any history, x and y are a sufficient statistic
to summarize the maximization problem: Firstly, feasibility depends only on x and y .
Secondly, the arrival process is independent of the history. This is a consequence of the
memorylessness of the Poisson process, the independence of interarrival times, and the
independence of the Bernoulli distributions from the arrival times. Thus, the state of
our problem is (x , y) with state space S := {(x , y) ∈ N2≥0| x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, x + y > 0}.15
In particular, time is not part of the state. Thus, there exists an optimal policy that
matches only upon agents’ arrival: Whenever an action is optimal on a given state, the
policy that takes this action on this state is optimal and only matches upon arrival.
A policy that conditions the action, for some state (x , y), on variables different
from x and y , e.g. time, is only optimal if all actions that the policy might take in that
state are optimal. Vice versa, if there is a unique optimal policy among those that match
only upon arrival, then at every state exactly one action is optimal which implies that
this policy is the unique optimal policy in the set of all policies.16
In the following, we restrict attention to feasible matching policies that condition
solely on (x , y). As we will prove generic uniqueness of the optimal policy, the restric-
tion will turn out to be without loss, and we will obtain a sharp characterization of
all optimal matching policies. Accordingly, we suppress the dependence on time and
history in the notation for continuation values and policies and write them merely as a
function of x and y .
It is convenient to define the expected discount factor until the arrival of the next
agent
δ := E[e−r t1] = λ
λ + r
. (3)
15Note, that this formulation implies that a state represents the set of agents in the market including
the new arrival.
16Whenever the optimal policy is unique, there does not exist a stochastic policy which yields a higher
payoff.
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Building upon the preceding insights, we are thus led to study the Bellman equation
V (x , y) = max







pV (x − 2ϕHH − ϕHL + 1, y − 2ϕLL − ϕHL) (4)
+ (1 − p)V (x − 2ϕHH − ϕHL , y − 2ϕLL − ϕHL + 1)	 ,
subject to:
2ϕHH + ϕHL ≤ x , 2ϕLL + ϕHL ≤ y, ∀x , y ∈ S.
Given the recursive formulation of the designer’s problem (4), the difference between
optimal matching policies and welfare-maximizing matching policies has an intuitive in-
terpretation. Every matching policy defines, together with the arrival process, a Markov
chain over states in S. As matching policies are deterministic, there are two possible suc-
cessors for each state with transition probabilities p and 1− p. Depending on the policy,
this Markov chain might have a recurrent set. If the Markov chain has a recurrent set
and the market is initially, i.e., at the point in time at which the policy is enforced, in
a state within the recurrent set, then no state outside the recurrent set is reached with
positive probability. A policy is then welfare-maximizing if it maximizes the designer’s
expected payoff at all states in the recurrent set. The criterion welfare maximization
does not restrict policies on states outside of the recurrent set. An optimal matching
policy maximizes the designer’s expected payoff at every state in S. In the following, we
solve for optimal policies.17 Firstly, this allows us to solve the designer’s problem for any
initial state of the market. Secondly, an optimal policy maximizes the designer’s payoff
even if in the past several agents arrived at the same point in time. Also, as we will
see below, focusing on optimal policies elucidates the economic trade-offs connected to
welfare maximization and their resolution.
2.3 Optimal Policy
We start by considering the welfare maximization problem under complete information.
This means at the point in time of an agent’s arrival, the authority observes both the
agent’s arrival and his type. Incentive constraints arising from the agents’ informational
advantage are added in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Regular Case
By means of the assumption mHH ≤ 3mLL we have guaranteed that the match value of
a pair of productive agents is not extremely high compared to the output generated by
two unproductive agents. In this case there are three important policies to be considered,
which are portrayed in the following.
17 As will become clear from the analysis below, solving for optimal policies is indispensable even if
we are only interested in welfare-maximizing policies. See the outline of the proof of Theorem 1 for an
explanation.
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Definition 1. Positive Assortative Policy
The Positive Assortative Policy creates in each state (x , y) the maximal number of homoge-
neous pairs of both kinds of agents. Mixed matches are never created.
The matching pattern produced by this policy is positive assortative. In the absence
of discounting, this policy maximizes the overall match value. Whenever there is exactly
one agent of either kind left in the market, the policy lets both agents wait despite
waiting costs.
Definition 2. Provident Impatient Policy
The Provident Impatient Policy creates in each state (x , y) the maximal number of homoge-
neous pairs of both kinds of agents. If both x and y are uneven, one mixed match is created
in addition.
The matching pattern produced by this policy is not positive assortative but contains
a relatively large number of homogeneous matches. Only when there is exactly one
mixed pair left in the market after all homogeneous pairs have been created, the mixed
match is created as well. In that sense homogeneous matches are given priority over
mixed matches. However, the policy never lets two agents wait.
Definition 3. Myopic Impatient Policy
The Myopic Impatient Policy creates in each state (x , y) the maximal number of pairs of
productive agents. If x is uneven and y ≥ 1, one mixed match is created. The maximal
number of pairs from the pool of remaining unproductive agents is formed.
The matching pattern produced by this policy is not positive assortative and
contains a relatively little number of homogeneous matches. Again, the policy first
creates the maximal number of productive matches. If afterwards there is a productive
agent left, it is matched to an unproductive agent with priority. Only then pairs of
unproductive agents are formed. In that sense productive agents are given priority over
homogeneous matches. The policy acts entirely myopic in the sense that it maximizes
the sum of immediate match values. The three matching policies are illustrated in
Figure 1 in the introduction.
In order to state the main theorem, we define two functions that partition the space
of parameter constellations (p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL). Define
m1HL := mHH
δp
1 − δ(1 − 2p) + mLL
δ(1 − p)




1 − δ(1 − 2p) + mLL
1 − δ(1 − p)
1 − δ(1 − 2p) . (6)
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Theorem 1. For any given parameter constellation (p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) one of three
matching policies is optimal:
If mHL ≤ m1HL , the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal.
If mHL ∈ [m1HL ,m2HL], the Provident Impatient Policy is optimal.
If mHL ≥ m2HL , the Myopic Impatient Policy is optimal.
The optimal policy is unique if mHL /∈ {m1HL ,m2HL}.
In the following we first elaborate on the statement of Theorem 1. Then we provide
an economic intuition for the result and the underlying trade-offs. The treatment of the
theorem is completed with an outline of the proof.
Immediate implications. First, Theorem 1 is surprisingly simple in the sense that
only three policies are generically optimal. In particular, it is generically not optimal
to let two unproductive agents wait when there is nobody else in the market. As we
show in the extension to this section, this crucially hinges on the regularity assumption
3mLL ≥ mHH .
The second comment addresses the difference between optimal and welfare-
maximizing policies. The Provident Impatient Policy and the Myopic Impatient Policy
do not differ on states which are reached once one of the two policies is established.
Once they are installed, the total number of agents in the market never exceeds two
and both policies form a pair whenever possible, which is each second arrival. We call
the set of policies which always form a pair as soon as two agents are present the set of
Impatient Policies. For a discussion why to focus on optimal policies we refer the reader
to Section 2.2.
Intuition. There are two major driving forces. We refer to the first one as the
gain of assortative matching. The value of matching two productive agents and two
unproductive agents is higher than the value of two mixed matches. In order to achieve
positive assortative matchings, it might be necessary to accumulate agents. This is the
case whenever pairing agents in the order of their arrivals induces creating mixed pairs.
Hence, the gain of assortative matching is effective in favor of waiting with agents in
the market. The second force is the loss from deferring matches. Having agents wait in
the market is costly because of discounting. This force is effective in favor of creating
match values early; this may include creating mixed pairs.
We first comment on the influence of complementarity of the match value function
on optimal policies. Given all other parameters, the match value of a mixed pair charac-
terizes the degree of supermodularity of the match value function in the agents’ types.
The largermHL , the more are the partners’ types substitutes, and perfect substitutability
is achieved at the upper bound mHL = 1/2(mHH +mLL). The theorem states that the
relation between the match value of a mixed pair and the optimal policies is monotone
in the sense that there are two cut-off levels: When complementarity is strong, the
Positive Assortative Policy is optimal, for intermediate levels the Provident Impatient
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Policy is optimal, and for high degrees of substitutability it is optimal to apply the
Myopic Impatient Policy. The intuition is perspicuous: The higher the value of mixed
matches, the smaller is the gain from assortative matching. As all other parameters are
kept fixed, the loss from deferring matches is unchanged. Hence, with increasing match
values for mixed pairs the losses from deferring matches more and more outweigh
the gains from positive assortativeness. Whereas the Positive Assortative Policy fully
realizes gains from positive assortativeness, the Myopic Impatient Policy solely prevents
losses from deferring matches.
Second, for given match values we discuss how the choice of optimal policies de-
pends on the impatience, represented by the discount factor δ. Recall that δ is a com-
pound expression of the arrival rate and the discounting rate. The discount factor in-
creases when the discount rate decreases, or when the arrival rate increases. The ar-
rival rate of agents can be interpreted as the size of the market. We obtain the following
consequence of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. There exist two functions δ1 and δ2 that map any parameter constellation
(p,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) into [0, 1] with δ
1 > δ2 such that:
If δ ≥ δ1, the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal.
If δ ∈ [δ2,δ1], the Provident Impatient Policy is optimal.
If δ ≤ δ2, the Myopic Impatient Policy is optimal.
We call δ1 and δ2 cut-off levels. The existence of two cut-off levels follows from
showing that ∂m1HL /∂ δ ≥ 0 and ∂m2HL /∂ δ ≥ 0 independent of the specific choice of
parameters. This means that when fixing all parameters but δ, the monotonicity in mHL
carries over to monotonicity in δ. 1≥ δ1 ≥ δ2 ≥ 0 implies that given any parameter
constellation (p,mHH ,mLL ,mHL), for each of the three policies there exists a δ such
that the policy is optimal.
Implication 1: The relation between patience and the optimal policies is also mono-
tone. The stronger discounting, the greater are the losses from deferringmatches. Hence,
the stronger future payoffs are discounted, the less willing is the designer to give up im-
mediate output for the option of realizing gains from positive assortativeness in the
future.
Implication 2: The result tells us that for little rates of discounting the efficient
matching pattern resembles the standard pattern from frictionless matching. More
precisely, note that for δ = 1 holds m1HL = 1/2(mHH +mLL), which is the maximum
value for mHL , and whenever m
1
HL is interior, then δ
1 is interior as well. m1HL and thus
δ1 is interior for all p,δ 6= {0, 1}. From an economic perspective, the dynamic model
approaches the static frictionless model when discounting gets negligible. Combining
the above statements, this implies that the efficiency result of positive assortative
matchings in static environments is robust to small dynamic frictions.
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Third, we examine the role of the distribution of arriving agents’ types represented
by p. Surprisingly, there are situations in which ceteris paribus the Provident Impatient
Policy is optimal for small and high probabilities but for intermediate values of p the
Positive Assortative Policy is optimal. This non-monotonicity arises from the presence
of two different effects. For an illustration, consider the state in which there is one
agent of either type in the market. First, a higher probability of productive arrivals
decreases the expected time until the next productive arrival. For the productive
agent in the market this means that the likelihood that he can be matched with a
productive peer in the near future increases. This raises the expected value of letting
the productive agent wait instead of creating a mixed match. This effect implies that
the attractiveness of the Positive Assortative Policy is increasing in p, implying that the
cut-off δ1 should decrease in p. However, there is an opposite second effect originating
from the unproductive agent. For high levels of p abstaining from the creation of mixed
matches implies a large expected waiting time for the unproductive agent. This implies
that the value the unproductive agent contributes to is strongly discounted. In isolation,
δ1 should increase in p . In particular, if the values mLL and mHH do not differ much,
the second effect is strong enough such that as p approaches one, δ1 increases in p.
Then δ1 has its minimum at some interior value, decreases for small p, and increases
for high values of p. In this case the designer is more willing to enforce the Positive
Assortative Policy because he knows that arrivals of both types happen regularly such
that all agents get matched in near future.
The dependence of the optimal matching policy on p and δ is graphically illustrated
for match values that represent three canonical match value functions: The case of per-
fect complements (Figure 2), the multiplicative case (Figure 3), and the case of (almost)
perfect substitutes (Figure 4). The red line depicts δ1, the boundary between the param-
eter regions in which the Positive Assortative Policy and the Provident Impatient Policy
are optimal. The blue line depicts δ2, the boundary between the Provident Impatient
Policy and the Myopic Impatient Policy. As mentioned, for large values of δ the Positive
Assortative Policy is optimal, for intermediate values the Provident Impatient Policy, and
for small values the Myopic Impatient Policy.
In the case of perfect complements, Figure 2, the match value of a mixed match
equals the match value of a homogeneous match of unproductive agents. A consequence
is that the Provident Impatient Policy dominates the Myopic Impatient Policy in the
sense that the expected welfare from the Provident Impatient Policy is weakly higher on
each possible state. The reason is that, starting on a given state, both policies generate
the same sum of match values in the first period using the same number of agents.
However, the Myopic Impatient policy uses weakly more productive agents for it than
the Provident Impatient Policy.18 Furthermore, as the match value function is strongly
18 Consider, for example, the state (1,2). The Provident Impatient Policy matches the two unproductive
agents, whereas the Myopic Impatient Policy creates a mixed match. Both match values are equal, but the
Provident Impatient Policy leaves a productive agent in the market whereas the Myopic Impatient Policy
leaves an unproductive agent in the market.
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Figure 2. Perfect complements: m(H, L)= min{H, L}; Here H = 3 and L = 1. The red line
depicts δ1; the blue line depicts δ2.









Figure 3. Product: m(H, L)= H · L; Here H =p3 and L = 1.
supermodular, the gain of assortative matching is high, and the parameter region in
which the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal is large.
The case of multiplication, illustrated in Figure 3, is regularly used to model comple-
mentarities in the match value function. All three policies from Theorem 1 are optimal
on a parameter region with positive measure. Note that for p close to one, the Positive
Assortative Policy is never optimal - the designer always wants to avoid leaving unpro-
ductive agents unmatched.
In the case of perfect substitutes, approximated by Figure 4, there are no com-
plementarities in the match value function. As there are no gains from assortative
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Figure 4. Almost perfect substitutes: Almost m(H, L)= H + L; Here H = 1.5, L = 0.5 and
m(H, L)= 1, 98< H + L.
matching, the parameter regions, for which the Positive Assortative Policy and the
Provident Impatient Policy are optimal, vanish.19
Outline of the proof. The problem is solved using a Guess & Verify method. We
guess three candidate matching policies, which turn out to be optimal on some subset
of the parameter space. As a side product of the verification, we obtain both the precise
parameter region where the verified policy is optimal and its (generic) uniqueness on
that parameter region. It turns out that the respective parameter regions of the three
matching policies constitute a partitioning of the parameter space. The challenging
step is the verification, as it involves checking deviations on a discrete but infinite state
space. We cope with the situation by developing a procedure we call “State Space
Reduction”.
Guess. We guess the Positive Assortative Policy, the Provident Impatient Policy, and
the Myopic Impatient Policy as candidate matching policies. Remember that joint with
the arrival process a matching policy defines a Markov chain over future states S. For
all three candidates, the induced Markov chains jumps to a finite recurrent set after the
first period. This means that (apart from the initial state) only a finite number of states
realize. For the Provident Impatient Policy and the Myopic Impatient Policy only the five
states (1, 0), (0, 1), (0,2), (2,0), and (1,1) can occur. For the Positive Assortative Policy
the recurrent set is {(1, 0), (0,1), (1,1), (0, 2), (2, 0), (2,1), (1,2)}.20
19 From ∂m1HL /∂ δ ≥ 0 and ∂m2HL /∂ δ ≥ 0 joint with m1HL = m2HL = 1/2(m(H,H)+m(L, L)) at δ = 1
follows that when m(H, L) approaches 1/2(m(H,H)+m(L, L)), m(H, L)> m1HL ,m
2
HL for almost all δ.
20Note that the state represents the set of agents in the market including the new arrival.
2.3 Optimal Policy | 25
As these recurrent sets are finite, the value function of each candidate at every state
in the respective recurrent set can be computed as the solution to a finite system of
equations. The reason is that the value function at an element in the recurrent set only
depends on payoffs generated from states in that set and the transition probabilities.
For illustrative reasons, we state here the system of equations for the Myopic Impatient
Policy. Denote the corresponding values by VMIP :
VMIP(0,1) =δ[pVMIP(1, 1) + (1 − p)VMIP(0,2)]
VMIP(1, 0) =δ[pVMIP(2, 0) + (1 − p)VMIP(1,1)]
VMIP(0, 2) =mHH + δ[pVMIP(1,0) + (1 − p)VMIP(0, 1)]
VMIP(2, 0) =mLL + δ[pVMIP(1, 0) + (1 − p)VMIP(0,1)]
VMIP(1, 1) =mHL + δ[pVMIP(1, 0) + (1 − p)VMIP(0,1)].
(7)
The value functions on states outside the respective recurrent sets can then easily be
computed as they only differ from the ones on the recurrent set by the payoff generated
in the starting period. We illustrate this by a short example.
Example 1. The example shows how the value function of the Myopic Impatient Policy at
state (6, 5) can be written as a function of the immediate payoff and the value at a state in
the recurrent set:
VMIP(6,5) =3mHH + 2mLL + δ[pVMIP(1, 1) + (1 − p)VMIP(0,2)]
=3mHH + 2mLL + δVMIP(0, 1).
Policies that differ only on states outside the recurrent set have the same value
function at states inside the recurrent set and the recurrent sets coincide. In particular,
the values of the Provident Impatient Policy (VPI P) equal those of the Myopic Impatient
Policy on the recurrent set. If the initial state lies in the recurrent set, a policy is
welfare-maximizing if it maximizes the value on each state in the recurrent set. Any
policy that differs outside of the recurrent set is welfare-maximizing as well.21
Verification. Verifying the optimality of the three candidates can potentially be cum-
bersome. We describe the procedure that we apply to all three candidate policies. Fix
one candidate. In the previous step, we determined the value on each state. The verifi-
cation consists of showing for any state that following the policy is better than deviating
on the particular state and subsequently following the candidate solution. By the princi-
ple of optimality, if all conditions are checked, we have shown both the matching policy,
defined as a course of actions, and the associated value function to be optimal. When
following the candidate is strictly better than any deviation on any state, the optimal
policy is unique.
21 For the difference of optimality and welfare maximization see Section 2.2.
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The difficulty in the verification is that there is a large number of potential deviations
to be checked: First, the number of states on which deviations have to be checked is
(countably) infinite; second, on states with many agents in the market there is a large
number of deviations possible.
This problem can not be avoided by restricting attention to welfare-maximizing poli-
cies that start with the very first arrival. Even though in the latter case welfare maxi-
mization demands optimality only on a finite set of states, the verification still demands
guessing the optimal policy on each possible state. The reasoning is as follows: On each
state in the recurrent set, applying the candidate policy must be better than any alterna-
tive action. These alternative actions might, however, lead to states outside the recurrent
set as illustrated in Example 2.
Example 2. The example illustrates how checking deviations from the Myopic Impatient
Policy at state (1,1), a state in the respective recurrent state, involves the value on states
(2,1) and (2, 1), which are not in the recurrent set for that candidate. The (only possible)
deviation considered here is to not create the mixed pair:
VMIP(1,1) =mHL + δ[pVMIP(1,0) + (1 − p)VMIP(0, 1)]
>δ[pVMIP(2, 1) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 2)].
In order to evaluate whether the value associated with a deviation is strictly lower
than the candidate course of action, we must make statements about the upper bound
of the value when being in this “off-path” state. As we want to determine for which
parameter configurations precisely the candidate policy is optimal, we need to know
exactly the maximal value of the “off-path” state. Therefore, we need to know what the
optimal policy does on that state. In order to find the optimal policy on that “off-path”
state we guess it and again check deviations, which may lead to more “off-path” states.
As there is always the possibility of not matching anything, any state in the state space
is reached by the procedure. Hence, it is necessary to set up a candidate that is optimal
and verify it.
We tackle the problem of checking the large number of deviations by a proof strat-
egy that involves what we call “State Space Reduction”. The State Space Reduction is an
elaborate induction argument and is the crucial step of the proof. We believe that the
concept of the “State Space Reduction” can be used to address comprehensive maximiza-
tion problems, in particular the related problemwith more than two types of agents. The
State Space Reduction works as follows: Instead of checking deviations on each state,
we set up a number of general statements. On an arbitrary state, these statements iden-
tify deviations, which are not optimal, given the candidate policy will be continued in
the following states and given the candidate policy is optimal on smaller states.22 We
call these statements “principles” that specify which kind of deviations do not have to
22 State (x , y) is smaller than state (x ′, y ′) if and only if x ≤ x ′ and y ≤ y ′ with at least one inequality
being strict.
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be considered. Then we identify states on which these principles capture every possible
deviation. We show that there is only a finite number of states including the smallest
ones, on which the principles do not capture every possible deviation. When explicitly
showing that on this finite set there are no profitable deviations, we have shown that
there are no profitable deviations at all. Note, that this set of states does not equal the
recurrent set and also differs between the Provident Impatient Policy and the Myopic
Impatient Policy. To state the principles, we use one further definition.
Definition 4. A policy ρ is consistent iff for any state (x , y) ∈ S and any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2
holds: ρθ1θ2(x , y)> 0⇒ ρθ1θ2(x − 1{θ1=L} − 1{θ2=L}, y − 1{θ1=H} − 1{θ2=H})=
ρθ1θ2(x , y)− 1 and ρθ3θ4(x − 1{θ1=L} − 1{θ2=L}, y − 1{θ1=H} − 1{θ2=H})= ρθ3θ4(x , y)
for all (θ3,θ4) /∈ {(θ1,θ2), (θ2,θ1)}.
The meaning of consistency is best illustrated by an example: Suppose on a given
state the policy creates matches with at least one pair of productive agents amongst
them, θ1 = θ2 = H. Then, on the state with two productive agents less, the policy creates
the same matches except for one pair of productive agents. This definition is used in
order to formulate the first principle. Each of our candidates is consistent.
Lemma 1. (Principle 1) Assume that the candidate policy is consistent. Then in every
state, deviations that form a pair that is also formed under the candidate policy, do not
have to be checked.
For example, consider a consistent candidate policy and a state on which it forms a
homogeneous pair of productive types. On that state no deviations have to be considered
that also match two productive agents.
The reason is based on two observations. First, note that the match value of the
pair that is created under the candidate and the deviation can be canceled out from the
inequality that corresponds to checking the deviation. Second, due to consistency, the
candidate policy creates the same matches except for one pair of productive agents on
the state with two productive agents less. Combining the two observations, the deviation
is not profitable given there was no profitable deviation on the state with two productive
agents less. The same holds for homogeneous pairs of unproductive agents and mixed
pairs. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 3. The example shows how a deviation from the Positive Assortative Policy as in
Principle 1 on state (6,5) can be traced back to a deviation on a smaller state. Denote VPAP
the value under the Positive Assortative Policy. The deviation considered matches exactly
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one pair of productive agents:
VPAP(6, 5) =3mHH + 2mLL + δ[pVPAP(1, 1) + (1 − p)VPAP(0, 2)]
>mHH + δ[pVPAP(5, 5) + (1 − p)VPAP(4, 6)]
⇔ 2mHH + 2mLL + δ[pVPAP(1, 1) + (1 − p)VPAP(0,2)]
>δ[pVPAP(5,5) + (1 − p)VPAP(4,6)]
⇔ VPAP(4,5) > δ[pVPAP(5,5) + (1 − p)VPAP(4,6)].
Lemma 2. (Principle 2) Assume that the candidate policy is consistent. Consider a state
and a deviation on it that leaves two agents with types θ1 and θ2 unmatched. If after the
following arrival the candidate policy creates a pair (θ1,θ2) independent of the arriving
agent’s type, this deviation does not have to be checked.
For example, consider a deviation which lets two productive types in the market.
The deviation does not have to be checked, if in the next period (upon the next arrival)
a match of two productive agents is created independently of the type of arrival. The rea-
son is that a better deviation exists. The more profitable deviation equals the excluded
deviation except that the match, which would be made later for sure, is created imme-
diately. Because of discounting, this deviation has a higher value. It suffices to check
against the best deviation instead of all deviations.
Lemma 3. (Principle 3) In every state, deviations that create more than one mixed pair
do not have to be considered.
The reason is similar to the one of Principle 2. There exists another deviation which
is more profitable. The more profitable deviation exploits the supermodularity of the
match value function and creates one homogeneous pair of either type instead of two
mixed pairs.
In the next step, we apply the principles to all three candidate matching policies. For
each candidate we identify the set of states for which all deviations can be excluded.
Lemma 4. When the Positive Assortative Policy is the candidate, there is no need to verify
deviations on all states that contain more than two agents of the same type.
The proof consists of applying Principles 1 to 3 to the Positive Assortative Policy and
then combining them. By Principle 1, deviations that create a homogeneous pair do not
have to be checked. By Principle 2, deviations that leave more than one agent of the
same type in the market do not have to be checked. The application of Principle 3 to
the Positive Assortative Policy is straightforward.
Finally, we combine the applications of the principles: Consider a state with three
productive types. Principle 1 implies that there is no need to consider deviations that
match two productive types. Principle 2 states that we do not need to treat deviations
that leave two or more productive types unmatched. The only deviations left to con-
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sider match two or more productive types with unproductive ones. For those deviations,
Principle 2 applies. The proof for unproductive agents is analogous.
(1,0) (0, 1)
(2,0) (1, 1) (0, 2)
(3, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 3)
(4, 0) (3, 1) (2, 2) (1, 3) (0, 4)
(5, 0) (4, 1) (3, 2) (2, 3) (1, 4) (0, 5)
...
Figure 5. This graph represents the state space. It visualizes Lemmas 4, 5 and 6. Deviations on
states below the lines do not have to be verified. The red line corresponds to Lemma 4 and 5,
the green line to Lemma 6.
Lemma 5. When the Provident Impatient Policy is the candidate, there is no need to verify
deviations on all states that contain more than two agents of the same type.
The application of the three principles to the Provident Impatient Policy follows simi-
lar thoughts, even though there are differences. There are states in which the candidates
do not create homogeneous matches even though this is possible and in addition there
are states in which mixed matches are created.
Lemma 6. When the Myopic Impatient Policy is the candidate, there is no need to verify
deviations on all states that contain more than two productive agents or more than three
unproductive agents.
When the Myopic Impatient Policy is the candidate solution, the sets of remaining
states that are to be verified one by one is slightly larger than for the other two
candidates. The reason is that if two unproductive agents stay in the market, it might
happen that one of them is matched with a productive arrival in the next period. Hence,
the statement that two unproductive agents get matched in the next period anyways if
they are not matched, does not hold.
The deviations on the remaining states are verified one by one. Some deviations are
unprofitable only under certain conditions on parameters. These conditions define the
region of the parameter space in which a candidate is optimal. It turns out that these
regions constitute a partitioning of the entire parameter space. The condition mHL ≤
m1HL ensures that creating the mixed match in (1,1) is unprofitable if the candidate
is the Positive Assortative Policy. mHL ≥ m1HL ensures that creating the mixed match
in (1,1) is profitable if the candidate is the Provident Impatient Policy. m2HL takes the
corresponding role for the question whether to create the homogeneous match or the
mixed match in (1,2): If the candidate is the Provident Impatient Policy, the condition
mHL ≤ m2HL ensures that the homogeneous match is optimal, and if the candidate is
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the Myopic Impatient Policy, the condition mHL ≥ m2HL ensures that the mixed match is
value-maximizing.
2.3.2 Extension: Non-regular Case
In this extensionwe drop the assumptionmHH ≤ 3mLL . This means we allow for extreme
differences in the productivity of agents. When the value of unproductive agents is very
low compared to the value of productive agents, new matching policies can be optimal.
Optimality sometimes requires two unproductive agents to wait in the market, when
nobody else is in the market. Therefore we need to define a new class of matching
policies.
Definition 5. Matching Policy Pk
The Matching Policy Pk creates in each state (x , y) the maximal number of pairs of pro-
ductive agents. If x is uneven and y ≥ 1, one mixed matches is created. If a mixed match
is created, the maximal number of pairs from the pool of max{0, y − 1− k} unproductive
agents is formed. If no mixed match is created, the maximal number of pairs from the pool
of max{0, y − k} unproductive agents is formed.
Policy Pk has similarities to the Myopic Impatient Policy. The difference is that less
than the maximum number of homogeneous matches of unproductive agents is created.
When there are only unproductive agents in the market, the policy always keeps at least
k of them in the market. For example, Policy P1 creates no match in state (0, 2).
Proposition 1. For any given mLL ,mHH such that mHH > 3mLL , there exist parameter
constellations (p,δ,mHL) for which matching policy P1 is optimal.
In order to proof Proposition 1 we apply the same strategy as for proving Theorem
1. An application of the three principles reduces the verification to a finite set of states
on which deviations are verified by hand.
At first glance it might be surprising that it can be optimal to abstain from creating
the homogeneous match but to let two unproductive agents wait in the market. To gain
intuition for this result, we reconsider the two basic effects in the maximization problem.
Consider a situation in which the gain of assortative matching is very small such that the
sorting into matches is not decisive. The effect of the loss from deferring matches is then
to match agents early with priority given to productive agents. The implication, however,
requires careful consideration: Strong discounting does not only make it attractive to
match agents which are currently present in the market. It also provides incentives to lay
the foundation to quickly match productive agents which arrive in the future. The latter
can be achieved by storing an unproductive agent in the market such that a productive
agent that arrives in the future can be matched immediately upon arrival. If the value
of this availability exceeds the cost of deferring the match of two unproductive agents,
it is optimal to abstain from creating a match in order to keep an unproductive agent
as stock in the market. Proposition 1 states that there are parameter constellations for
which this does happen.
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Policy P1 is optimal when complementarities are low, the differences in the pro-
ductivity of agents are large, arrivals of productive agents are likely, and discounting is
intermediate. A prerequisite for Policy P1 to be optimal is that there is a strong prefer-
ence to match a single productive agent with an unproductive agent even if there are
two unproductive agents in the market. Therefore, the gain of assortative matching and
hence complementarities must be small. Under PolicyP1, two unproductive types incur
waiting costs in order to save the waiting cost of a potentially arriving productive type
in the future. This is optimal if the productive agent’s loss from waiting significantly
exceeds the unproductive agents’ loss, which is the case only for strong differences in
productivity. Furthermore, letting two unproductive agents wait in the market is only
optimal if the probability that it pays off, namely that a productive agent arrives in the
next period, is sufficiently high. Finally, Policy P1 is optimal for intermediate values of
δ. When discounting is very little, there is no desire to create mixed matches anyways
and clearly Policy P1 is not optimal. The smaller δ, the higher is the value of having
unproductive agents available when an productive agent arrives. This dominates the in-
creased cost of accumulating unproductive agents. However, when discounting is very
strong, Policy P1 is not optimal either: The designer does not care about the option to
match productive agents earlier, because the option only increases payoffs in the strongly
discounted future.
In Figure 6 we fix match values such that for each possible (p,δ) one of the
policies listed in Theorem 1 or the Policy P1 is optimal. The figure illustrates the
respective parameter regions (p,δ). The red and the blue line are δ1 and δ2 as before.
The black line depicts the boundary between the parameter regions on which the
Myopic Impatient Policy and Matching Policy P1 are optimal. Matching Policy P1 has
no boundary to the Provident Impatient Policy. PolicyP1 is optimal for large values of p.
Policy P1 is optimal for low levels of complementarity. Corollary 2 shows that the
monotonicity of optimal policies with respect to mHL extends to Matching Policy P1.





any parameter constellation (p,δ,mHH ,mLL) into R≥0 satisfying m3HL < 12(mLL +mHH)
and m2HL ≤ m3HL ≤ m4HL such that:
If mHL ≤ m1HL , the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal.
If mHL ∈ [m1HL ,m2HL], the Provident Impatient Policy is optimal.
If mHL ∈ [m2HL ,m3HL], the Myopic Impatient Policy is optimal.
If mHL ∈ [m3HL ,min{m4HL , 12(mLL +mHH)}], the Matching Policy P1 is optimal.
A consequence of Corollary 2 is that the condition mHH ≤ 3mLL is not only sufficient
for the statement of Theorem 1 to hold but also necessary.WhenevermHH > 3mLL , there
exist parameters (p,δ) such that none of the three matching policies from Theorem 1
is optimal if mHL =
1
2(mLL +mHH).
Note, that for some parameter constellations m4HL <
1
2(mLL +mHH). This may hap-
pen for some values of (p,δ) if the ratio mHH /mLL is extremely high and mHL is close
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Figure 6. Parameter choice: m(H,H)= 10,m(L, L)= 1,m(H, L)= 4.8. The black line depicts
the boundary between the parameter regions on which the Myopic Impatient Policy and
Matching Policy P1 are optimal. Matching Policy P1 has no boundary to the Provident Impatient
Policy.
to its upper limit. In that case none of the four matching policies is optimal. Following
the logic presented in this extension, our guess is that in these special cases it would
be optimal to hold even more than one unproductive agent on stock to prepare for the
case that several productive agents arrive to the market in row. Proposition 2 describes
an extreme case in which this stock is even infinite.
Proposition 2. Policy P∞ is optimal only if mLL = 0.
Policy P∞ never matches two unproductive agents. Potentially, it accumulates an
unbounded stock of unproductive agents. When two unproductive agents generate no
value, there is no loss of deferring homogeneous matches of unproductive agents. If in
addition the creation of mixed pairs is strictly profitable when a single productive agent
is in the market, Policy P∞ is uniquely optimal.
However, we show that apart from the extreme case mLL = 0, Policy P∞ is never
optimal: This means that generically Policy P∞ is not optimal. Hence, if a policy that
keeps unproductive agents on stock is optimal and there is a positive cost of waiting
with the agents, there is a maximum number of unproductive agents above which
two of them get matched. The reason for keeping k unproductive agents on stock is
to prepare for the event that k productive agents arrive in row. The probability for
this event is exponentially decreasing in k; the cost of holding an additional agent
on stock is, however, not decreasing in k. Therefore, at some number of agents the
additional cost from accumulating a larger stock exceeds the additional expected profit.
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The previous propositions have identified parameter constellations on which none of
the three initially introduced policies is optimal. Recall that we interpret the three match
values as describing the possible outcomes of a function that maps tuples of types (θ1,θ2)
into match values m(θ1,θ2). Despite the results of this extension, there is a large num-
ber of natural match value functions for which on each parameter constellation either
the Positive Assortative Policy, the Provident Impatient Policy, or the Myopic Impatient
Policy is optimal. An important functional form, which is regularly used to represent
complementarities in matching, is the product case.
Proposition 3. Assume m(θ1,θ2)= θ1 · θ2. For any values of H, L, p and δ one of the fol-
lowing matching policies is optimal: The Positive Assortative Policy, the Provident Impatient
Policy, or the Myopic Impatient Policy.
Note, that this result holds irrespective of the ratio H / L. This means that even when
the ratio is large such that mHH > 3mLL unproductive agents are never accumulated.
2.4 Incomplete Information and Implementation
In our model, agents are characterized by their productivity θ and their arrival time a.
In Section 2.3, we assumed that the designer can observe agents’ characteristics. We
now consider situations in which the designer cannot observe agents’ entry into the
market or their productivity, which are thus private information to the agents. There-
fore, the designer needs to elicit private information from agents. As the designer’s
and agents’ interests are not aligned, e.g. either type of agent wants to be assigned
a productive partner, the presence of private information gives rise to an incentive
problem. In this section we analyze ways of implementing the welfare-maximizing
policies under various information structures.
Henceforth, we assume that the match value is divided equally among the two
partners. This splitting-rule can be justified as the Nash Bargaining Solution: In our
model, the designer assigns two agents to a pair. Once the match is formed, both agents
leave the market and can not return. This implies that once they are matched, both
partners have an outside option of zero. If both agents have equal bargaining power,
they share the surplus of their cooperation, the match value, equally.23 We allow the
designer to use monetary transfers and assume that agents have quasilinear utility.
Thus, they maximize (half of the) match value minus payments.24 We study the market
beginning with the first arrival. Therefore, initially the market is in the recurrent set of
all optimal policies, and we may focus on the implementation of welfare-maximizing
policies. In particular, we only distinguish between the Positive Assortative Policy and
23 For a strong justification of uniform sharing rules in static settings see also Dizdar and Moldovanu
(2016).
24 Recall that agents discount the future.
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the Impatient Policy.
In the following, we will prove a possibility result for the implementation of the op-
timal policies. To strengthen this result, we consider a setting which impedes implemen-
tation. Firstly, we will impose strong requirements on the mechanism. Secondly, agents
will draw on a rich information structure, allowing for many deviations. Finally, regard-
ing the designer’s information, we assume that he does not observe arriving agents’
types. We consider both observable and unobservable arrivals.
2.4.1 Observable Arrivals
First, we analyze the case in which the designer observes arrivals. We consider direct
mechanisms in which agents report their type. Upon arrival, an agent observes the
past reports of all other agents in the market and reports his type. With a slight abuse
of notation we denote by S the set of agents that are already in the market and by
ΘS the vector containing their types. We adopt the convention to denote reported
types with hats. We call the vector ΘˆS market report. Given policy ρ, market report
ΘˆS , and an agent entering the market and reporting type θˆ , we denote the (random)
variable describing the type of that agent’s partner by θ˜ρ(ΘˆS ,θˆ) and the random variable
describing the time when the agent will be matched by tρ(ΘˆS ,θˆ). A mechanism maps the
market report into the allocation given by the welfare-maximizing policy and a payment.
We begin by stating the properties of the mechanism. We concentrate on mecha-
nisms that support efficient exit meaning that an agent who stops to affect current and
future matches also stops to receive and pay transfers.25 In particular, payments do not
condition on realized match values and agents cannot reveal their partner’s type to the
designer after being matched. This is in accordance with our interpretation that agents
leave the market after forming a group. Thus, we focus on payments τΘˆS(θˆ) that are
charged upon arrival and depend on the market report and the agent’s report.
We study direct mechanisms that have a truthful equilibrium in which welfare is
maximized. Agents arrive to the market, observe past reports of all agents in the market,
form Bayesian expectations with respect to the future, and maximize their utility given
that all other agents report truthfully. Observe that this notion of incentive compatibil-
ity coincides with interim incentive compatibility in Bergemann and Välimäki (2010).
Formally, the incentive compatibility constraints are given by:
1
2
E[e−r tρ(ΘS ,θ)m(θ˜ρ(ΘS ,θ),θ)] − τΘS (θ) ≥ 1
2
E[e−r tρ(ΘS ,θˆ)m(θ˜ρ(ΘS ,θˆ),θ)] − τΘS (θˆ), ∀θ , θˆ ,ΘS , (8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the partner’s type and the matching
time.26 There are other perceivable specifications of the agents’ information structure
25 See also Bergemann and Välimäki (2010). In the dynamic assignment literature an analogous condi-
tion is the requirement that mechanisms are online, cf. Gershkov and Moldovanu (2010).
26 As types do not change over time, (8) implies that the mechanism is periodic ex post incentive compat-
ible in the sense of Bergemann and Välimäki (2010). Thus, the mechanism exhibits the no-regret property
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in which agents observe only the number of reports, i.e., the number of agents in
the market, or do not observe reports at all. If the designer can implement the
welfare-maximizing policies under this information structure, he can implement the
welfare-maximizing policies under any information structure in which agents have less
information.27
As agents participate in the mechanism voluntarily, the following individual ratio-
nality constraints have to be satisfied
1
2
E[e−r tρ(ΘS ,θ)m(θ˜ρ(ΘS ,θ),θ)] − τΘS(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ,ΘS . (9)
Observe that (9) entails a strong notion of individual rationality because, in addi-
tion to observing his type, an agent also observes the market report before he decides
whether to participate.28
As last condition, we impose that the mechanism requires no external injection of
money:
τΘS(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ,ΘS (10)
i.e., all payments are positive, which implies that the mechanism runs no deficit at
any point in time.
Implementation in our setting is not straightforward. Consider the Positive Assor-
tative Policy: An agent that reports a productive type will be assigned a productive
partner; an agent that reports an unproductive type will be assigned an unproductive
partner. Consider an agent that arrives to a market with one productive agent and one
unproductive agent. This situation resembles the static model: Independently of his re-
port, the third agent will be matched immediately with a partner whose report coincides
with his report. Either type of arriving agent would like to form a group with the produc-
tive agent. Supermodularity of the match value is equivalent to increasing differences,
mHH −mHL ≥ mHL −mLL .29 Intuitively, increasing differences implies that amatchwith
a productive partner instead of a match with an unproductive partner is valued more
by a productive agent than by an unproductive agent. This gap allows the designer to
construct payments that make truthful revelation incentive compatible.30
with respect to past agents’ types. Also, as noted by Dizdar and Moldovanu (2016), ex post implementation
is intuitively closer to the complete information environment of traditional matching models.
27 See also Myerson (1986). For example, the designer can reveal any information that is missing to
agents and use the original mechanism.
28 As will become clear from the analysis below the outside option could be any sufficiently small positive
value.
29 This is the discrete analogon of the single-crossing property from mechanism design with continuous
types.
30 If the unproductive agent would have a larger incentive to report the productive type than the pro-
ductive agent, separation would be possible but would induce both types of agents to lie.
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Next, consider an agent that arrives to amarket with one unproductive agent. Report-
ing the productive type is less attractive because of the waiting costs incurred until the
arrival of the next productive agent. If he reports the unproductive type, he is matched
immediately. Therefore, in this case, supermodularity does not necessarily imply increas-
ing differences. The theorem below establishes that, despite these time constraints, the
optimal policy is implementable whenever it is welfare-maximizing.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is no general implementation result for our
environment as we have a dynamic setting with interdependent values, independent
types, and payments that satisfy efficient exit.31 Our positive implementation result is
also surprising in light of the impossibility result for implementing efficient allocations
in static settings with interdependent values, cf. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
Theorem 2. There exist payments such that the implementation of the welfare-maximizing
policies is incentive compatible, individual rational, runs no deficit, and supports efficient
exit.
Impatient Policy. If the designer observes arrivals, the implementation of the
Impatient Policy is straightforward. As the policy does not condition on the type but
matches every two consecutive agents, irrespective of their types, there is no need to
elicit agents’ private information. Hence, it is possible to set all payments equal to zero.
Furthermore, this is individual rational, runs no deficit, and satisfies efficient exit.
Positive Assortative Policy. In case of the Positive Assortative Policy, the situation
is more intricate as the agents’ report affects their match. It is useful to aggregate the
market report ΘS into a tuple. Under the Positive Assortative Policy there can be either
no agent (0,0), an agent with a productive report (1,0), an agent with an unproductive
report (0,1), or two agents with one productive and one unproductive report (1,1) in the
market. Denote by ∆θ (p,δ) the expected discount factor until the next arrival of type
θ . In accordance with our intuition, ∆θ (p,δ) is increasing in δ, ∆L(p,δ) is decreasing
in p, and ∆H(p,δ) is increasing in p.




∆H(p,δ)mHH − τ(0,1)(H) ≥ 12mHL − τ
(0,1)(L). (11)
Analogously, the incentive constraint for the unproductive type in (0,1) is
1
2
∆H(p,δ)mHL − τ(0,1)(H) ≤ 12mLL − τ
(0,1)(L). (12)
31 For settings with: (i) private values cf. Bergemann and Välimäki (2010), (ii) correlated types cf. Liu
(2014), and (iii) without efficient exit cf. Nath et al. (2015).
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∆H(p,δ)mHH − mHL ≥ ∆H(p,δ)mHL − mLL (14)
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an incentive compatible
payment pair in (0, 1).
Observe that the left side of (14) decreases quicker than the right side as the ex-
cepted discount factor decreases. Especially for low discount factors δ or low values of
p, (14) might be violated. Similarly, we can derive conditions for the existence of incen-
tive compatible payments for all other market reports, (0,0), (1,0), (1, 1). It turns out,
if (14) holds, the conditions for the other market reports are also satisfied. Comparing
(14) to the boundary of the Positive Assortative Policy (5), shows that for all parameters
for which the Positive Assortative Policy is welfare-maximizing (14) holds. Thus there
exist incentive compatible payments that satisfy efficient exit, for all market reports.
We proceed by charging the unproductive type the maximum individual rational
payment for all market reports,








Given the unproductive type’s payment, we choose, for every market report, the
maximal payment for the productive type such that the payment pair is incentive
compatible, cf. e.g. (13). Individual rationality of the unproductive type and incentive
compatibility of the productive type yield individual rationality for the productive type.
The proof concludes by verifying that all payments are positive.
The proof of Theorem 2 reveals that if positive assortative matching fails to be in-
centive compatible, it also fails to be welfare-maximizing. Intuitively, if (14) is violated,
the incentive for an unproductive agent to report the productive type is stronger than
the incentive for a productive agent. This means that an unproductive agent’s gain of
being matched with a productive agent instead of being matched with an unproductive
agent outweighs the respective loss for a productive agent. Then, it is plausible that it
is welfare-maximizing to create mixed matches.
Note that the mechanism constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 generates revenues:
Firstly, we set the unproductive type’s expected utility to zero for all market reports
by charging the highest payment that is individual rational. Secondly, we choose the
maximal incentive compatible payment for the productive type. By reducing payments,
the mechanism could account for more lucrative outside options.
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The payments of the unproductive type that implement the Positive Assortative Pol-
icy depend on the market report only through the presence or absence of an agent in
the market whose type coincides with the agent’s reported type. That is, payments are
equal for market reports (0,0), (1, 0) and for market reports (0,1), (1,1). This is a con-
sequence of the agent’s report fixing his (future) partner’s type and his expected waiting
costs under the Positive Assortative Policy.
2.4.2 Extension: Simple Payments
The payments that implement the Positive Assortative Policy in Theorem 2 depend on
the market report. In applications it is often desirable to use simple mechanisms that
condition on as few parameters as possible. In this section, we examine under which
conditions the Positive Assortative Policy is implementable with transfers that depend
solely on the reported type but not on the market report. We refer to these payments
as simple payments. In addition, this elucidates the relation of implementation of posi-
tive assortative matching in our dynamic model and in the static analogon. In the static
model payments condition only on the agent’s own report. Therefore, our analysis inves-
tigates when positive assortative matching can be implemented in the dynamic model
with “static” payments.
Proposition 4. The Positive Assortative Policy is implementable with simple payments if





This parameter region is a strict subset of the parameter region where the Positive Assorta-
tive Policy is optimal.
In Theorem 2 we proved that the conditions for the existence of incentive compat-
ible payment differences hold. However, the conditions differ across market reports.
Therefore, the main issue is to find a single payment pair (τ(H),τ(L)) that is incentive
compatible for all possible market reports. To this end, it is instructive to consider Figure
7. Rows correspond to market reports. The green part of each line marks the region
where payment differences are incentive compatible, whereas payment differences that
lie within the red region are not incentive compatible. We are looking for a payment
difference τ(H)−τ(L) which lies in the green interval across all market reports. As
the boundaries vary significantly with p and δ, existence of such a payment difference
is not guaranteed. As illustrated in Figure 7, the left boundary of market report (1,0)
and the right boundary of market report (0,1) are most restrictive. Intuitively, (1,0)
is the most attractive market report for reporting the productive type, whereas (0,1)
is the most attractive market report for reporting the unproductive type. Combining
these two conditions yields (17).
Observe that (4) holds as δ approaches one, that is, as the time friction vanishes.
This means that as the time constraints fades, we can draw on simple payments, which










Figure 7. Incentive compatible payment differences
reflect the payments used in the static model to implement the Positive Assortative Pol-
icy. Similarly, an increase in complementarities, i.e., a decrease in mHL , strengthens
the increasing differences property and thus allows for an implementation with simple
payments.
2.4.3 Extension: Asymmetric Match Value Splits
Hitherto, we assumed that partners share their match value equally. While this seems
intuitive if partners are homogeneous, i.e., have the same type, one can imagine other
sharing rules in case of mixed pairs.32 An appropriate sharing rule might alleviate the
incentive problem.33 This section investigates under which conditions there exists a shar-
ing rule which induces truthful revelation of types without further intervention, that is
to say, without incentivizing agents with payments. In the following, denote by α the
productive type’s share of the match value when he forms a group with an unproductive
type.
Proposition 5. There exists a share α such that the welfare-maximizing policies are im-
plementable without payments if and only if the welfare-maximizing policies are imple-
mentable with simple payments.
Recall that the implementation of the Impatient Policy in Theorem 2 is straight-
forward. Hence, we may concentrate on the Positive Assortative Policy. Consider the
incentive constraints for market report (0, 1). The productive agent reports truthfully if
1
2
∆H(p,δ)mHH ≥ αmHL . (18)
32 The precise way of how these “premuneration values” are determined may depend on the specific
legal or institutional environment and may lie beyond the designer’s control, see Mailath et al. (2015) for
an exhaustive discussion.
33 A different interpretation is that agents share the match value equally but the designer can prescribe
internal transfers within matched pairs.
40 | 2 Dynamic Formation of Teams
Analogously, the unproductive agent reports truthfully if
1
2
mLL ≥ (1 − α)∆H(p,δ)mHL . (19)
Observe that the incentive constraint of the productive agent gives an upper bound
on α, whereas the incentive constraint of the unproductive agent gives a lower bound
on α. We proceed similar for the remaining market reports. As in the previous section,
the most restrictive conditions arise in (1,0) and (0,1). In particular, (18) yields the




∆L(p,δ)mLL ≥ (1 − α)mHL (20)












Reformulating (21) shows that it coincides with (17), which concludes the proof.
To get some intuition for Proposition 5, we reformulate the crucial incentive con-
straints (18) and (20). The difference between the equal split and the α split can be
interpreted as a substitute for payments:
1
2












Recall that the boundaries on the difference of incentive compatible, simple pay-




∆H(p,δ)mHH ≥ 12mHL + (τ(H) − τ(L)), (24)
1
2
∆L(p,δ)mLL ≥ 12mHL − (τ(H) − τ(L)). (25)
Because α is contained in [0, 1], (22) and (23) provide less flexibility than (24)
and (25). The value that can be redistributed through a sharing rule is bounded by the
total match value that is generated in the mixed match, whereas there is no bound
on the payment difference. Hence, if there exists an incentive compatible sharing rule,
we can also find an incentive compatible, simple payment difference. Proposition 5
states, however, that the converse is true as well. A conclusion is that for any incentive
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compatible pair of simple payments, the payment difference never exceeds the total
match value. Put differently, incentive compatibility does not require extreme transfer
differences.
Inequality (20) implies that for any incentive compatible sharing rule α, it holds
α > 12 , i.e., the productive type receives a larger share of the match value when he forms
a group with an unproductive type. In the Positive Assortative Policy, the mixed group
never occurs on path. Thus, changes in the sharing rule only affect the attractiveness of
deviations. When the market consists of one productive agent, an unproductive agent’s
misreport increases the match value that he creates with his partner from mLL to mHL
and reduces the time until he is matched. Consequently, in the absence of payments,
truth-telling is incentive compatible only if the unproductive agent’s share of the output
is lower when being matched with an productive agent. Under the condition identified
in Proposition 5, also the productive agent’s incentive constraints are satisfied, even
though he receives a larger share of the match value when misreporting. The reason is
that for the productive agent the total value that is shared is smaller if he misreports.
2.4.4 Unobservable Arrivals
Depending on the organizational details of the market, the designer might not observe
agents’ arrivals to the market. Instead, agents report their arrival to the designer. Given
the welfare-maximizing policies, agents may want to exploit this additional source
of private information by strategically delaying their arrival report. We maintain the
assumption of private types. This renders implementation of the welfare-maximizing
policy a multidimensional screening problem. The current section examines conditions
under which the designer can overcome this additional challenge and implement the
welfare-maximizing policies.
As in Section 2.4.1, we give arriving agents the informational advantage of past
reports being public. We focus on incentive compatible, individual rational, direct mech-
anisms that run no deficit, satisfy efficient exit, and implement the welfare-maximizing
policies. We modify the market report to contain the reported types of all agents in the
market that have reported their type and arrival. We construct payments that depend
on the reported type, the market report, and the reported arrival time. Agents can
report their arrival only after actually arriving to the market, and only agents who have
reported their arrival may report their type.
Because of substantially different issues, we discuss the Positive Assortative Policy
and the Impatient Policy separately.
Positive Assortative Policy. When type spaces have more than one dimension, in-
centive constraints pose a severe challenge to the design of incentive compatible mecha-
nisms as one has to account for double deviations, i.e., deviations in several dimensions
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at the same time. Surprisingly, the mechanism constructed in the proof of Theorem 2
also implements the Positive Assortative Policy with unobservable arrivals.
Proposition 6. There exists an incentive compatible, individual rational mechanism that
runs no deficit, supports efficient exit, and implements the Positive Assortative Policy when
both, arrivals and types, are private information to the agents.
Proof. To prove Proposition 6, we show that agents report their type truthfully and
that also the timing of the report remains unchanged, which means that agents reveal
their arrival immediately, i.e., truthfully.
We naturally adjust the payments constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 to account
for the two-dimensional type space: If an agent reveals his arrival and his type at the
same time, payments are as in the proof of Theorem 2. If an agent reveals his arrival
strictly before his type, he is punished by a payment of mHH .
To tackle the issue of double deviations in the framework of our model, we divide
the problem of showing incentive compatibility into two steps:
(i) First, we show that whenever agents report their type, they report truthfully.
(ii) Second, we argue that given agents report their type truthfully, agents report their
arrival time truthfully.
By the memorylessness of the Poisson process, the incentive problem faced by
an agent at an arbitrary point in time is the same as the incentive problem at the
time of the last arrival. This latter problem, however, resembles the incentive problem
with observable arrivals. As the payments solve the incentive problem with observable
arrivals, we deduce that (i) holds.
Now, we prove (ii). Given our specification of payments, agents report arrival time
and type simultaneously. By the first step, agents report their type truthfully. It remains
to be shown that agents want to report their arrival as early as possible. Under the
Positive Assortative Policy, an agent’s report fixes his match partner’s type. The agent’s
partner is, depending on the market report, either an agent with the same type that
is already in the market, or the next agent of his type that arrives to the market. By
memorylessness of the Poisson process, delaying an arrival may only be profitable for
an agent if the market report changes compared to the market report at the arrival time.
By our choice of payments, the unproductive type receives zero expected utility upon
arrival for every market report. Therefore, it is an optimal strategy for the unproductive
agent to report his arrival time truthfully. Given our payments, the expected utility of a
productive type at the point of his arrival is ∆L(p,δ) (mHL −mLL) for market reports
(0,0) and (1, 0), and mHL −mLL for market reports (0,1) and (1, 1). We see that the
productive agent’s expected utility is highest if an unproductive agent is already in the
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market. Thus, if the productive agent arrives in (1, 1) or (0, 1), he reports his arrival
immediately. On the other hand, if the productive agent arrives in (0,0) or (1,0), he
might consider waiting for the arrival of an unproductive agent before he reports his
arrival to get a higher level of expected utility. Yet, the waiting time until the next
arrival of an unproductive agent discounts future payoffs with an expected discount
factor of at least ∆L(p,δ) thereby mitigating the advantage of waiting. Hence, also in
(0,0) and (1, 0) it is unprofitable for the productive type to delay his arrival report.34
This concludes the proof of Step (ii).
Jointly, (i) and (ii) imply that the Positive Assortative Policy together with our
payments is incentive compatible even when arrivals are unobservable. Individual
rationality, no deficit, and efficient exit remain satisfied, completing the construction
of the mechanism. 
Impatient Policy. Implementing the Impatient Policy in a market where the
designer can observe arrivals turned out to be straightforward. As the designer may
ignore agents’ private information to implement the Impatient Policy, he can abstain
from using payments. Yet, if the designer cannot observe agents’ arrivals, information
relevant for implementing the welfare-maximizing policies, implementation of the
Impatient Policy becomes more difficult.
In contrast to the Positive Assortative Policy, the agent’s reported type does not fix
his match partner’s type in the Impatient Policy. The agent’s partner is, depending on
the market report, either the only agent that is present in the market or the next agent
that arrives to the market, irrespective of his type. If the designer asks an agent for
his type, future agents may condition their reporting strategy on that report. Consider,
for example, a productive agent that arrives to a market with one agent that has
reported an unproductive type. If the productive agent reveals his arrival immediately,
he will form a group with the unproductive agent. If the productive agent delays his
arrival report until after the next arrival, he has the opportunity to be matched with
a productive agent. Therefore, depending on the parameter constellation, it might be
profitable for the productive agent to delay his arrival report.
The designer can circumvent this problem by separating the agents’ arrival report
from their type report. To implement the Impatient Policy, the designer only needs
agents’ arrival times but not their types. If the designer asks agents only for their arrival
time, future agents only observe arrival reports. Given that agents only observe arrival
reports, it is optimal for the agents to report their arrival as early as possible, i.e.,
34 To avoid issues with large states that occur because several agents report their arrival simultaneously,
we punish agents reporting the same arrival time with a sufficiently high payment, say,mHH . In equilibrium
this entails no welfare loss. The deviations checked are, thus, an upper bound for the most profitable
deviation.
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truthfully. Therefore, anticipating the agents’ informational advantage from reported
types, the designer strategically chooses not to ask the agents for their type in order to
implement the Impatient Policy.
Combining the insights of the last two sections, we find that even if the designer does
not observe arrivals to the market, the welfare-maximizing policies are implementable.
2.4.5 Concluding Remarks
Remark 1. When implementing the Impatient Policy with unobservable arrivals, we
demonstrated that it can be beneficial for the designer to strategically not ask agents
for their type. Transferring this thought, we can construct another mechanism which
implements the Positive Assortative Policy with observable arrivals. As opposed to
the Impatient Policy, the Positive Assortative Policy exploits information about agents’
types; there exists exactly one situation in which the designer does not need this
information upon an agent’s arrival: When an agent arrives to an empty market. In
this case, the designer needs the agent’s information only upon arrival of the next
agent, as there is no decision to be taken beforehand. Thus, the designer could set up a
mechanism in which an agent that arrives to an empty market does not report his type
immediately but only upon arrival of the next agent. The difference to the mechanism
studied in Section 2.4.1 is that the second agent arriving to the market does not know
the first agent’s type. Recall that the most critical situation when implementing the
Positive Assortative Policy in Section 2.4.1 arose when the market consisted of one
unproductive agent and for small values of p. Under the new mechanism, the subtle
difference is that in this situation the second agent does not know that the first agent
is unproductive but attaches a high probability to this event.
Remark 2. Observe that throughout Section 2.4 we did not use the assumption
of Section 2.3 that the value of the productive pair is not too large compared to the
value of the unproductive pair. Hence, our implementation results carry over to the
case mHH > 3mLL whenever the Positive Assortative Policy and the Impatient Policy are
welfare-maximizing.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies a dynamic matching market organized by a central authority.
Agents of different types that arrive to the market according to a discrete process are
matched by a social planner. The model is flexible with respect to four key features: The
degree of complementarity of the partners’ characteristics in the match value function,
the relative size of absolute values of output generated by the two possible homoge-
neous matchings, the probability distribution of arriving agents’ types and the patience
represented by discounting. In the first part of this chapter, we address the optimal
matching policies under complete information. We develop a tool that helps us to solve
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for the optimal matching policy in closed form without imposing any restriction on the
policy. Whenever the agents’ productivities do not differ too much, one of three policies
is optimal: The Positive Assortative Policy, the Provident Impatient Policy, or the My-
opic Impatient Policy. The social planner is more willing to abstain from creating mixed
matches in order to wait for positive assortative matchings when discounting is weak or
complementarities are strong. This has two immediate implications: a) the optimality of
positive assortative matchings in static matching is robust to small discounting frictions,
and b) when mixed matches are created because of impatience in models of search
and matching, this might be welfare-enhancing. The role of the distribution of arriving
agents’ types is more sophisticated: The designer might abstain from mixed matches
only for intermediate probabilities of productive arrivals. When the match value of two
productive agents exceeds by far the match value of the unproductive counterpart, it
is sometimes optimal to stock unproductive agents in the market in order to ensure
that arriving productive agents can get paired immediately. In the second part of this
chapter, we consider implementability of the optimal policy in the presence of private
information. We prove implementability of the optimal matching policy when agents
have private information about their types and can hide their arrival to the market. We
show that if the complementarity of the match value function is sufficiently strong or the
environment is sufficiently patient, the welfare-maximizing policy can be implemented
with payments that are reminiscent of those that implement the welfare-maximizing
policy in the static model. Finally, we identify situations in which the market organizer
can abstain from using monetary incentives.
The simple structure of our model helps to expose the trade-off between accumulating
agents to achieve positive assortative matchings and matching agents early in order to
avoid waiting costs. We conjecture that the State Space Reduction developed in this
chapter can also be employed to find optimal policies in the extended model with an
arbitrary but finite number of types. While we focus on a supermodular match value,
we conjecture that in the submodular case it is optimal to form exclusively mixed pairs
as the time friction vanishes. Therefore, policies which store homogeneous groups of
both productive and unproductive agents might be optimal. Analyzing a model with
a continuum of types, but discrete arrivals, would allow for a more detailed compari-
son between the centralized matching market and decentralized search and matching
models. This is an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendix 2.A Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1 uses Lemma 1 to 6, which are, hence, proven first.
Preliminaries for Lemma 1 to 3. We denote the candidate policy by ρ, fix an arbi-
trary state (x , y) ∈ S, and denote by d = (dHH , dHL , dLL) a one-period deviation that
matches on (x , y) dHH homogeneous pairs of productive agents, dHL mixed pairs, and
dLL homogeneous pairs of unproductive agents. The value of ρ on (x , y) can be written
as
Vρ(x , y) = ρ
HH(x , y)mHH+ρ
HL(x , y)mHL + ρ
LL(x , y)mLL
+δ[pVρ(x
′ + 1, y ′) + (1 − p)Vρ(x ′, y ′ + 1)] (26)
with
x ′ = x − 2ρHH(x , y) − ρHL(x , y), y ′ = y − 2ρLL(x , y) − ρHL(x , y).
Similarly, the value of deviation d from ρ on (x , y) can be expressed as
V dρ (x , y) = dHHmHH+dHLmHL + dLLmLL
+δ[pVρ(x
′′ + 1, y ′′) + (1 − p)Vρ(x ′′, y ′′ + 1)] (27)
with
x ′′ = x − 2dHH(x , y) − dHL(x , y), y ′′ = y − 2dLL(x , y) − dHL(x , y).
In each of the Lemmas we will argue that the value of ρ exceeds the value of a certain
class of deviations.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that ρHH(x , y)> 0 and dHH > 0. Subtracting mHH from
Vρ(x , y) and V
d
ρ (x , y), we observe that the deviation is unprofitable if and only if
(ρHH(x , y) − 1)mHH + ρHL(x , y)mHL + ρLL(x , y)mLL + Vρ(x ′, y ′) (28)
≥ (dHH − 1)mHH + dHLmHL + dLLmLL + δ[pVρ(x ′′ + 1, y ′′) + (1 − p)Vρ(x ′′, y ′′ + 1)].
By consistency the left hand side of the above inequality coincides with Vρ(x − 2, y).
As the deviation dHH − 1, dHL , and dLL is feasible on (x − 2, y), (28) describes a
deviation from ρ on (x − 2, y). Given that no deviation is profitable on smaller
states, the inequality holds. Thus, deviation (dHH , dHL , dLL) is not profitable on (x , y)
either. The proof is analogous for the casesρHL(x , y), dHL > 0 andρ
LL(x , y), dLL > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a deviation (dHH , dHL , dLL) such that ρ
HH(x ′′ +
1, y ′′)> 0 and ρHH(x ′′, y ′′ + 1)> 0. The proof constructs an auxiliary deviation d ′ =
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(d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL) on (x , y) with V d
′
ρ (x , y)≥ V dρ (x , y). Hence, if (d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL) is not
profitable, then (dHH , dHL , dLL) is not profitable either.
Set (d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL)= (dHH + 1, dHL , dLL). By our choice of (dHH , dHL , dLL),
(d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL) is feasible. From consistency of ρ, ρHH(x ′′ + 1, y ′′)> 0,
and ρHH(x ′′, y ′′ + 1)> 0 follows Vρ(x ′′ + 1, y ′′)= mHH + Vρ(x ′′ − 1, y ′′) and
Vρ(x
′′, y ′′ + 1)= mHH + Vρ(x ′′ − 2, y ′′ + 1). Together with δ < 1 this implies for
V dρ (x , y):
dHHmHH + dHLmHL + dLLmLL + δmHH
+ δ[pVρ(x
′′ − 1, y ′′) + (1 − p)Vρ(x ′′ − 2, y ′′ + 1)]
< (dHH + 1)mHH + dHLmHL + dLLmLL
+ δ[pVρ(x
′′ − 1, y ′′) + (1 − p)Vρ(x ′′ − 2, y ′′ + 1)].
We conclude by observing that the latter term is V d
′
ρ (x , y). The two remaining cases
ρHL(x ′′ + 1, y ′′), ρHL(x ′′, y ′′ + 1)> 0 and ρLL(x ′′ + 1, y ′′), ρLL(x ′′, y ′′ + 1)> 0
follow from an analogous argument. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a deviation (dHH , dHL , dLL) with dHL ≥ 2. As in Lemma 2,
we construct an auxiliary deviation d ′ = (d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL) with higher value.
Set (d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL)= (dHH + 1, dHL − 2, dLL + 1). (d ′HH , d ′HL , d ′LL) is feasible because
(dHH , dHL , dLL) is feasible. As next period states are identical under both deviations,
V d
′
ρ (x , y)− V dρ (x , y)= mHH +mLL − 2mHL ≥ 0, where the inequality follows from the
supermodularity of the match value function. Thus, V d
′
ρ (x , y)≥ V dρ (x , y). 
Proof of Lemma 4. By construction, the Positive Assortative Policy ρPAP is consistent.
Fix a state (x , y) with x ≥ 3 and consider a deviation (dHH , dHL , dLL) on (x , y). As
ρHHPAP(x , y)> 0, only deviations with dHH = 0 have to be verified by Lemma 1. Subse-
quent to following (dHH , dHL , dLL) there are at least x − 2dHH − dHL productive agents
in the market after the next arrival. As ρHHPAP(x
′, y ′)> 0, ∀x ′ ≥ 2, only deviations with
x − 2dHH − dHL < 2 have to be checked by Lemma 2. By Lemma 3, only deviations
with dHL < 2 have to be checked. As x ≥ 3, the set of deviations satisfying the latter
three conditions is empty, i.e., no deviation on (x , y) with x ≥ 3 has to be checked.
Similarly, no deviation on (x , y) with y ≥ 3 has to be checked. 
Proof of Lemma 5. As all arguments used for the Positive Assortative Policy ρPAP also
apply to the Provident Impatient Policy ρPI P , the proof is exactly the same as the proof
of Lemma 4. 
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Proof of Lemma 6. By construction, the Myopic Impatient Policy ρMIP is consistent.
The proof for states (x , y) with x ≥ 3 parallels the proof of Lemma 4. For states with
many unproductive agents, however, we need to alter the argument slightly. When
applying Lemma 2, we can only exclude deviations with y − 2dLL − dHL ≥ 3 because
ρLLM IP(x
′, y ′)> 0 holds only ∀y ′ ≥ 3. We can apply Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 as before.
Thus, no deviation has to checked on states (x , y) with y ≥ 4. 
Proof of Theorem 1. For each candidate policy, Lemmas 4 to 6 identify the set of states
on which every possible deviation has to be verified for its unprofitability by hand. As
is shown in the following, for all parameter constellations (p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) such
that mHL /∈ {m1HL ,m2HL}, deviations from the respective candidate policy give a strictly
lower payoff. This implies uniqueness of the optimal policy.
Claim 1: The Positive Assortative Policy is optimal for all parameter constellations
(p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) such that mHL ≤ m1HL .
The value function VPAP at states in the recurrent set is determined by the following
equations:
VPAP(1,0) =δ[pVPAP(2, 0) + (1 − p)VPAP(1,1)], (29)
VPAP(0,1) =δ[pVPAP(1, 1) + (1 − p)VPAP(0,2)], (30)
VPAP(1,1) =δ[pVPAP(2, 1) + (1 − p)VPAP(1,2)], (31)
VPAP(2,0) =mHH + δ[pVPAP(1,0) + (1 − p)VPAP(0,1)], (32)
VPAP(0, 2) =mLL + δ[pVPAP(1, 0) + (1 − p)VPAP(0, 1)], (33)
VPAP(2,1) =mHH + δ[pVPAP(1,1) + (1 − p)VPAP(0,2)], (34)
VPAP(1,2) =mLL + δ[pVPAP(2, 0) + (1 − p)VPAP(1, 1)]. (35)
Define VPAP(0, 0) := δ[pVPAP(1, 0)+ (1− p)VPAP(0, 1)]. The value at all remaining
states (x , y) is given by
VPAP(x , y) =ρ
HH
PAP(x , y) + ρ
LL
PAP(x , y) + ρ
HL
PAP(x , y) + VPAP(x
′, y ′)
with x ′ = x − 2ρHHPAP(x , y) − ρHLPAP(x , y) < 2
and y ′ = y − 2ρLLPAP(x , y) − ρHLPAP(x , y) < 2.
Observe that this determines VPAP(x , y) uniquely on the entire state space. By Lemma
4, the set of states on which the unprofitability of deviations has to be verified is
{(x , y)|x ≤ 2, y ≤ 2, x + y ≥ 2)}.35
35Note that on states (1,0) and (0,1) there is no possible deviation and hence no profitable deviation.
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On states (2, 0) and (0, 2) the only possible deviation is (dHH , dHL , dLL)= (0,0, 0). In
both states this deviation does not have to be considered by Lemma 2.
On state (1,2) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
VPAP(1, 2) = mLL + VPAP(1, 0) ≥ mHL + VPAP(0, 1). (36)
On state (2,1) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
VPAP(2, 1) = mHH + VPAP(0,1) ≥ mHL + VPAP(1,0). (37)
On state (2,2) there are five possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
and (0, 2, 0). Deviations (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) do not have to be considered
by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 2, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviation
(0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
VPAP(2, 2) = mHH + mLL + VPAP(0,0) ≥ mHL + VPAP(1,1). (38)
On state (1,1) there is one possible deviation, which is (0, 1, 0). The condition for
deviation (0, 1, 0) to be unprofitable is
VPAP(1,1) ≥ mHL + VPAP(0,0). (39)
The final step is to observe that inequalities (36) to (39) hold if and only if mHL ≤ m1HL ,
in particular, (39) corresponds exactly to mHL ≤ m1HL . For computational details see
Appendix 2.B.
Claim 2: The Provident Impatient Policy is optimal for all parameter constellations
(p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) such that m
1
HL ≤ mHL ≤ m2HL .
The value function VPI P at states in the recurrent set is given by the following equations:
VPI P(1,0) =δ[pVPI P(2, 0) + (1 − p)VPI P(1,1)], (40)
VPI P(0,1) =δ[pVPI P(1, 1) + (1 − p)VPI P(0,2)], (41)
VPI P(1,1) =mHL + δ[pVPI P(1, 0) + (1 − p)VPI P(0,1)], (42)
VPI P(2,0) =mHH + δ[pVPI P(1,0) + (1 − p)VPI P(0, 1)], (43)
VPI P(0, 2) =mLL + δ[pVPI P(1, 0) + (1 − p)VPI P(0,1)]. (44)
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Define VPI P(0, 0) := δ[pVPI P(1,0)+ (1− p)VPI P(0,1)]. The value at all remaining
states (x , y) is determined as follows:
VPI P(x , y) =ρ
HH
PIP(x , y) + ρ
LL
P I P(x , y) + ρ
HL
PIP(x , y) + VPI P(x
′, y ′)
with x ′ = x − 2ρHHPIP(x , y) − ρHLPIP(x , y) < 2
and y ′ = y − 2ρLLP I P(x , y) − ρHLPIP(x , y) < 2.
Solving the system gives
VPI P(0, 0) =
δ2
1 − δ2 [(p
2 + (1 − p)2)mHL + (1 − p)p(mHH + mLL)], (45)
VPI P(1, 0) =δVPI P(0, 0) + δ(pmHH + (1 − p)mHL), (46)
VPI P(0, 1) =δVPI P(0, 0) + δ(pmHL + (1 − p)mLL), (47)
VPI P(1, 1) =mHL + δVPI P(0, 0), (48)
VPI P(2, 0) =mHH + δVPI P(0,0), (49)
VPI P(0, 2) =mLL + δVPI P(0,0). (50)
By Lemma 5, the set of states on which the unprofitability of deviations has to be
verified is {(x , y)|x ≤ 2, y ≤ 2, x + y ≥ 2)}.
On states (2, 0) and (0, 2) the only possible deviation is (dHH , dHL , dLL)= (0,0, 0). In
both states this deviation does not have to be considered by Lemma 2.
On state (2,1) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. The inequality corresponding to
deviation (0, 1, 0) is
VPI P(2, 1) = mHH + VPI P(0, 1) ≥ mHL + VPI P(1,0). (51)
On state (2,2) there are five possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
and (0, 2, 0). Deviations (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) do not have to be considered
by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 2, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviation
(0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
mHH + mLL + VPI P(0,0) ≥ mHL + δ[pVPI P(2, 1) + (1 − p)VPI P(1,2)]. (52)
On state (1,1) there is one possible deviation, which is (0, 0, 0). The condition for
deviation (0, 0, 0) to be not profitable is
VPI P(1, 1) = mHL + VPI P(0,0) ≥ δ[pVPI P(2, 1) + (1 − p)VPI P(1,2)]. (53)
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On state (1,2) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
VPI P(1,2) = mLL + VPI P(1,0) ≥ mHL + VPI P(0, 1). (54)
The final step is to show that inequalities (51) to (54) hold if and only if
m1HL ≤ mHL ≤ m2HL . Inserting the explicit solution for VPI P into (53) and solving
for mHL shows that (53) corresponds to mHL ≥ m1HL . Similarly, (54) yields mHL ≤ m2HL .
See Appendix 2.B for calculatory details.
Claim 3: The Myopic Impatient Policy is optimal for all parameter constellations
(p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) such that mHL ≥ m2HL .
TheMyopic Impatient Policy has the same recurrent set as the Provident Impatient Policy,
R := {(x , y)|1≤ x + y ≤ 2}. Define VMIP(0, 0) := δ[pVMIP(1,0)+ (1− p)VMIP(0,1)].
By construction, ρMIP(x , y)= ρPI P(x , y), ∀(x , y) ∈ R, hence, VMIP(x , y)= VPI P(x , y),
∀(x , y) ∈ R with explicit solution (45) to (50). At all remaining states (x , y) the value
is given by
VMIP(x , y) =ρ
HH
MIP(x , y) + ρ
LL
M IP(x , y) + ρ
HL
MIP(x , y) + VMIP(x
′, y ′)
with x ′ = x − 2ρHHMIP(x , y) − ρHLMIP(x , y) < 2
and y ′ = y − 2ρLLM IP(x , y) − ρHLMIP(x , y) < 2.
By Lemma 6, the set of states on which the unprofitability of deviations has to be
verified is {(x , y)|x ≤ 2, y ≤ 3, x + y ≥ 2)}.
On state (2,0) the only possible deviation is (dHH , dHL , dLL)= (0,0, 0). This deviation
does not have to be considered by Lemma 2.
On state (2,1) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable
either: The corresponding inequality is
VMIP(2,1) = mHH + VMIP(0,1) ≥ mHL + VMIP(1,0). (55)
As VMIP(0, 1)= VPI P(0, 1) and VMIP(1,0)= VPI P(1,0), (55) equals (51) which holds.
On state (1,1) the only possible deviation is (0, 0, 0) which is unprofitable if
VMIP(1, 1) = mHL + VMIP(0,0) ≥ δ[pVMIP(2, 1) + (1 − p)VMIP(1,2)]. (56)
On state (2,2) there are five possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
and (0, 2, 0). Deviations (0, 0, 0), and (1, 0, 0) do not have to be considered by Lemma
2. Deviation (0, 2, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviation (0, 0, 1)
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does not have to be considered by Lemma 1. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
mHH + mLL + VMIP(0, 0) ≥ mHL + δ[pVMIP(2,1) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 2)]. (57)
On state (0, 3) the only possible deviation is (0, 0, 0) which does not have to be consid-
ered by Lemma 2.
On state (1,3) there are three possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0).
Deviations (0, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0) do not have to be considered by Lemma 1. Deviation
(0, 0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2.
On state (2,3) there are five possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
and (0, 2, 0). Deviations (0, 0, 0), and (1, 0, 0) do not have to be considered by Lemma
2. Deviation (0, 2, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviation (0, 0, 1)
does not have to be considered by Lemma 1. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
mHH + mLL + VMIP(0, 1) ≥ mHL + δ[pVMIP(2,2) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 3)]. (58)
On state (0,2) the only possible deviation is (0, 0, 0) which is unprofitable if
VMIP(0, 2) = mLL + VMIP(0, 0) ≥ δ[pVMIP(1,2) + (1 − p)VMIP(0, 3)]. (59)
On state (1,2) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1). Deviation (0,
0, 1) is not profitable if
mHL + VMIP(0, 1) ≥ mLL + VMIP(1, 0), (60)
and deviation (0, 0, 0) is not profitable if
mHL + VMIP(0, 1) ≥ δ[pVMIP(2,2) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 3)]. (61)
The final step is to show that inequalities (56) to (61) hold if and only if mHL ≥ m2HL .
Using the explicit solution for VMIP and solving for mHL , we find that (60) is equivalent
to mHL ≥ m2HL and that (59) corresponds to mHL ≤ m3HL . Supporting calculations can
be found in Appendix 2.B.
To conclude the proof, observe that mHL ≤ m3HL for all p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL such that
mHH ≤ 3mLL . Thus, the parameter regions on which the three candidates are optimal
span the entire parameter space. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The existence of two cut-off levels follows from showing that
∂m1HL
∂ δ ≥ 0 and ∂m
2
HL
∂ δ ≥ 0, independent of the specific choice of parameters. Using the
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definitions of m1HL and m
2





[1 − δ(1 − 2p)]2 + mLL
1 − p






[1 − δ(1 − 2p)]2 + mLL
−p
[1 − δ(1 − 2p)]2
>mHH
p
[1 − δ(1 − 2p)]2 + mHH
−p
[1 − δ(1 − 2p)]2 = 0.
Furthermore, m1HL < m
2
HL implies δ
1 > δ2. Finally, m1HL = m
2
HL = 0 for δ = 0 and
m1HL = m
2
HL = 1/2(mHH +mLL) for δ = 1 and imply δ
1,δ2 ∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We follow the same steps as for the other candidate policies
above. Denote Matching Policy P1 by ρP1.
Claim 1: To verify candidate policy ρP1 it is sufficient to verify deviations on
{(x , y)|x ≤ 2, y ≤ 4, x + y ≥ 2)}.
By construction, ρP1 is consistent. For states (x , y) with x ≥ 3 the argument is the
same as in Lemma 4. Analogously to Lemma 6, we need to adjust the proof slightly for
states with many unproductive agents when applying Lemma 2. In this case, we can
only exclude deviations on states (x , y) with y ≥ 5.
Claim 2: There exists a parameter region on which there is no profitable deviation from
ρP1 on {(x , y)|x ≤ 2, y ≤ 4, x + y ≥ 2)}.
Define VP1(0,0) := δ[pVP1(1, 0)+ (1− p)VP1(0,1)]. The value function VP1 at states in
the recurrent set is determined by
VP1(1, 0) =δ[pVP1(2,0) + (1 − p)VP1(1, 1)], (62)
VP1(0, 1) =δ[pVP1(1,1) + (1 − p)VP1(0, 2)] (63)
VP1(1, 1) =mHL + δ[pVP1(1,0) + (1 − p)VP1(0,1)], (64)
VP1(2, 0) =mHH + δ[pVP1(1, 0) + (1 − p)VP1(0,1)], (65)
VP1(0, 2) =δ[pVP1(1,2) + (1 − p)VP1(0,3)], (66)
VP1(0, 3) =mLL + δ[pVP1(1,1) + (1 − p)VP1(0, 2)], (67)
VP1(1, 2) =mHL + δ[pVP1(1,2) + (1 − p)VP1(0,3)]. (68)
56 | 2 Dynamic Formation of Teams
The value at all remaining states (x , y) is
VP1(x , y) =ρ
HH
P1 (x , y) + ρ
LL
P1(x , y) + ρ
HL
P1 (x , y) + VP1(x
′, y ′)
with x ′ = x − 2ρHHP1 (x , y) − ρHLP1 (x , y) < 2
and y ′ = y − 2ρLLP1(x , y) − ρHLP1 (x , y) < 3.
On state (2,0) the only possible deviation is (dHH , dHL , dLL)= (0,0, 0) which does not
have to be considered by Lemma 2.
On state (2, 1) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
VP1(2,1) = mHH + VP1(0,1) ≥ mHL + VP1(1, 0). (69)
On state (1,1) the only possible deviation is (0, 0, 0) which is unprofitable if
VP1(1,1) = mHL + VP1(0, 0) ≥ δ[pVP1(2, 1) + (1 − p)VP1(1,2)]. (70)
On state (2, 2) there are five possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1)
and (0, 2, 0). Deviation (0, 0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation
(0, 2, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviations (0, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 1)
do not have to be considered by Lemma 1. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
mHH + mLL + VP1(0,0) ≥ mHL + δ[pVP1(2,1) + (1 − p)VP1(1, 2)]. (71)
On state (0, 3) the only possible deviation is (0, 0, 0) which is unprofitable if
VP1(0, 3) = mLL + VP1(0,1) ≥ δ[pVP1(1,3) + (1 − p)VP1(0, 4)]. (72)
On state (1, 3) there are three possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1).
Deviation (0, 1, 1) does not have to be considered by Lemma 1. Deviation (0, 0, 0) does
not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 0, 1) is not profitable if
mHL + VP1(0,2) ≥ mLL + δ[pVP1(2, 1) + (1 − p)VP1(1, 2)]. (73)
On state (0, 2) the only possible deviation is (0, 0, 1) which is unprofitable if
VP1(0, 2) = δ[pVP1(1, 2) + (1 − p)VP1(0,3)] ≥ mLL + VP1(0, 0). (74)
On state (1, 2) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1). Deviation (0,
0, 1) is not profitable if
mHL + VP1(1,0) ≥ mLL + VP1(1, 0), (75)
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and deviation (0, 0, 0) is not profitable if
mHL + VP1(0,1) ≥ δ[pVP1(2,2) + (1 − p)VP1(1,3)]. (76)
On state (2,3) there are five possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
and (0, 2, 0). Deviation (0, 0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation
(0, 2, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviations (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1)
do not have to be considered by Lemma 1. Deviation (0, 1, 0) is not profitable if
mHH + mLL + VP1(0,1) ≥ mHL + δ[pVP1(2,2) + (1 − p)VP1(1,3)]. (77)
On state (0,4) there are two possible deviations: (0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 2). Deviation (0,
0, 0) does not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviation (0, 0, 2) does not have to
be considered by Lemma 1.
On state (1,4) there are four possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) and (0,
0, 2). Deviations (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) do not have to be considered by Lemma 2.
Deviations (0, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 2) do not have to be considered by Lemma 1.
On state (2, 4) there are nine possible deviations: (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1,
1), (0, 0, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 0, 2), (0, 0, 1) and (0, 2, 0). Deviations (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1,
0) do not have to be considered by Lemma 2. Deviations (0, 2, 0) and (0, 2, 1) do not
have to be considered by Lemma 3. Deviations (1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 2), (0, 0, 2), (0, 1, 1),
(0, 2, 1) and (0, 0, 1) do not have to be considered by Lemma 1.
(69) to (77) hold if and only if m3HL ≤ mHL ≤ m4HL , where
m4HL =
1









(72) coincides with mHL ≤ m4HL , and (74) is equivalent to mHL ≥ m3HL . All other
inequalities are then implied. See Appendix 2.B for supporting calculations.
We conclude the proof by showing that P1 actually arises. First, we argue that m
3
HL ≤




HL the factors in front of mHH coincide.
Therefore, m3HL ≤ m4HL is equivalent to





≥ 1 − δ + δp + 1 − δ
δp
(79)
which holds as δ, p ∈ (0, 1). Second, as argued in the last part of the proof to Theorem







Proof of Corollary 2. The corollary follows from Theorem 1 and the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that there exists an optimal policy ρ that never
matches two unproductive agents and denote its value function on (x , y) by Vρ(x , y).
We derive a lower bound a and an upper bound a for Vρ(x , y) such that a > a, which
yields a contradiction.
















mLL = a, (80)
where the second inequality holds because Vρ(0, 0),Vρ(0,1)≥ 0.
Upper bound. As ρ never matches two unproductive agents, we can derive an upper
bound on the number of matches created in each period when starting in state (0, k)
and following policy ρ. When being in state (0, k) in period t, the maximal number of
matches in period t + s is bounded from above by s, for any s ∈ N. Hence, Vρ(0, k) is
bounded from above by the value generated from creating the highest match value as
often as possible and as early as possible, i.e., matching two productive agents in every
subsequent period which yields
Vρ(0, k) ≤ mHH 11 − δ = a.
For every parameter constellation (p,δ,mHH ,mLL ,mHL) there exists a k such that
a > a, which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3. It is sufficient to proof that if m(θ1,θ2)= θ1 · θ2 then
mHL ≤ m3HL = mHH δp1 − δ(1 − 2p) + mLL
1 − δ(1 − p) + 1−δδp
1 − δ(1 − 2p) , ∀H, L, p,δ









(1 − δ(1 − 2p)) +












Plugging (82) into (81) gives
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0 ≤ 3 − 2δ − δ2,
which holds true as δ < 1. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. The Impatient Policy is implementable by setting τΘS(θ)= 0, for




1 − δ(1 − p) , ∆
L(p,δ) =
δ(1 − p)
1 − δp . (83)








∆H(p,δ)mHL − τ(0,0)(H) ≤ 12∆
L(p,δ)mLL − τ(0,0)(L),
for market report (1,1),
1
2




mHL − τ(1,1)(H) ≤ 12mLL − τ
(1,1)(L),
for market report (1,0),
1
2




mHL − τ(1,0)(H) ≤ 12∆
L(p,δ)mLL − τ(1,0)(L),
and for market report (0,1),
1
2




∆H(p,δ)mHL − τ(0,1)(H) ≤ 12mLL − τ
(0,1)(L).
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Combining the incentive constraint of the productive type with the incentive constraint

































Thus, an incentive compatible payment difference exists if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
∆H(p,δ)mHH − ∆L(p,δ)mHL ≥ ∆H(p,δ)mHL − ∆L(p,δ)mLL , (88)
mHH − mHL ≥ mHL − mLL , (89)
mHH − ∆L(p,δ)mHL ≥ mHL − ∆L(p,δ)mLL , (90)
∆H(p,δ)mHH − mHL ≥ ∆H(p,δ)mHL − mLL . (91)
Observe that ∆θ (p,δ)≤ 1, for all θ . Hence, (91) implies (88) to (90). To prove that
(91) holds whenever the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal, we show that (91) holds








We argue that the right-hand side of (92) is larger than m1HL . To this end, we will show
that the multipliers of mHH and mLL in (92) are (weakly) larger than the corresponding





1 − δ + 2δp
which coincides with the multiplier of mHH in m
1





1 − δ + δp
1 − δ + 2δp . (93)
(93) is larger than the multiplier of mLL in m
1
HL if and only if
1 − δ + δp
1 − δ + 2δp ≥
δ(1 − p)
1 + δ − 2δp ⇔ δ ≤ 1.
Thus, whenever the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal, we can find an incentive
compatible payment pair, for every market report Θs.
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We construct payments which are positive and individual rational: Set
τ(0,0)(L) = τ(1,0)(L) =
1
2
∆L(p,δ)mLL ≥ 0, (94)
τ(0,1)(L) = τ(1,1)(L) =
1
2
mLL ≥ 0. (95)
By construction, payments (94) and (95) set the unproductive agent’s expected utility
to zero and are therefore individual rational. For every market report, choose, given
the unproductive type’s payment, the maximal payment for the productive type that is




























Individual rationality of the payments for the unproductive type and incentive compat-
ibility yield individual rationality for the productive type.
Given that (88) - (91) are satisfied whenever the Positive Assortative Policy is optimal,

































As all payments are positive, the mechanism runs no deficit. Furthermore, payments
support efficient exit because they are charged upon arrival. 
Proof of Proposition 4. For incentive compatibility, we need to find a single payment
pair (τ(H),τ(L)) such that the difference τ(H)−τ(L) satisfies conditions (84) to (87).
Observe that (87) yields the lowest upper bound, whereas (86) yields the highest lower












Rearranging terms, note that incentive compatible payments exist iff
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To see that (97) describes a strict subset of the parameter region in which the Positive
Assortative Policy is optimal, we compare it to the boundary of the Positive Assortative
Policy m1HL . We show that (97) is more restrictive than mHL ≤ m1HL by separately com-





(1 − δ(1 − p)) <
δp
1 − δ(1 − 2p) ⇔ δ < 1. (98)




1 − δp <
δ(1 − p)
1 + δ(1 − 2p) ⇔ δ < 1. (99)
Set τ(L)= 12∆
L(p,δ)mLL ≥ 0. For market reports (1,1) and (0,1), an arriving unpro-


















which is consistent with incentive compatibility by (96). Given τ(H), the productive
type’s expected utility from truthtelling is
1
2









for market reports (0,0) and (0,1). Thus, the pair (τ(H),τ(L)) is individual rational.
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therefore, the mechanism runs no deficit. Payments are charged only upon arrival and
hence support efficient exit. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix the share α of the productive agent in the mixed pair. The




∆H(p,δ)mHH ≥ ∆L(p,δ)αmHL , ∆H(p,δ)(1 − α)mHL ≤ 12∆
L(p,δ)mLL ,
for market report (1,1),
1
2
mHH ≥ αmHL , (1 − α)mHL ≤ 12mLL ,
for market report (1,0),
1
2
mHH ≥ ∆L(p,δ)αmHL , (1 − α)mHL ≤ 12∆
L(p,δ)mLL ,
and for market report (0,1),
1
2
∆H(p,δ)mHH ≥ αmHL , ∆H(p,δ)(1 − α)mHL ≤ 12mLL .
Observe that, for every market report, the incentive constraint of the productive agent
provides an upper bound on α, whereas the incentive constraint of the unproductive




































The incentive constraint of the productive agent given market report (0,1) yields the
lowest upper bound, cf. (103), and the incentive constraint of the unproductive agent
for market report (1,0) provides the highest lower bound, cf. (102). Thus, any incentive










































which coincides with (97).
The Positive Assortative Policy without payments supports efficient exit and provides all
agents with (expected) utility of at least zero. Thus, individual rationality is satisfied
which concludes the proof. 
Appendix 2.B Appendix: Supporting Calculations
Calculations for the proof of Theorem 1.
Preliminaries for equations (36)-(39). We derive a couple of useful relationships. Using
the definition of VPAP(0, 0) and inserting VPAP(2,0), VPAP(0, 2), VPAP(2,1), VPAP(1,2),
the system (29) - (35) can be reformulated to
VPAP(0, 0) = δ[pVPAP(1,0) + (1 − p)VPAP(0,1)], (106)
VPAP(1, 0) = δ[p(mHH + VPAP(0,0)) + (1 − p)VPAP(1,1)], (107)
VPAP(0, 1) = δ[pVPAP(1,1) + (1 − p)(mLL + VPAP(0,0))], (108)
VPAP(1, 1) = δ[p(mHH + VPAP(0,1)) + (1 − p)(mLL + VPAP(1,0))]. (109)
Firstly, consider VPAP(1,0)− VPAP(0,1). By (107) and (108), we obtain
VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1) =
= δ[p(mHH + VPAP(0,0) − VPAP(1, 1)) + (1 − p)(−mLL + VPAP(1, 1) − VPAP(0, 0))],
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which yields, inserting (106) and (109), the equation
VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1) =δp [mHH + δp(VPAP(1, 0) − mHH − VPAP(0,1))
+δ(1 − p)(VPAP(0, 1) − mLL + VPAP(1, 0))]
+δ(1 − p) [−mLL + δp(mHH + VPAP(0,1) − VPAP(1,0))
+δ(1 − p)(mLL + VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1))] .
Solving for VPAP(1, 0)− VPAP(0, 1) gives
VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1) = δ[pmHH(1 − 2pδ + δ) − (1 − p)mLL(1 − δ + 2pδ)]1 − δ2(1 − 2p)2 .
(110)
Similarly, by (109) and (106), we obtain
VPAP(1, 1) − VPAP(0, 0) =
δ[p(mHH + VPAP(0,1) − VPAP(1,0)) + (1 − p)(mLL + VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1))],
which gives, inserting (107) and (108), the equation
VPAP(1, 1) − VPAP(0, 0) =δp [mHH + δp(VPAP(1, 1) − mHH − VPAP(0,0))
+δ(1 − p)(mLL + VPAP(0, 0) − VPAP(1, 1))]
+δ(1 − p) [mLL + δp(mHH + VPAP(0,0) − VPAP(1,1))
+δ(1 − p)(VPAP(1, 1) − mLL − VPAP(0, 0))] .
Solving for VPAP(1, 1)− VPAP(0, 0) yields
VPAP(1, 1) − VPAP(0, 0) = δ[pmHH(1 − 2pδ + δ) + (1 − p)mLL(1 − δ + 2pδ)]1 − δ2(1 − 2p)2 .
(111)
Comparing (111) to (110), observe that




0 < A < 1. (113)
Exploiting (112), inequalities (36) to (39) can be reformulated to
VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1) ≥ mHL − mLL , (114)
mHH − mHL ≥ VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1), (115)
mHH + mLL − mHL ≥ VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1) + mLLA, (116)
VPAP(1,0) − VPAP(0,1) ≥ mHL − mLLA. (117)
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Deriving equation (36). It is immediate that (117) implies (114), i.e., that (39) implies
(36).
Deriving equation (38). Similarly (115) implies (116), i.e., (37) implies (38).
Deriving equation (39). Inserting (110), (117) can be written as
mHL ≤ mHH δp1 − δ + 2pδ + mLL
δ(1 − p)
1 + δ − 2pδ (118)
which corresponds exactly to mHL ≤ m1HL .
Deriving equation (37). We argue that (39) implies (37), i.e., (118) implies (115).








1 + δ − 2pδ . (119)
Therefore (118) implies (115) if
2δp
1 − δ + 2pδ ≤ 1 ⇔ δ ≤ 1, (120)
which holds.
Deriving equation (51). Rearranging terms to isolate VPI P(1,0)− VPI P(0, 1) and insert-
ing the expression for VPI P(1,0)− VPI P(0,1), (51) can be rewritten as
mHH − mHL > δ[pmHH + (1 − 2p)mHL − (1 − p)mLL]. (121)
If (121) holds for δ = 1, it holds for any δ. Setting δ = 1 and rearranging terms yields
mHH +mLL > 2mHL which is satisfied by assumption.
Deriving equation (61). We argue that (60) implies (61):
δ[pVMIP(2,2) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 3)]
= δ[p(mHH + mLL + VMIP(0,0)) + (1 − p)(mHL + mLL + VMIP(0,0))]
= δmLL + VMIP(1, 0)
< mLL + VMIP(1,0)
≤ mHL + VMIP(0,1),
where the last inequality follows from (60).
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Deriving equation (58). We show (58) exploiting supermodularity and optimality of (0,
1, 0) on state (1,2):
mHL + δ[pVMIP(2,2)) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 3)] ≤ mHL + VMIP(1,2)
= 2mHL + VMIP(0,1)
≤ mHH + mLL + VMIP(0,1).
Deriving equation (57). We show (57) exploiting supermodularity and optimality of (0,
1, 0) on state (1,1):
mHL + δ[pVMIP(2,1)) + (1 − p)VMIP(1, 2)] ≤ mHL + VMIP(1,1)
= 2mHL + VMIP(0,0)
≤ mHH + mLL + VMIP(0,0).
Deriving equation (56). (59) and (60) imply (56): (56) is equivalent to
δVMIP(0,1) − VMIP(0, 0) ≤ mHL − δpmHH − δ(1 − p)mHL ,
similarly, (59) is equivalent to
δVMIP(0,1) − VMIP(0, 0) ≤ mLL − δpmHL − δ(1 − p)mLL .
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (56) to hold is
mLL − δpmHL − δ(1 − p)mLL ≤ mHL − δpmHH − δ(1 − p)mHL ,
which is equivalent to mHL ≥ m2HL , i.e. (60).





HL . Reformulating mHL ≤ m3HL , ∀p,δ,mHH ,mLL , gives
mHL − mLL ≤ 1 − δ
δp





2mLL and rearranging terms yields
1
2
(mHH − mLL) ≤ mLL
δp
, ∀p,δ,mHH ,mLL .
This holds if and if
1
2
(mHH − mLL) ≤ mLL , ∀mHH ,mLL ,
i.e., mHH ≤ 3mLL , ∀mHH ,mLL .
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Calculations for the proof of Proposition 1.
Preliminaries for equations (69) - (77). It is instructive to rewrite (62) - (68):
VP1(0, 0) =δ[pVP1(1,0) + (1 − p)VP1(0,1)], (122)
VP1(1, 0) =δ[p(mHH + VP1(0, 0)) + (1 − p)(mHL + VP1(0,0))], (123)
VP1(0, 1) =δ[p(mHL + VP1(0,0)) + (1 − p)VP1(0,2)], (124)
VP1(0, 2) =δ[p(mHL + VP1(0,1)) + (1 − p)(mLL + VP1(0, 1))]. (125)
Plugging (123) into (122) gives
VP1(0,0) = δp (δVP1(0,0) + δ(pmHH + (1 − p)mLL)) + δ(1 − p)VP1(0, 1). (126)
For VP1(0, 1)−δVP1(0, 2) we obtain, inserting (124) and (125),
VP1(0,1) − δVP1(0,2) =δp(mHL + VP1(0,0) − δmHL − δVP1(0,1))
+ δ(1 − p)(VP1(0,2) − δmLL − δVP1(0,1)). (127)
Rearranging (125) we see that
VP1(0,2) − δVP1(0, 1) = δ(pmHL + (1 − p)mLL). (128)
Inserting (124), (126), and (128) into (127), we can solve for VP1(0,1)−δVP1(0, 2)
which is explicitly given by
VP1(0, 1) − δVP1(0,2) = δp

mHL − δmLL + mHH p2δ2 − mHLp2δ2 + mLLpδ − mHLpδ

1 + p2δ2 − pδ2 . (129)
Next, we derive a closed-form expression for VP1(0, 0)−δVP1(0,1). To this end, note
that
VP1(0,0) − δVP1(0, 1) =δp(VP1(1,0) − δmHL − δVP1(0, 0))
+ δ(1 − p)(VP1(0,1) − δVP1(0, 2)). (130)
Furthermore by (123)
VP1(1,0) − δVP1(0,0) = δ(pmHH + (1 − p)mHL). (131)
Inserting (131) and (129) into (130) gives
VP1(0, 0) − δVP1(0, 1) = pδ
2

mHH p + mHL(1 − 2p − pδ + p2δ) + mLL(−δ + 2pδ − p2δ)

1 − pδ2 + p2δ2 . (132)
Deriving equation (72). Rearranging terms in (72) gives
VP1(0,1) − δVP1(0, 2) ≥ δ [pmHL + (1 − p)mLL] − mLL . (133)
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Plugging (129) into (133) and rewriting (133) as a condition on mHL , we obtain









The term on the right side of (134) is m4HL .
Deriving equation (74). We argue that (74) holds if and only if mHL ≥ m3HL . Inserting
VP1(1, 2) and VP1(0,3) in (74) gives
δ [p(mHL + VP1(0, 1)) + (1 − p)(mLL + VP1(0, 1))] ≥ mLL + VP1(0, 0).
Rearranging terms yields
δ [pmHL + (1 − p)mLL] − mLL ≥ VP1(0, 0) − δVP1(0,1). (135)
Plugging (132) into (135) and some algebra yields
mHL ≥ mHH δp1 − δ(1 − 2p) + mLL
1 − δ(1 − p) + 1−δδp
1 − δ(1 − 2p) . (136)
Observe that the right side of (136) coincides with m3HL .
Deriving equation (76). We show that (72) and (74) imply (76). Reformulating (72)
gives
mLL − δpmHL − δ(1 − p)mLL ≥ δVP1(0,2) − VP1(0, 1), (137)
and (76) gives
mHL − δpmHH − δ(1 − p)mHL ≥ δVP1(0, 2) − VP1(0, 1). (138)
(137) implies (138) if
mHL − mLL ≥ δp(mHH − mHL) + δ(1 − p)(mHL − mLL). (139)
Note that (139) coincides with mHL ≥ m2HL . As (74) requires mHL ≥ m3HL and
m3HL ≥ m2HL , (139) is implied by (74).
Deriving equation (70). We argue that (74) implies (70). Note that we can rewrite (74)
as
VP1(0,0) − δVP1(0, 1) ≤ δ (pmHL + (1 − p)mLL) − mLL , (140)
and (70) as
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VP1(0, 0) − δVP1(0,1) ≥ δ (pmHH + (1 − p)mHL) − mHL . (141)
Plugging (132) into (140) and (141) yields, after some algebra, for (140)
δ2p2(mHH − mHL) + mLL(1 − δ) ≤ δ2p2(mHL − mLL) + (1 − δ)pδ(mHL − mLL),
(142)
and for (141)
δp(mHH − mHL)(1 − δp − δ2p(1 − p)) + (1 − p)p2δ3(mHL − mLL) ≤
mHL(1 − δ) + (1 − p)pδ3(mHL − mLL). (143)
It is sufficient for (140) to imply (141), i.e. (142) to imply (143), if it holds that
(δp(mHL − mLL) + (1 − δ)(mHL − mLL))(1 − δp − δ2p(1 − p)) ≤
mHL(1 − δ) + (1 − p)2pδ3(mHL − mLL). (144)
For (144) in turn it is sufficient if
(δp + (1 − δ))(1 − δp − δ2p(1 − p)) ≤ (1 − δ) + (1 − p)2pδ3. (145)
Simplifying (145) shows that the term on the left side coincides with the term on the
right side.
Deriving equation (69). Supermodularity and (74) imply (69). Inserting (123) and (124)
into (69) and rearranging terms yields
mHH − mHL ≥ δ [p(mHH − mHL) + (1 − p)(mHL + VP1(0,0) − VP1(0, 2))] . (146)
By (74) it is sufficient for (146) to hold that
mHH − mHL ≥ δ [pmHH + (1 − 2p)mHL − (1 − p)mLL] . (147)
Reformulating yields
mHH − mHL
mHL − mLL ≥
δ(1 − p)
1 − δp . (148)
By supermodularity the left side of (148) is larger than one, whereas the right side of
(148) is smaller than one. Therefore, (74) implies (69).
Deriving equation (77). (77) is implied by (75), (76), and supermodularity: Given (75)
and (76), from optimality on state (1,2) we know
mHL + δ[pVP1(2,2) + (1 − p)VP1(1,3)] ≤ 2mHL + VP1(0, 1), (149)
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and from supermodularity follows
2mHL + VP1(0, 1) ≤ mHH + mLL + VP1(0, 1). (150)
Combining (149) and (150) gives (77).
Deriving equation (71). (71) is implied by (70) and supermodularity: Given (70), from
optimality on state (1, 1) we know
mHL + δ[pVP1(2, 1) + (1 − p)VP1(1,2)] ≤ 2mHL + VP1(0,0), (151)
and from supermodularity follows
2mHL + VP1(0, 0) ≤ mHH + mLL + VP1(0, 0). (152)
Combining (151) and (152) gives (71).
Deriving equation (73). (73) is implied by (74), (70), and supermodularity: Given (74),
from optimality on state (0, 2) we know
mHL + VP1(0, 2) ≥ mHL + mLL + VP1(0,0), (153)
and given (70), from optimality on state (1,1) follows
mHH + mLL + VP1(0, 0) ≤ mLL + δ[pVP1(2,1) + (1 − p)VP1(1,2)]. (154)
Combining (153) and (154) gives (73).
Deriving equation (75). We argue that (74) implies (75) by showing that “not (75)”
implies ‘not (74)’. Applying “not (75)” and (74) leads to a contradiction:
mLL + VP1(0, 0) ≤ δ[p(mHL + VP1(0, 1)) + (1 − p)(mLL + VP1(0,1))]
≤ δ[p(mLL + VP1(1,0)) + (1 − p)(mLL + VP1(0, 1))]
= δmLL + VP1(0,0).
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This chapter studies a seller whose reputation is determined by the types of her customers. In
our model, a monopolist repeatedly sells a good to heterogeneous customers who, depend-
ing on their type, increase or decrease the seller’s reputation. First, we study a trade-off
between realizing current-period profits and building reputation for future periods. Sec-
ond, we analyze reputation dynamics. Over time, reputation always converges to a stable
level. Convergence behavior, however, depends strongly on the good’s durability. While the
reputation of less durable goods fluctuates around the long-run reputation, the reputation
of more durable goods converges monotonically.
3.1 Introduction
The reputation of several goods is substantially influenced by the types of their con-
sumers. This effect is particularly pronounced for luxury and fashion goods, such as
exclusive watches and fashionable apparel. When considering buying such a good, con-
sumers not only take into account the utility from the good itself but also whether they
want to be associated with its clientele. “Good-looking people attract other good-looking
people”, as Mike Jeffries, at that time CEO of Abercrombie & Fitch, states in a controver-
sial interview in 2006.1 Economically, past buyers impose an externality on new buyers.
? Based on joint work with Tim Frommeyer (see Frommeyer and Schickner, 2016). We thank Francesc
Dilmé, Benny Moldovanu, and Deszö Szalay for guidance throughout the project. Furthermore, we wish to
thank Daron Acemoglu, Simon Board, Gonzalo Cisternas, Pauli Murto, Aniko Öry, and participants of the
Workshop on Dynamic Incentive Problems 2015 in Bonn for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 See Denizet-Lewis (January 24, 2006).
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This externality can be positive or negative depending on whether the association with
the good’s clientele is desirable for new buyers. Sellers seem to be aware of their con-
sumers’ concerns and strategically try to target a certain clientele. In the same interview,
Mike Jeffries emphasizes: “(...) we want to market to cool, good-looking people. We don’t
market to anyone other than that.” He goes on to say: “Are we exclusionary? Absolutely.
Those companies that are in trouble are trying to target everybody: young, old, fat, skinny.
But then you become totally vanilla. You don’t alienate anybody, but you don’t excite any-
body, either.” These quotes exemplify how sellers manage their reputation by targeting
a specific clientele, in Jeffries’ words “good-looking people”, in order to attract new con-
sumers who wish to be associated with this clientele by possessing the same good. In
turn, new consumers influence the good’s reputation. How a seller manages reputation
depends on the characteristics of the market and the good and may differ substantially
across markets and goods.
In this chapter, we present a dynamic model to study how a monopolist optimally
manages her reputation by targeting specific clienteles in order to maximize profits. In
particular, we are interested in how the underlying characteristics of the market affect
the evolution of reputation, demand, and prices over time.
The reputation of a seller has several facets. Traditionally, a good’s reputation is
linked to its intrinsic properties such as quality. As these properties are usually private
information of the seller, we refer to this facet of reputation as private reputation. Goods
with high private reputation are believed to be of better quality, for example, than goods
with low private reputation. However, reputation also has a public facet. Often, buyers
do not only derive utility from the good’s intrinsic properties but also fromwhat the good
symbolizes to others. In itself this public reputation has many aspects. For example, a
seller forms her public reputation through advertisement. In this chapter, we study the
effect of the seller’s clientele on her public reputation.
For most goods both facets of reputation are present. However, the importance of
one or the other may vary across goods, time, and cultures. In this chapter, we focus
solely on the public reputation a seller derives from her clientele. Whenever referring
to reputation in the following, we mean reputation in this sense unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
In our model, a profit-maximizing monopolist repeatedly offers a good to a con-
tinuum of heterogeneous, short-lived buyers. Buyers are ordered according to their
type which describes their effect on the seller’s reputation. Selling to buyers of higher
types improves the seller’s reputation, and selling to buyers of lower types decreases
the seller’s reputation. A buyer’s willingness to pay increases in the seller’s reputation
and in their type.2 Therefore, the seller can choose her clientele through her pricing
strategy and thereby manage her reputation. For any price, buyers purchase the good
2 Intuitively, the higher a buyer’s type, the more reputation improves after he purchases the good. The
buyer anticipates his influence and, hence, his willingness to pay increases in his type.
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only if their type exceeds a cutoff type.
In the first part of this chapter, we consider a general model in which types are drawn
from a general, continuous distribution and a buyer’s utility is quasilinear. Reputation
tomorrow is a function of reputation today and today’s cutoff type, which characterizes
the current clientele. We impose, first, that reputation is persistent, i.e., ceteris paribus
a higher reputation today yields a higher reputation tomorrow, and, second, that repu-
tation is increasing in today’s clientele, i.e., selling to an exclusive group of high-type
buyers increases reputation, whereas selling to a broader group of buyers with hetero-
geneous types decreases reputation.
Within this general framework, we start by establishing existence of aMarkov perfect
equilibrium and characterize the seller’s value in any equilibrium. We then argue that
the seller’s value is increasing in reputation which implies that reputation is beneficial
for the seller. In each period, the seller solves an intertemporal trade-off. On the one
hand, selling to a small, exclusive clientele increases her reputation and, hence, her
future profits. On the other hand, limiting demand in this way decreases her profits
today.
Conventionally, high prices increase the seller’s profit by increasing revenue. In our
model, in addition, the seller sets high prices to target an exclusive clientele in order
to improve her reputation. In other words, high prices prevent buyers with lower types
from purchasing the good and, hence, protect the seller’s reputation.
To obtain explicit results regarding the reputation dynamics, we specialize our
setup in the second part of this chapter. We assume that a buyer’s utility is linear and
that the distribution of types is uniform. Reputation tomorrow is a convex combination
of today’s reputation and the cutoff type. We associate the weight of the convex
combination on current-period reputation with the good’s durability. Intuitively, if the
durability of the good is higher, buyers possess the good for a longer period of time.
Consequently, the good is longer associated with their type, and the influence of past
buyers’ types, captured by today’s reputation, on tomorrow’s reputation is compara-
tively high. Conversely, if the durability of the good is lower, new buyers constitute
a significant fraction of the seller’s clientele. Thus, the influence of today’s buyers’
types, characterized by today’s cutoff type, on tomorrow’s reputation is relatively high.
An example for a market that is characterized by comparatively high durability is
the market for watches, whereas, for example, the market for fashionable apparel is
characterized by comparatively low durability. With these adjustments, we obtain a
linear-quadratic setup. We determine the seller’s value and policy function in closed
form which makes the setup tractable for a more explicit analysis.
Next, we study optimal reputation dynamics, in particular, their dependence on the
good’s durability. First, we show that reputation always converges to a long-run reputa-
tion. Although it is optimal in the short run for the seller to target different clienteles,
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this result implies that it is optimal in the long run to target a fixed clientele and main-
tain a constant reputation. In contrast to the private reputation literature, e.g. Holm-
ström (1999), Cripps et al. (2004), and Cripps et al. (2007), reputation is not a short
run phenomenon. Even in the long run, the seller trades off the benefit of increasing
her reputation against realizing higher current-period profits. The long-run reputation
is increasing in the discount factor and decreasing in the good’s durability.
Second, convergence behavior towards the long-run reputation is substantially dif-
ferent for goods with different durability. If the durability of the good is below a thresh-
old, reputation oscillates towards the long-run reputation. A period of high reputation
is followed by reputation of low reputation and vice versa. If the durability is above
the threshold, reputation and price dynamics are monotone. If the initial reputation is
high, reputation decreases monotonically to the long-run reputation, and, in contrast,
increases monotonically to the long-run reputation if reputation is initially low.
Despite the substantially different convergence behavior of the cases described
above, we identify an underlying monotonicity in the degree of fluctuations across
these cases. To this end, we determine an appropriate measure for fluctuations, the
normalized distance between two subsequent reputation levels, and show that fluctu-
ations are monotonically decreasing in durability, i.e., the higher the durability of the
good the less reputation fluctuates over time.
Our model predicts substantial fluctuations in reputation and prices for goods with
low durability and relatively stable, monotone reputation dynamics for goods with
high durability. There are many factors that drive price and reputation dynamics. The
relative importance of these factors may vary significantly across markets. Nevertheless,
our findings seem to be in line with anecdotal evidence. As an example for a durable
good, consider the Swiss watchmaker Rolex. Business Insider documents how prices of
Rolex watches have steadily increased over the last sixty years, both in absolute terms
and as measured as a proportion of average income. At the same time its reputation
seems to have improved constantly: “(...) today’s Submariner, the tool-watch of yesterday,
has transformed into an internationally recognized status symbol (...).”3 As an example
for a good with low durability, it is insightful to come back to Abercrombie & Fitch.
During its reputational high before and at the time of Jeffries’ interview, customers
were queuing in front its stores. Simultaneously, Abercrombie & Fitch was expanding
considerably. The German newspaper FAZ notes in an article that the brand has “lost its
coolness” since then, which some analysts attribute to the fact that it has become too
widespread. Further, the authors observe that Abercrombie & Fitch is currently cutting
back its network of stores.4 In a similar vein, consider the rapid rise and decline of
the fashion label Ed Hardy. At its reputational height, many celebrities wore Ed Hardy
clothes. According to a CNN article, the designer himself attributes the subsequent
fall of the brand to the fact that “ (...) widespread licensing aspired to make the brand
3 See Bredan (January 1, 2015).
4 See Lindner and Löhr (August 31, 2015).
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more accessible to people at every price point.” An analyst observes that, as a result, Ed
Hardy became “very trailer park” and states that “they made it too unexclusive.”5 Similar
upward and downward fluctuations in reputation due to an expansion and contraction
of clientele are documented for the fashion labels Burberry and Louis Vuitton.6
Finally, we argue that public reputation provides another rationale for planned
obsolescence. Intuitively, if a seller starts with a low reputation, she can improve her
reputation by including higher types into her clientele more quickly if the durability of
the good is low. This reputational explanation of planned obsolescence complements
the traditional demand-driven explanation.
Related Literature. In the private reputation literature, the seller’s reputation rep-
resents the market’s belief about her unknown type, productivity, or quality. In Kreps et
al. (1982), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and Cripps et al. (2004), reputation reflects
the market’s belief that the seller is a competent type who strategically chooses her ef-
fort level instead of a behavioral type who always exerts the same effort. In Holmström
(1999), Tadelis (1999), Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), and Dilmé (2016), repu-
tation is the buyers’ belief about the seller’s productivity or quality which influences
their utility from purchasing the seller’s good. Whereas in these models buyers update
their beliefs based on openly observable information, it is costly to acquire information
about the seller’s quality in Liu (2011) as well as in J. Lee and Liu (2013). Overall, the
models in the private reputation literature are dynamic and, typically, a monopolistic,
long-living seller faces a sequence of myopic, short-lived buyers. For a more detailed
overview, see, for example, Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008).
To illustrate the difference to the public reputation studied in our work, consider the
classical example of a restaurant from the private reputation literature. The restaurant’s
private reputation describes the customers’ belief that food and service are of high
quality. Public reputation describes the clientele a customer is associated with when
visiting the restaurant. This could be, for example, students or politicians and business
men.
The literature on consumption externalities distinguishes the bandwagon effect, the
snob effect, and the Veblen effect (Veblen, 1899; Leibenstein, 1950). The bandwagon
effect and the snob effect describe the case when demand increases or decreases,
respectively, if others consume the same good. The Veblen effect refers to conspicuous
consumption, that is, when demand for a good increases in its price. In our model, there
are bandwagon effects with respect to high-type buyers and snob effects with respect
to low-type buyers. Becker (1991) and Becker and Murphy (1993) consider consumers
who care about who else possesses a good and find snob and bandwagon effects.
Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) as well as Amaldoss and Jain (2005a) show that Veblen
5 See Alabi (September 30, 2013).
6 See also Lindner and Löhr (August 31, 2015).
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effects can arise when consumers signal wealth from the consumption of conspicuous
goods or when consumers have social needs, such as desire for prestige. Grilo et al.
(2001) and Amaldoss and Jain (2005b) examine optimal pricing of conspicuous goods
in static duopoly competition.
In our work, we combine the dynamic approach of the private reputation literature
with consumption externalities. Pesendorfer (1995) and Hashimoto and Matsubayashi
(2014) also consider the problem of a monopolistic seller in a dynamic model with
consumption externalities. Pesendorfer (1995) examines fashion cycles in a model
where consumers of different types buy a good to distinguish themselves from each
other. The good’s reputation stems from its ability to signal a buyer’s type in a secondary
marriage market. Over time, more consumers buy the good such that the signaling
effect and, hence, reputation and prices decrease monotonically. When the price has
dropped low enough, the seller introduces a new, initially exclusive product line. As
opposed to the focus on optimal replacement of a product in Pesendorfer (1995), we
examine the effects of changes in the good’s characteristics on the seller’s reputation
management. Moreover, considering the reputation of a good, we obtain richer dy-
namics. In our model, reputation is not always monotonically decreasing. Depending
on initial reputation and the good’s durability, reputation can monotonically increase,
monotonically decrease, or oscillate. Hashimoto and Matsubayashi (2014) analyze
optimal pricing of a monopolistic seller in a dynamic model with either positive or
negative consumption externalities. Consumers’ utilities depend on past sales which the
seller anticipates when solving her pricing problem. For the case where consumption
externalities are negative, their results are in line with ours. If the consumers’ utilities
only depend on recent sales, reputation oscillates downwards, whereas reputation
decreases monotonically if consumers discount past sales less strongly. In contrast
to their paper, however, in our model some consumers exert positive consumption
externalities whereas others exert negative externalities. Furthermore, we provide a
full characterization of the seller’s optimal pricing strategy, varying the characteristics
of the market. Moreover, we model the reputation channel more explicitly through
which buyers influence others’ utilities from buying the good.
In contrast to social consumption externalities as studied in our and the above
works, another branch of literature studies technological consumption externalities.
These arise when the utility of a good increases with the size of its user base, such as
telephones or social networks. Katz and Shapiro (1985) as well as I. H. Lee and Mason
(2001) analyze price competition between firms under positive or negative network
effects, and Dhebar and Oren (1985), Bensaid and Lesne (1996), and Gabszewicz and
Garcia (2008) consider dynamic pricing strategies of a monopolist.
Further related is Rayo (2013) who studies a monopolist selling a good that signals
social status in a screening model as well as the literature on peer groups (see, for
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example, Board, 2009), and the literature on scarcity (see, for example, Stock and
Balachander, 2005).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section
3.2. In Section 3.3, we derive the existence result and the trade-off between building
reputation and current-period profits in the general model. In Section 3.4, we proceed
by studying reputation dynamics in the specified model. In Section 3.5, we discuss the
implications on planned obsolescence. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
Time is discrete and infinite, t ∈ {0, . . .}. A single long-lived seller (she) repeatedly
offers a good to a unit mass of short-lived buyers (he).
Seller. In each period t, the long-lived seller sets a price pt for the good. She has
no production costs and discounts future payoffs with discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
Buyers. Every period-t buyer is characterized by his type θ ∈ [0,1] which is dis-
tributed according to a continuous distribution function F(θ) with support [0, 1]. The
types of buyers who purchase the good in periods 0,1, . . . , t − 1 determine the reputa-
tion of the good at time t which we denote by λt ∈ [0,1]. A period-t buyer with type θ
who purchases the good with reputation λt at price pt receives utility
u (θ ,λt) − pt ,
where u : [0, 1]2→ R≥0 is strictly increasing in both arguments and continuous. We
do not explicitly model buyers as players in the game. Notice that there exists a
cutoff type θ †(λt , pt) ∈ [0, 1] for every reputation λt and every price pt such that
u(θ †(λt , pt),λt)= pt .7 We assume that all buyers with type θ ≥ θ †(λt , pt) purchase
the good and all buyers with type θ < θ †(λt , pt) do not purchase the good. We justify
this assumption with the following reasoning. Assume that each buyer decides whether
to buy the good, and normalize buyers’ utility from not buying the good to zero. Conse-
quently, a period-t buyer with type θ purchases the good only if
u(θ ,λt) − pt ≥ 0. (1)
Recall that u is strictly increasing in the first argument. If it is optimal for a buyer with
type θ to buy the good then it is optimal for any buyer with type θ ′ ≥ θ to buy the
good as well. Analogously, if it is optimal for a buyer with type θ not to buy the good
then it is also optimal for any buyer with type θ ′ ≤ θ not to buy the good. The cutoff
7 For pt < u(0,λt) we set θ
†(λt , pt)= 0, and for pt > u(1,λt) we set θ †(λt , pt)= 1.
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is given by the type for which (1) holds with equality.8 Thus, the seller’s demand in
period t is 1− F(θ †(λt , pt)). We refer to the set of buyers who purchase the good as
the seller’s clientele.
Reputation Transition. Initially, the seller’s reputation is λ0 ∈ [0, 1]. It evolves dy-
namically depending on the types of buyers who purchase the good. We assume that
reputation satisfies the following two properties. First, reputation is persistent in the
sense that, ceteris paribus, a higher reputation today yields a higher reputation tomor-
row. Second, the more exclusive the seller’s clientele today, the higher her reputation,
that is, reputation increases in today’s cutoff type. Formally, we assume that reputation
evolves according to
λt+1 = φ(λt ,θ
†(λt , pt)), (2)
where φ : [0,1]2→ [0,1] is strictly increasing and continuous in both arguments.9
Information and Timing. At time t, the seller knows the set of agents who bought
the good in periods 0,1, . . . , t − 1 as well as the corresponding prices and reputation
levels. The timing of the game in each period t is as follows. First, the seller sets a
price pt . Then, period-t buyers arrive, buy the good or not, and leave the market. Last,
reputation updates according to (2).
Histories and Payoffs. Let pt = (p0, . . . , pt−1) be the history of prices up to time t.
For any t and initial reputation λ0, p
t determines a history of reputation levels λt(pt)=
(λ0,λ(p
1), . . .λ(pt)) through (2). The seller’s history at the start of period t is given by
ht = (pt ,λt(pt)) and h0 = λ0. Further, denote the set of all possible histories at the start
of period t byH t .





δs−tps(1 − F(θ †(λ(ps), ps)). (3)
Strategies and Equilibrium. A (behavioral) pure strategy of the seller is a collection
of functions ρ = (ρt)∞t=0, where
ρt : H t −→ R≥0,
ht 7−→ pt .
The strategy is Markovian if ρt is a function of λt only, for all t.
8 In light of this reasoning, our assumption to not model buyers as players is mainly for notational
convenience. This is a common assumption in the private reputation literature, see, for example, Board
and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). Essentially, we only assume that the buyer with the cutoff type purchases the
good.
9We consider a deterministic reputation transition in order to obtain a clean comparison of reputation
dynamics.
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Definition 1. A strategy ρ∗ = (ρ∗t )∞t=0 of the seller constitutes
(i) a Nash equilibrium (NE) if it maximizes (3) at h0.
(ii) a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if it maximizes (3) at any ht , for any t.
(iii) a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) if it is Markovian and a subgame perfect equi-
librium.
3.3 Equilibrium Existence and Value of Reputation
We start by establishing existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a MPE. In any NE the seller’s value is V (λ0), where V (λ) is
the unique solution to
V (λ) = sup
p∈R≥0

p(1 − F(θ †(λ, p)) + δV  φ(λ,θ †(λ, p))	 . (4)
This and all subsequent proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The seller’s problem
is to choose an infinite sequence of prices in order to maximize her discounted sum
of profits. A strategy of the seller which solves this problem is a Nash equilibrium. In
Proposition 1, we show that the value of the seller is characterized by Bellman equation
(4). A policy function, corresponding to a solution of the Bellman equation, induces
a strategy that is Markovian. Thus, solving the seller’s problem through (4) yields a
Markov perfect equilibrium. We establish existence of a value function which solves
(4) and of a corresponding policy function. As any Markov perfect equilibrium is also
a Nash equilibrium, Proposition 1 particularly implies existence of a Nash equilibrium.
The proof draws on classical results from the literature on dynamic programming.
We proceed by characterizing the seller’s value function in more detail.
Proposition 2. Reputation is valuable for the seller, that is, V (λ) is increasing.
This result shows that a higher reputation entails a higher value and is thus better
for the seller. Specifically, a higher reputation benefits the seller in two ways. First,
the buyers’ willingness to pay increases in reputation because their utility function is
increasing in reputation. Therefore, a seller with a higher reputation can sell to the
same group of buyers at a higher price. Second, as reputation is persistent, a higher
reputation today implies a higher reputation tomorrow, for a fixed group of buyers. As
a result, the first effect carries over to subsequent periods. The proof of Proposition 2
exploits these two effects using a mimicking argument. A high-reputation seller can
always induce the same proportion of buyers to purchase the good as a low-reputation
seller at higher prices. Consequently, the high-reputation seller can earn higher profits.10
10 The fact that the value function is increasing does not follow from classical sufficient conditions in the
literature because the per-period payoff function is not necessarily increasing in reputation.
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Moreover, Proposition 2 reveals that there is an intertemporal trade-off between
building a reputation for the future and realizing profits in the current period. On the
one hand, the seller wants to set a price to increase her next-period reputation in order
to get a higher continuation value. Considering only this effect, it is optimal for the
seller to set a high price such that only a small exclusive group of high-type buyers
purchases the good. This drives up the seller’s next-period reputation. On the other
hand, the seller wants to set a price that maximizes current-period profits. If the seller
sets a high price only a small number of buyers purchase the good. In order to maximize
current-period profits, it is better for the seller to set an intermediate price, the static
monopoly price, at which a larger set of buyers purchase the good. In turn, however, a
larger set of buyers contains a more diverse pool of types. Therefore, setting the static
monopoly price comes at the cost of driving down the seller’s next-period reputation
compared to the case where the seller targets a small, exclusive group of high-type
buyers. To maximize overall profits, the seller has to balance these two countervailing
effects. Consequently, the seller’s optimal price today is higher than the static monopoly
price to protect her reputation tomorrow.
In other words, the seller trades off targeting mass, that is a large group of buyers
with diverse types, and targeting class, that is a small but exclusive group of buyers with
high types.
3.4 Reputation Dynamics
So far, we have shown existence of an equilibrium and that reputation is valuable for
the seller in a general model. In this section, we are interested in reputation dynamics.
In particular, we study the reputation’s long-run behavior and its dynamic evolution
over time. To characterize the dynamic properties of the model, we need to impose
additional structure which allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for the seller’s
value and policy function.
Model Adjustments. In the following, we consider the case where types are uni-
formly distributed, and a buyer’s utility from buying the good is linear in λt and θ ,
specifically
u (θ ,λt) = θ + λt . (5)
This implies that for a given cutoff θ †t the good’s price is λt + θ
†
t , and demand is 1− θ †t .
Further, we assume the following reputation transition,
λt+1 = αλt + (1 − α)θ †t , (6)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Reputation evolves according to a convex combination of today’s repu-
tation and cutoff type. The latter serves as a proxy for the clientele of the current-period.
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We interpret α as a measure for the good’s physical durability. A good that is more
durable is used longer and, hence, also associated longer with its buyers’ types. A high
value of α corresponds to a good with high durability whose buyers’ types are identified
with it for a relatively long time. Therefore, new buyers only account for a small fraction
of goods in circulation and reputation depends less on their types. In turn, however,
their types impact the good’s reputation for a long time. Examples for such goods are
expensive watches. In contrast, a low value of α represents a good with low durability.
It is in circulation for a relatively short period of time and, hence, reputation depends
more on the current period’s clientele. Fashionable apparel is an example for such a
good.
Intuitively, in our model, we keep the size of the group of buyers who determine the
good’s reputation constant. One could think of a reference group of buyers whose types
are associated with the good. This keeps the influence of each buyer on reputation
constant over time and simplifies the analysis. Keeping this in mind, we can motivate
the specific form of (6) more formally if we imagine that the good becomes unusable
with probability 1−α. The types of buyers in the reference who do not use the good
any longer are replaced by those of current-period buyers. Therefore, the fraction 1−α
of the good’s reputation is determined by current-period buyers’ types, represented by
the proxy θ †, and the fraction α by past-period buyers’ types. See also the discussion
following Proposition 3.
Value and Policy Function. In this framework, we derive closed-form solutions for
the seller’s value function and the seller’s policy function. We start by establishing a
preliminary result.
Lemma 1. The value function V (λ) is continuous in α, δ and λ.
This result equips us with the properties we need to characterize the value function
for the uniform-linear model.
So far, the seller’s strategy determines a price for any reputation level. There is a
one-to-one relation between the cutoff type and the price. Hence, instead of setting a
price, it is convenient to think of the seller’s strategy as choosing cutoff types in the
following.
Proposition 3.
(i) The value function V (λ) is quadratic and continuously differentiable.
(ii) The corresponding unique policy function θ ∗ (λ) is of the form
θ1λ + θ0, (7)
for some θ0 and θ1 ∈ (−1, 0).
This result can be seen from two perspectives. Technically, we derive a closed-form
solution for the uniform-linear model which turns out to be linear-quadratic, i.e., the
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policy function is linear, and the value function is quadratic. Economically, we show
that the policy function is decreasing in reputation. In other words a seller with high
reputation chooses a lower cutoff type and, thus, sells to a larger group of buyers than
a seller with low reputation. To gain some intuition for this result, it is instructive to
consider the seller’s current-period profits. The effect of θ † on current-period profits is
twofold. On the one hand, a higher θ † corresponds to a higher price. On the other hand,
a higher θ † corresponds to selling to a smaller group of high-type buyers, that is, to lower
demand. Specifically, the price is linearly increasing in θ †, whereas demand is linearly
decreasing in θ †. At the interior optimum, the seller balances these two opposing effects.
Ceteris paribus, a higher reputation increases the price one-to-one but has no effect on
demand. Taking the two opposing effects into account, it is profitable for the seller to
trade off a fraction of the price increase for an increase in demand by choosing a lower
θ †. This intuition remains valid even when accounting for the effect on the continuation
value. The continuation value is increasing in θ † because tomorrow’s reputation is higher
if the seller sells exclusively to a small group of high-type buyers. This strengthens the
positive effect that an increase in today’s reputation has on today’s price through θ †.
Nevertheless, the optimum remains interior and the seller continues to trade off the
two opposing effects.
Corollary 1. There exists a unique SPNE.
Proposition 1 yields existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium and hence of a Nash
equilibrium. By Proposition 3 there exists a unique policy function and therefore a
unique Markov perfect equilibrium. Because we only model the seller as a player, the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is also unique.
In our representation of the reputation transition (6), reputation in the next period
depends on the cutoff buyer θ † as a summary statistic for demand in the current period.
Note that we retain the linear-quadratic structure for the seller’s value and policy
function if we consider a more general reputation transition where the next period’s
reputation depends on a linear function of demand or, equivalently, the cutoff buyer. As
types are uniformly distributed, this includes, for example, the conditional expectation
of the types of buyers who purchase the good. Thus, our qualitative results carry over to
these alternative specifications of the reputation transition that depend more generally
on demand. For computational convenience, however, we stick to specification (6) in
the following.
Long-run Reputation. With the seller’s equilibrium strategy at hand which is im-
plicitly determined by her policy function, we analyze in detail how she dynamically
manages her reputation over time. We start by showing that reputation converges to
some λˆ ∈ (0, 1) in the long run. We refer to λˆ also as long-run reputation in the follow-
ing.
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Proposition 4. As t →∞, reputation converges to a unique λˆ, for any λ0 ∈ [0, 1].





which is increasing in δ and decreasing in α.
(ii) For α= 1, λˆ= λ0.
For each reputation, the seller trades off the value of reputation tomorrow against
demand and, hence, profits today. In order to increase reputation, she has to sell to
a more exclusive clientele which decreases her profits today. Targeting a larger group
of buyers today decreases her reputation and lowers profits from future periods. From
Proposition 4, we learn that there exists a reputation level, λˆ, where these effects are in
balance and the seller does not want to change her reputation. Whereas it is optimal for
the seller to dynamically adjust her reputation and clientele in the short run, the seller
optimally targets a fixed clientele and has a constant reputation in the long run.
Note that, in contrast to the private reputation literature, reputation is not a short-
run phenomenon. Even in the long run, the seller takes into account that her current
clientele determines her future reputation.
As second insight, we provide comparative statics results for the long-run reputa-
tion λˆ with respect to the seller’s discount factor δ as well as the good’s durability α.
Intuitively, as δ increases the seller becomes more patient and values future periods
more. In each period, she trades part of her current-period profits off against reputation
tomorrow, recall the discussion following Proposition 2. When future periods become
more valuable to the seller, she is willing to invest more of her profits today into higher
reputation in subsequent periods in order to increase profits from future periods. As a
result, the long-run reputation increases.
Furthermore, Proposition 4 reveals that it is optimal for the seller to decrease
her reputation over time if she has a high reputation initially. On average, the seller
realizes higher profits in early periods at the cost of driving down her reputation over
time. Conversely, if the seller starts with a low reputation, it is optimal for her to
increase reputation over time at the cost of lower profits in early periods. In the long
run, however, reputation is stable. Intuitively, above λˆ, the benefits of higher profits in
early periods outweigh the costs of decreasing reputation in the long run; below λˆ the
benefits of higher reputation in the long run outweigh the costs of lower profits in early
periods. At the long-run reputation, the trade-off between realizing current-period
profits and changing reputation is balanced. As α increases, the good becomes more
durable and reputation more persistent. From the seller’s perspective, she has to give up
more demand to increase reputation and loses less reputation when increasing demand.
Therefore, the costs of increasing current-period profits go down, whereas the benefits
of higher current-period profits are unaffected by the change in α. Consequently, the
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level where these costs and benefits are in balance is lower, that is, long-run reputation
λˆ decreases in α.
Although it seems that the conditions imposed on the general model, outlined in
Section 3.2, are not sufficient to guarantee existence of a long-run reputation, we can
establish existence in frameworks that are more general than our linear-quadratic setup.
See, for example, Jose Alexandre Scheinkman (1976), Araujo and Jose A Scheinkman
(1977), McKenzie (1986), Stokey et al. (1989) for sufficient conditions.
In the following, we say that the seller has good reputation in period t if λt > λˆ and
bad reputation in period t if λt < λˆ. Further, we say that the seller milks reputation
in period t if she targets a clientele which decreases her next-period reputation, that
is θ †t < λt . Conversely, the seller builds reputation if she targets a clientele which
increases her next-period reputation, that is θ †t > λt .
In the next step, we are interested how the underlying characteristics of the mar-
ket affect the convergence dynamics towards the long-run reputation. The market is
characterized by the good’s durability α. Therefore, we analyze the effect of the good’s
durability on how reputation converges. The following definition turns out to be useful.
Definition 2. A sequence of reputations {λt}
∞
t=0
(i) oscillates towards long-run reputation λˆ if λt ≤ (≥)λˆ implies that λt+1 ≥ (≤)λˆ, for
all t, and |λt − λˆ| ↓ 0.
(ii) stagnates at long-run reputation λˆ if λt = λˆ, for all t ≥ 1.
(iii) converges smoothly to long-run reputation λˆ if λt ≤ λt+1 ≤ λˆ, for all t, or λt ≥
λt+1 ≥ λˆ, for all t, and |λt − λˆ| ↓ 0.
Intuitively, if reputation oscillates towards λˆ, a period of good reputation is followed
by a period of bad reputation and vice versa. The magnitude of the fluctuation between
good and bad reputation decreases over time. If reputation stagnates at λˆ, it jumps
to the long-run reputation λˆ in the first period and remains constant from then on.
There are two scenarios in which reputation converges smoothly to λˆ. First, reputation
is good in every period and deteriorates over time to λˆ, i.e., reputation converges to λˆ
monotonically from above. Second, reputation is bad in all periods and increases over
time to λˆ, i.e., reputation converges to λˆ monotonically from below.
For a better understanding of the dynamics, we study two benchmark cases. In the
first case, the good is everlasting, i.e. α= 1, and in the second case the good is most
ephemeral, i.e. α= 0.
Benchmark: Everlasting Good (α = 1). In the extreme case when the good is ev-
erlasting, the good is always associated with the initial buyers’ types. Current buyers do
not affect reputation. Intuitively, as the good is everlasting, the reference group of buyers
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who determine the seller’s reputation is unchanged over time. Consequently, reputation
remains at its initial value λ0 in each period. From the seller’s perspective, the dynamic
trade-off disappears. Her reputation tomorrow is not influenced by her clientele today
and, hence, she solves the same static problem in each period.













As reputation remains constant at λ0, this is an extreme case of smooth convergence
to λˆ in the sense of Definition 2.
Benchmark: Most Ephemeral Good (α = 0). Contrary to the previous case, the
good is most ephemeral such that buyers use their good for one period only. Therefore,
the group of buyers who possess the good consists exclusively of current-period buyers,
and, consequently, the good is only associated with their types. The seller’s reputation
tomorrow is independent of her reputation today. Hence, her choice of today’s price
not only determines her current-period profits but also fully determines her reputation
tomorrow. Consequently, in this benchmark, reputation reacts most sensitively to adjust-
ments in the seller’s clientele.
Lemma 3. Suppose α= 0. The seller’s policy function is
θ ∗ (λ) = − λ
1 +
p
1 − δ +
1 + δ
1 + δ +
p
1 − δ ,





See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the resulting dynamics of reputation,
prices, and demand. We observe that reputation alternates between periods of high
reputation and periods of low reputation if the good is most ephemeral. Also, the
corresponding sequences of prices and demand fluctuate substantially. Over time, the
amplitude of the fluctuations decreases and reputation oscillates towards the long-run
reputation.
Intermediate Durability: α ∈ (0,1). For goods of intermediate durability, the set
of buyers who possess the good, and whose types are thus associated with the good,
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Figure 1. Reputation (solid black line), prices (dashed red line), and demand (dotted blue line)
for α= 0 and δ = 0.8 in t ∈ {0, . . . , 10} with λ0 = 0.1 (a), and λ0 = 0.9 (b).
consists of current-period buyers (α < 1) and buyers from previous periods (α > 0).
Therefore, both influence the seller’s next-period reputation. In this case, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 5. There exists a cutoff α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that reputation
(i) converges smoothly to λˆ if α > α¯.
(ii) stagnates at λˆ if α= α¯.
(iii) oscillates towards λˆ if α < α¯.
Proposition 5 describes how the seller manages her reputation over time, depending
on the durability of the good. From Proposition 4 we know that the seller’s reputation
converges to λˆ, starting from any initial reputation λ0. The seller manages her reputa-
tion by setting prices and thereby targeting a particular clientele which in turn influ-
ences her reputation in subsequent periods. Proposition 5 shows that, depending on the
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Figure 2. Reputation (solid black line), prices (dashed red line), and demand (dotted blue line)
for α= 0.7 and δ = 0.8 in t ∈ {0, . . . , 10} with λ0 = 0.1 (a), and λ0 = 0.9 (b).
durability of the good, there are three ways in which the seller’s reputation converges
to the long-run reputation. These differ substantially in the convergence behavior of
reputation and prices.
First, consider the case where the good is relatively durable, α > α¯, and the seller’s
initial reputation is good, λ0 > λˆ. Initially, the seller sells to a large group of buyers with
a diverse set of types by setting a price which is high in absolute terms but comparatively
low given her high reputation. As a result, reputation decreases. Because durability is
high, it takes time until the low-type buyers constitute a significant proportion of the
set of buyers who possess the good and affect the reputation negatively. Therefore, the
decline in reputation is relatively small. As time passes, the seller gradually targets less
buyers overall, however, she continues to sell to a large group of buyers. Consequently,
reputation declines at a decreasing rate. The effect on prices is twofold. On the one hand
decreasing demand corresponds to increasing prices. On the other hand, as reputation
decreases, the seller has to lower prices because the buyers’ willingness to pay decreases.
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Overall, we observe that prices decrease smoothly over time which corresponds to de-
mand decreasing slower than reputation. See Figure 2b for a graphical representation.
Intuitively, if the good’s durability is high and the initial reputation of the seller is good,
the seller gradually milks her reputation in every period. That is, she exploits that the
good is mostly associated with her initially exclusive clientele so that selling to a broader,
less exclusive, clientele only gradually deteriorates her reputation. As a result she real-
izes high profits in each period at the expense of slowly driving down next period’s
reputation.
If the good is relatively durable, α > αˆ, but the seller’s reputation is bad initially
λ0 < λˆ, we observe the mirror image of this behavior. See Figure 2a for a graphical
representation. At first, the seller targets a small group of high-type buyers, and demand
is low. The corresponding price is comparatively high given her low reputation, and,
thus, reputation increases. As the good is durable, however, it takes time until the good
is associated with these high-type buyers. Therefore, reputation only increases slowly.
Over time, the seller gradually expands the set of buyers to which she sells but overall
she continues to target a small, exclusive clientele. As a result, reputation increases
at a decreasing rate. Analogously to the last case, prices increase over time because
demand increases slower than reputation. Intuitively, even though the seller targets a
larger group of buyers which would require setting a lower price, she can charge a higher
price because the buyer’s willingness to pay increases as her reputation improves. In this
case, the seller builds reputation over time, i.e, she sacrifices profits in each period by
selling only to an exclusive clientele in order to build reputation for future periods.
Altogether, the dynamics are relatively smooth andmonotone if the good’s durability
is high. If the seller’s initial reputation is high, reputation deteriorates monotonically to
the long-run reputation because the seller milks her reputation in every period. If her
initial reputation is low, reputation improves monotonically to the long-run reputation
as the seller builds reputation in every period.
Second, we analyze the case when the good has low durability, α < αˆ. Consider a
period in which the seller has good reputation. She sets a comparatively low price given
her high reputation such that demand is high, i.e., a large group of buyers with a diverse
set of types purchases the good. In other words, the seller milks her high reputation and
consequently reputation deteriorates. This is reminiscent of the behavior of a seller with
good reputation when the good’s durability is high. As the good’s durability is low, how-
ever, current-period buyers represent a significant proportion of the buyers who possess
the good in this case. Thus, the types of recent buyers, in particular of current-period
buyers, have a significant impact on the seller’s reputation in the next period. Conse-
quently, reputation does not decrease gradually as before but drops below the long-run
reputation. As a result, the seller has a bad reputation in the next period. Now consider a
period in which the seller has bad reputation. The seller sets a comparatively high price
and sells exclusively to a small group of high-type buyers, i.e., she builds reputation. As
durability is low, these high-type buyers make up a significant part of the buyers who
possess the good. As a result, reputation jumps above the long-run reputation. These
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Figure 3. Reputation (solid black line), prices (dashed red line), and demand (dotted blue line)
for α= 0.1 and δ = 0.8 in t ∈ {0, . . . , 10} with λ0 = 0.1 (a), and λ0 = 0.9 (b).
observations imply that a period of good reputation is followed by a period of bad repu-
tation and vice versa. As reputation converges to the long-run reputation, the amplitude
of the alternations in reputation decreases over time. Analogously, prices alternate with
decreasing amplitude. See Figure 3 for a graphical representation.
All in all, if the good’s durability is low, reputation, demand, and prices fluctuate
substantially. Periods of good reputation in which the seller milks her reputation alter-
nate with periods of bad reputation in which the seller builds reputation. Intuitively,
milking good reputation is profitable because the seller increases demand at a compara-
tively high price. Therefore, her current-period profits are particularly high. Conversely,
building reputation in periods of bad reputation is less costly because, in any case, the
seller’s price is comparatively low due to her bad reputation. Hence, the seller has to
give up relatively little in terms of profits today to increase reputation tomorrow.
Third, in the knife-edge case where the durability of the good coincides with α¯,
reputation jumps immediately to the long-run reputation which balances the trade-off
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between current profits and the future benefits from a good reputation in the long run.
Consequently, reputation remains constant in all subsequent periods.
We further investigate the effect of the good’s durability on the reputation dynamics.
Proposition 5 suggests that there is a monotone relationship between the durability of
the good and the volatility of reputation dynamics. Intuitively, the lower the durability
of the good, the more reputation fluctuates around the long-run reputation. This
conjecture raises the issue of finding an appropriate measure for volatility to compare
the volatility of two reputation sequences. In the following, we propose such a measure
and formalize this intuitive conjecture.
It is instructive to make the dependence of reputation on α explicit. Fix a distance
h ∈ R from long-run reputation λˆ(α) and consider the reputation
λ(α) := λˆ(α) + h.
Let λ′(α) be the next-period reputation when following the optimal policy if the current-
period reputation is λ(α), i.e.,
λ′(α) := αλ(α) + (1 − α)θ ∗(λ(α)).
Intuitively, we define reputation relative to the long-run reputation λˆ(α) to account for
changes in λˆ(α) as the durability of the good α changes.11 Our measure for volatility
is the distance between between λ′(α) and λ(α). The following result formalizes our
conjecture:
Proposition 6. |λ′(α)−λ(α)| is decreasing in α.
We show that the higher the durability of the good, the smaller the volatility of the
seller’s reputation. In other words, the higher α, the smaller the distance between two
subsequent reputation levels. In this sense, there is a continuous transition between the
three patterns in which reputation converges to the long-run reputation λˆ, outlined in
Proposition 5. This continuous relationship, gives rise to the question where the sub-
stantially different convergence behavior of the three cases comes from. Technically, it
is the consequence of the fact that the distance between two subsequent reputation lev-
els is increasing in α combined with the fact that the policy function is decreasing in λ
and has a fixed point at λˆ. For illustration, consider a seller who has a good reputation
initially. If α is high, the distance between two subsequent reputation levels is relatively
small. Thus, if the current-period reputation is larger than λˆ, the next-period’s repu-
tation is larger than λˆ as well. Therefore, the seller milks reputation in both periods.
As α decreases the distance between two subsequent reputation levels increases. If α
is sufficiently low, the next-period reputation is below λˆ. Because the policy function
11 See also the discussion following Proposition 6.
3.5 Planned Obsolescence | 93
is decreasing and has a fixed point at λˆ, the seller switches from milking to building
reputation in the next period.
To account for the fact that λˆ depends on α, we use the distance of two subsequent
reputation levels defined relative to λˆ as our volatility measure. This is crucial because if
we do not measure reputation relative to λˆ, we ignore the dependence of λˆ on α. Then,
it can happen for reputations close to λˆ that the decrease in λˆ outweighs the decrease
in fluctuations around λˆ such that the distance between two subsequent reputation
levels is increasing in α. As we are interested in the way reputation transitions to and
fluctuates around λˆ, however, we measure distances relative to λˆ in (the proof of)
Proposition 6.
Intuitively, Proposition 5 and 6 predict that for goods with high durability, one should
observe less fluctuations in reputation, clientele, and hence prices. The good is longer
associated with its buyers’ types and the seller manages her reputation such that it only
gradually approaches the long-run reputation. In other words, in markets for relatively
durable goods in which buyers care about the seller’s past clientele, we should rarely
observe price discounts. As mentioned in the introduction, this finding is consistent
with the observation that the prices and reputation of the Swiss watchmaker Rolex have
gradually increased over the last sixty years.
In contrast, for producers of goods with low durability our model predicts significant
fluctuations in reputation, clientele, and prices. For these goods, reputation is mostly
determined by current-period buyers. Hence, if a seller with a good reputation milks
reputation by selling to a broader clientele, she incurs a severe negative effect on her
next-period reputation. As outlined in the introduction, this provides a rationale for
substantial changes in clientele and reputation of fashion labels such as Abercrombie &
Fitch and Ed Hardy.
3.5 Planned Obsolescence
After studying the effect of the good’s durability on the seller’s reputation dynamics, we
analyze how durability affects the profit of the seller. This analysis sheds light on planned
obsolescence. Does a good with low durability yield higher profits for the seller than a
good with high durability? The classical explanation of planned obsolescence is that it
is optimal for a monopolist to produce a good with uneconomically short life to increase
demand in future periods, see Bulow (1986). In our model, durability does not affect the
size of the market in future periods. Nevertheless, we argue that a seller with low initial
reputation can obtain higher profits if the good is less durable. Intuitively, if the seller
has a low reputation, she can only charge comparatively low prices and hence, wants
to build reputation over time. She improves her reputation to generate higher profits in
the future by selling to an exclusive clientele at the cost of current-period profits. If the
durability of the good is comparatively low, the seller has to sacrifice less current-period
profits to improve reputation because the new high types quickly replace the initial
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low types in the seller’s clientele. As a result, the seller can obtain higher profits if the
good is less durable. Put differently, reputation is more sensitive to changes in the seller’s
clientele if the durability of the good is low.While this makes it more difficult to maintain
a high initial reputation, it is desirable for a seller with low initial reputation. Thus,
our model reveals additional incentives for planned obsolescence from a reputational
perspective which complements the classical explanation.
For the following result, it is convenient to make the dependence of V (λ) on α
explicit and write V (λ,α).
Proposition 7. For any α ∈ (0, 1) there exists a cutoff λ¯0(α) ∈ (0,1) such that
(i) for all λ0 ≥ λ¯0(α) it holds that V (λ0, 1)≥ V (λ0,α),
(ii) for all λ0 ≤ λ¯0(α) it holds that V (λ0, 1)≤ V (λ0,α).
In Proposition 7 we compare the seller’s profits from an everlasting good and a good
with durabilityα ∈ (0,1). We show that there exists a cutoff λ¯0(α) such that a seller with
initial reputation below λ¯0(α) can obtain higher profits if her good is not everlasting.
Conversely, an everlasting good yields higher profits than the less durable good for a
seller with initial reputation above λ¯0.
3.6 Conclusion
In a setting where buyers care about who else consumes the good, we study how a
seller dynamically manages reputation which is determined by her clientele. In contrast
to the seller’s private reputation which is the market’s belief about the seller’s private
type, this public reputation captures the consumption externalities that buyers impose
on each other. In a general setup, we show that public reputation is valuable for the
seller and that there exists a trade-off between current-period profits and a higher
reputation in subsequent periods. In a linear-uniform specification of the model, we
find that reputation converges to a stable long-run reputation. In line with anecdotal
evidence from various industries, the convergence path depends strongly on the
good’s characteristics. As the examples of Ed Hardy and Abercrombie & Fitch illustrate,
reputation of less durable goods such as fashionable apparel fluctuates substantially. In
contrast, the reputation of goods with higher durability such as luxury watches evolves
monotonically as the case of the Swiss watchmaker Rolex exemplifies.
In future research, we think it is interesting to analyze reputation dynamics when
other market characteristics, in addition to the good’s durability, influence the repu-
tation transition. In a similar vein, studying the implications on reputation dynamics
of competition between multiple sellers could shed light on how companies with very
different reputation coexist in one market. For example, in the automobile industry it
seems that the Italian car manufacturer Ferrari and the Romanian car manufacturer
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Dacia not only differ with respect to quality-related private reputation but also with
respect to what their cars symbolize to others.
Although our results about price and reputation dynamics seem to match observa-
tions in several markets, our model considers public reputation as the only determi-
nant of prices. Testing empirically how strongly pricing is influenced by public, clientele
driven reputation as opposed to private, quality driven reputation would provide inter-
esting insights.
Finally, we would like to highlight that the public reputation analyzed in this chapter
is present in several other applications as well, such as in the job market. A professor
who considers whether to join a university, for example, takes into account the uni-
versity’s reputation, which depends on the academic standing of its past and current
faculty members. In turn, she also influences the university’s future reputation. Alter-
natively, young academics oftentimes work as an intern for a small salary in prestigious
companies to improve their resume. Then again, the company’s prestige is influenced
by the quality of their employees. We believe that analyzing the implications of public
reputation in this and further applications are promising avenues for future research.
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Appendix 3.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We apply Theorems 4.2 - 4.6 from Stokey et al. (1989). The-
orems 4.2 - 4.5 establish that we can study the seller’s problem of choosing an infinite
sequence of prices by means of the Bellman equation (4). Theorem 4.6 yields existence
of a value function, V (λ), which solves (4) as well as non-emptiness of the corresponding
optimal policy correspondence. Taken together, these results yield existence of equilib-
rium. To employ Theorems 4.2 - 4.6, we verify that Assumptions 4.3 - 4.4 from Stokey et
al. (1989) are satisfied in our model. We start by rewriting (4) to match their notational
convention:
V (λ) = sup
λ′∈[φ(λ,0),φ(λ,1)]
 
1 − F(φ−1(λ,λ′))u(φ−1(λ,λ′),λ) + δV (λ′)	 , (9)
where φ−1(λ,λ′) denotes the inverse of φ with respect to its second argument with
domain [0,1]× [φ(λ, 0),φ(λ, 1)]. Consider Assumption 4.3. First, note that the set
of all possible states, [0, 1], is convex. Second, the correspondence which maps the
initial state λ into the set of feasible next-period states, [φ(λ, 0),φ(λ, 1)], is non-empty,
compact-valued, and continuous because φ is continuous and strictly increasing in its
second argument. To verify Assumption 4.4, we consider the per-period return function 
1 − F(φ−1(λ,λ′))u(φ−1(λ,λ′),λ) (10)
with domain {(λ,λ′) | (λ,λ′) ∈ [0, 1]× [φ(λ, 0),φ(λ, 1)]}. Because [0,1] is a compact
set and F , φ, and u are continuous, (10) is continuous as well. Together with the
compactness of the domain, this observation also implies that (10) is bounded. Thus,
Assumptions 4.3 - 4.4 hold, and we can apply Theorems 4.2 - 4.6.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider λ˜, λ ∈ [0,1] such that λ˜≥ λ. We argue that V (λ˜)≥
V (λ) by showing that for any strategy of the seller with initial reputation λ (henceforth
sellerλ) we can find a strategy of the seller with initial reputation λ˜ (henceforth sellerλ˜)
which gives her weakly higher profits. Any strategy of the seller induces a sequence of
prices. Because u is strictly increasing, there is a one-to-one relationship between prices
and cutoffs. For this proof, it is instructive to consider sequences of cutoffs rather than
sequences of prices. Let {θ †s }
∞
s=0 be an arbitrary sequence of cutoffs chosen by sellerλ.
Note that sellerλ˜ can choose prices that induce the same sequence of cutoffs because
buyers’ utility is quasilinear in the price. If sellerλ˜ chooses the same sequence of cutoffs
{θ˜s}
∞
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(i) Sellerλ˜ sells to the same (mass of) buyers as sellerλ in each period.
(ii) The price that sellerλ˜ charges in the first period, u(θ
†
0 , λ˜), is higher than the price
that sellerλ charges in the first period, u(θ
†
0 ,λ), because u is increasing in the
second argument.
(iii) As φ is increasing in its first argument, we have φ(λ˜,θ †0 )≥ φ(λ,θ †0 ). Therefore,
sellerλ˜’s next-period reputation is higher than sellerλ’s next-period reputation. Us-
ing the same argument as in (ii), we deduce that sellerλ˜ also sets higher prices in
the future.
Taking (i) to (iii) together, we see that {θ˜ †s }
∞
s=0 guarantees sellerλ˜ a higher profit than
{θ †s }
∞
s=0 guarantees sellerλ. Furthermore, by Proposition 1, there exists a Markovian




s=0. We conclude that
V (λ˜)≥ V (λ).
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we adjust the Bellman equation, (4), to account for the
uniform-linear model specification. Also, as in the proof of Proposition 1, it is conve-
nient to let the seller choose cutoffs directly instead of prices. With linear utility, setting
a price pt at reputation λt implies that the cutoff is
θ † (λt , pt) = pt − λt .






= θ † + λt .
For notational convenience, we abbreviate θ † (λ, p) with θ † in the following. The uni-




= θ †. Therefore, we can rewrite (4) to
V (λ) = max
θ †∈[0,1]
 
θ † + λ
  
1 − θ † + δV  αλ + (1 − α)θ †	 , (11)
where the seller maximizes with respect to θ † instead of p.
By Proposition 1, V (λ) is the fixed point of the Bellman operator. We now prove that the
Bellman operator maps the (closed) set of functions which are continuous in α, δ, and
λ (henceforth denoted by C) into itself. Thus, the fixed point of the Bellman operator
must lie within that closed set and, hence, V (λ) is continuous in α, δ, and λ.
To show that the Bellman operator maps C into itself, consider an arbitrary g ∈ C . Ap-




θ † + λ
  
1 − θ † + δg  αλ + (1 − α)θ †	 (12)
We use Berge’s maximum theorem to deduce that (12) is a continuous function of α, δ,
and λ. First, note that for any λ the set of feasible choices is [0,1] which is compact and
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continuous as a correspondence of α, δ, and λ because it is independent of α, δ, and λ.
Second, note that  
θ † + λ
  
1 − θ † + δg  αλ + (1 − α)θ †
is continuous in α, δ, λ, and θ †. Thus, by the maximum theorem, (12) is an element
of C . Consequently, the Bellman operator maps C into itself and V ∈ C .
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider the case where α < 1. For α= 1 see Lemma 2.
Recall that the Bellman equation is given by (11).
(i) Step 1: We solve the Bellman equation with a guess and verify approach.
Consider the first-order derivative of the right-hand side of the Bellman equation
with respect to θ †
1 − θ † −  θ † + λ + δ(1 − α)V ′  αλ + (1 − α)θ † , (13)
and the first-order derivative of V (λ) with respect to λ
V ′(λ) = 1 − θ † + δαV ′  αλ + (1 − α)θ † . (14)
We guess that the value function is quadratic, that is,
V (λ) = v2λ
2 + v1λ + v0.
This implies for the first-order derivative
V ′(λ) = 2v2λ + v1. (15)
In order to verify the guess, we consider the first-order condition of the Bellman
equation by setting (13) equal to zero,
1 − θ † −  θ † + λ + δ(1 − α)V ′  αλ + (1 − α)θ † = 0. (16)
Using (15), we can rewrite (16) to
1 − θ † −  θ † + λ + δ(1 − α)  2v2  αλ + (1 − α)θ † + v1 = 0.
Solving for θ † yields
θ † =
1 + δ(1 − α)v1 − λ (1 − δ(1 − α) (2v2α))
2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) . (17)
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Now, we consider (14) where we plug in (15), the guess for V ′(λ), and (17). After
some algebra, we obtain
V ′(λ) =λ (1 + 4δαv2(2α − 1))
2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2)
+
2 (1 + δαv1)
 
1 − δ(1 − α)2v2
 − 1 + δ(1 − α) (2αv2 (1 + δ(1 − α)v1) − v1)
2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) . (18)
We use the guess for the left-hand side in order to match and thereby solve for
coefficients. First, we require that the coefficient of λ on the right-hand side of
(18) equals 2v2, the coefficient of λ in (15), i.e.,
2v2 =
1 + 4δαv2(2α − 1)
2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) .
Solving for v2 gives
v2 =
1 − δα(2α − 1) ±Æ(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2
2δ(1 − α)2 . (19)
We see that there are two possible solutions for v2. Second, we require that the
constant on the right-hand side of (18) equals v1 which is the constant in the
guess (15), i.e.,
v1 =
2 (1 + δαv1)
 
1 − δ(1 − α)2v2
 − 1 + δ(1 − α) (2αv2 (1 + δ(1 − α)v1) − v1)
2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) .




1 − δ(1 − α)2v2
 − 1 + 2δα(1 − α)v2
2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) (1 − δα) + δ(1 − α) (1 − 2δα(1 − α)v2) (20)
which depends on v2.
Step 2: We argue that only one of the two solutions for v2 is valid.
Denote the two candidates for v2 by
v+2 =
1 − δα(2α − 1) +Æ(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2
2δ(1 − α)2 , (21)
v−2 =
1 − δα(2α − 1) −Æ(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2
2δ(1 − α)2 . (22)
First, recall from Lemma 1 that the value function V (λ) is continuous in α and δ.
Rewriting the square root in the numerator givesÆ
(1 − δα2) (1 − δ + 4αδ(1 − α)).
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Observe that both solutions coincide if and only if α= δ = 1. As we consider δ ∈
(0,1) we conclude that v+2 6= v−2 . Hence, only one of the two candidates can be
the global solution for any pair (α,δ). If both were solutions, V (λ) would not be
continuous.
Second, we argue that value function induced by v+2 is not increasing for all pairs
(α,δ) which contradicts Proposition 2. Let v+1 be the solution to (20) when we
plug in v+2 for v2. Some algebra yields
v+1 =
α + (1 − 2α)  δα(2α − 1) −p(1 − δα2) (1 − δ + 4αδ(1 − α))
(1 − α)  1 − δα + δ(1 − α)(1 − 2α) −p(1 − δα2) (1 − δ + 4αδ(1 − α)) . (23)
Next, we show that there exists a pair of (α,δ) for which v+1 is strictly negative
which contradicts that the value function V (λ) is strictly increasing in λ for any
pair (δ,α). For α= 0 we get
−p1 − δ
1 + δ − p1 − δ , (24)
which is strictly negative for all δ ∈ (0,1). By continuity, we conclude that there
exists an α > 0 such that v+1 < 0. Consequently, v
+
2 is not the solution. Instead,
the solution is given by v−2 and the corresponding solution for v1, that is,
v−1 =
α + (1 − 2α)  δα(2α − 1) +p(1 − δα2) (1 − δ + 4αδ(1 − α))
(1 − α)  1 − δα + δ(1 − α)(1 − 2α) +p(1 − δα2) (1 − δ + 4αδ(1 − α)) . (25)
From now on, we identify v1 with v
−
1 and v2 with v
−
2 .
Step 3: We verify that the second-order condition is satisfied.
Consider the second-order derivative of the right-hand side of the Bellman equa-
tion with respect to θ †
−2  1 − δ(1 − α)2v2 . (26)
We start by showing that v2 ≥ 0 which is the case if the numerator of v−2 is positive,
i.e.,
1 − δα(2α − 1) ≥
q
(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2.
By squaring both sides of the equation and subtracting (1−δα(2α− 1))2, the
condition simplifies to
δ(1 − α)2 ≥ 0
which is always satisfied. Therefore, the second-order condition holds if and only if
δ(1−α)2v2 < 1. We show that 2(1−α)v2 ≤ 1 which implies that δ(1−α)2v2 <
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1. After plugging in (22), we can rewrite 2(1−α)v2 ≤ 1 to
1 − δα(2α − 1) −
q
(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2 ≤ δ(1 − α).
Rearranging terms and squaring both sides yields
(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2 ≥ (1 − δ + 2δα(1 − α))2 .
After some algebra, this condition can be reformulated to
−1 + α2 + δ  1 − 4α + 7α2 − 4α3 ≤ 0. (27)
For δ = 0, it simplifies to
α2 − 1 ≤ 0
which is always true, and for δ = 1 we get
−4(1 − α)2 ≤ 0
which is satisfied as well. As (27) is linear in δ, the condition holds for all δ ∈ (0,1)
and we can conclude that δ(1−α)2v2 < 1. Hence, the second-order condition is
satisfied.
(ii) The shape of the policy function follows now immediately from (17), where we
plug in v1 and v2 in order to determine the solutions for θ0 and θ1. We are left to
show that −1< θ1 < 0. θ1 is defined as the coefficient of λ in (17), i.e.,
θ1 = −1 − δ(1 − α) (2v2α)2 (1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) . (28)
Recall from Step 3 of the previous part of the proof that v2 ≥ 0 and 2(1−α)v2 ≤ 1
which implies that 2δ(1−α)αv2 < 1 and δ(1−α)2v2 < 1. Therefore, numerator
and denominator are positive and θ1 is strictly negative. Moreover, θ1 > −1 if the
denominator is larger than the numerator. This is the case if 2δ(1−α)2v2 < 1
which follows from 2(1−α)v2 ≤ 1. Recall also that the second-order derivative
of the right-hand side of the Bellman equation, (26), is strictly negative. Hence,
the objective is strictly concave and its maximizer is unique. Therefore, the policy
function is also unique. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) Consider α < 1. In the first step, we define
T : [0,1] −→ [0, 1] ,
λt 7−→ λt+1,
as the mapping of today’s into tomorrow’s reputation. Using the seller’s policy
function (7) and the reputation transition (6), we obtain
T (λt) = αλt + (1 − α) (θ0 + θ1λt) .
Note that the mapping is linear in λt with slope α+ (1−α)θ1. As θ1 ∈ (−1,0), it
follows that α+ (1−α)θ1 ∈ (0, 1) for any α ∈ [0, 1) and, hence, T is a contraction
mapping.
By Banach’s fixed-point theorem, the contraction mapping T has a unique fixed
point, that is, there is a unique λˆ such that T(λˆ)= λˆ, and, moreover, the sequence
λt+1 = T (λt) converges to λˆ as t →∞.
Second, we explicitly compute λˆ. To this end, we revisit the seller’s problem from
the proof of Proposition 3, in particular, the seller’s first-order condition, as in
(16),
1 − 2θ †(λ) − λ + δ(1 − α)V ′  αλ + (1 − α)θ †(λ) = 0,
and the first-order derivative with respect to λ, as in (18),
V ′(λ) = 1 − θ †(λ) + δαV ′  αλ + (1 − α)θ †(λ) .
Note that T(λˆ)= λˆ implies θ †(λˆ)= λˆ. By evaluating both conditions at the fixed
point λ= λˆ, we get
1 − 3λˆ + δ(1 − α)V ′(λˆ) = 0, (29)
and
V ′(λˆ) = 1 − λˆ + δαV ′(λˆ). (30)
Solving (30) for V ′(λˆ) yields
V ′(λˆ) = 1 − λˆ
1 − δα (31)
which we plug into (29) in order to solve for λˆ. The solution is






Finally, we consider the derivatives of λˆ with respect to δ and α. For convenience,




2 ∂ x(α,δ)∂ δ





2 ∂ x(α,δ)∂ α
(3 + x (α,δ))2
,
the signs of the derivatives of λˆ are determined by the signs of the derivatives of





(1 − δα)2 > 0, and
∂ x (α,δ)
∂ α
= − δ(1 − δ)
(1 − δα)2 < 0.
Hence, λˆ is increasing in δ and decreasing in α.
(ii) For α= 1, (6) implies that λt+1 = λt and, hence, λt = λ0, for all t ≥ 0, which
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that for α= 1, (6) implies that λt+1 = λt . When starting with
initial reputationλ0, it follows thatλt = λ0, for all t ∈ {1, . . .}. Thus, the seller’s decision
about θ † in period t does not influence her reputation in the next period. Her problem
reduces to maximize stage game payoffs in each period.







1 − θ †	 .
The objective is strictly concave in θ †. The first-order condition is given by
1 − λ0 − 2θ † = 0,





The seller’s profits are given by the discounted infinite sum of period profits. In each
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Proof of Lemma 3. This result follows from Propositions 3 and 4. First, consider v1 as




1 + δ +
p
1 − δ , (32)
v2 =
1 − p1 − δ
2δ
. (33)
We determine the seller’s policy function by evaluating (13) for α= 0,
θ ∗(λ) = − λ
2 (1 − δv2) +
1 + δv1
2 (1 − δv2) . (34)
With (32) and (33), we can rewrite (34) after some algebra to
θ ∗(λ) = − λ
1 +
p
1 − δ +
1 + δ
1 + δ +
p
1 − δ . (35)





Further, from (6) for α= 0 follows λt+1 = θ
†
t . From the proof of Proposition 4, we know
that θ ∗(λˆ)= λˆ. Moreover, θ ∗(λ) is decreasing by Proposition 3. Therefore, λt > λˆ
implies λt+1 < λˆ and vice versa, that is, reputation oscillates towards λˆ. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1: We derive θ1 in closed form.
It is convenient to define
∆ := (1 − α2δ)(1 − δ(1 − 2α)2).
Recall that we obtained θ1 from the first-order condition as
θ1 =
δ(1 − α)α2v2 − 1
2(1 − δ(1 − α)2v2) ,
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where
v2 =
1 − δα(2α − 1) − p∆
2δ(1 − α)2 .








1 + δα(2α − 1) + p∆ . (36)
Next, we multiply the numerator and the denominator of (36) by
1 − 1 − α
α
− δα(2α − 1) + p∆.




1 − 1 − α
α





Some algebra shows that the numerator can be written as
− 3 + 1
α
+ αδ(3α − 1). (37)
Now, consider the denominator of (36), 
1 + δα(2α − 1) + p∆1 − 1 − α
α
− δα(2α − 1) + p∆

.
Simplifying the latter expression yields p




Putting (37) and (38) together, we obtain for θ1:
θ1 =
−3 + 1α + αδ(3α − 1) p
∆ + (1 − α2δ)  3α−1α  ,
which we can further simplify to
θ1 =
−(1 − α2δ)
1 − α2δ + p∆ . (39)
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Step 2: We derive ∂ θ1∂ α in closed form.
We start by taking the derivative of θ1, see (39) from Step 1, with respect to α:
2αδ(1 − α2δ + p∆) 
1 − α2δ + p∆2
− (α
2δ − 1)−2αδ + 12∆− 12  −2δα(1 − δ(1 − 2α)2) + (1 − α2δ)(4δ(1 − 2α)) 
1 − α2δ + p∆2 .
Next, we multiply numerator and denominator by
p
∆. The numerator becomes
2αδ∆ + (1 − α2δ)1
2
 −2δα(1 − δ(1 − 2α)2) + (1 − α2δ)(4δ(1 − 2α)) ,
and simplifying yields
δ(1 − α2δ)(2 − 3α − αδ + 2α2δ).




δ(1 − α2δ)(2 + 2α2δ − 3α − αδ)
(1 − α2δ + p∆)2p∆ .




δ(1 − α2δ)(2 + 2α2δ − 3α − αδ)
(1 − α2δ +p(1 − α2δ)(1 − δ(1 − 2α)2))2p(1 − α2δ)(1 − δ(1 − 2α)2) .
(40)
Step 3: (1−α)θ1 is increasing in α.
The statement is equivalent to showing that
− θ1 + (1 − α)∂ θ1
∂ α
≥ 0. (41)
We plug in the explicit formulas for θ1 and
∂ θ1
∂ α which we derived in Step 1 and 2 and
rewrite the left side of inequality (41) as a single fraction over the denominator
(1 − α2δ + p∆)2p∆.
As the denominator is positive, it suffices to argue that the numerator
(1 − α)δ(1 − α2δ)(2 + 2α2δ − 3α − αδ) + (1 − α2δ)(1 − α2δ + p∆)(p∆)
is also positive. The latter expression is bounded from below by
(1 − α)δ(1 − α2δ)(2 + 2α2δ − 3α − αδ) + (1 − α2δ)∆.
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The definition of ∆ and some algebra yield
(1 − α2δ)  (1 − δ)(1 − α2δ) + δ(1 − α)(2 + 2α2δ + α − αδ − 4α3δ) .
It remains to be shown that
2 + 2α2δ + α − αδ − 4α3δ (42)
is positive. Observe that (42) is linear in δ. Therefore, it attains its minimum either at
δ = 1 or δ = 0. For δ = 0 we obtain
2 + α > 0,
and for δ = 1, (42) becomes
2 + 2α2 − 4α3 ≥ 0.
Consequently, (42) is positive for all δ ∈ (0,1) which implies that (41) holds.
Step 4: We prove (i)-(iii).
Note that α+ (1−α)θ1 is continuous in α, strictly increasing in α by Step 3, less than
zero at α= 0, and larger than zero at α= 1. Therefore, we can uniquely define α¯
through
α¯ + (1 − α¯)θ1 = 0.
(i) Consider α > α¯. Fix λ0 ≥ λˆ. Denote by λ the current-period reputation and by λ′
the next-period reputation. First, we argue that λ≥ λˆ implies λ′ ≥ λˆ:
λ′ = αλ + (1 − α)θ ∗(λ)
= αλ + (1 − α)(θ1λ + θ0)
= λ (α + (1 − α)θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 as α>α¯
+(1 − α)θ0
≥ λˆ(α + (1 − α)θ1) + (1 − α)θ0 (43)
= αλˆ + (1 − α)θ ∗(λˆ)
= λˆ.
Thus, if λ0 ≥ λˆ then λt ≥ λˆ, for all t. Second, we show that λ≥ λˆ implies λ≥ λ′.
Recall that θ ∗(λˆ)= λˆ, and that θ ∗ is decreasing in λ. Thus, we have
θ ∗(λ) < λˆ < λ,
and consequently
λ′ = αλ + (1 − α)θ ∗(λ) ≤ αλ + (1 − α)λ = λ.
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We deduce that if λ0 ≥ λˆ then λt ≥ λt+1, ∀t. From Proposition 4 we know that
limt→∞λt = λˆ, hence, |λt − λˆ| ↓ 0. The proof for λ0 ≤ λˆ is analogous.
(ii) Let α= α¯. Fix any λ0 ∈ [0,1]. Carefully inspecting the arguments from (i) shows
that (43) holds with equality if α= αˆ. Thus, we have λt = λˆ, for all t ≥ 1.
(iii) Consider α < α¯. Fix any λ0 ∈ [0,1]. In this case the inequality in (43) is reversed,
i.e., if λ≥ λˆ then λ′ ≤ λˆ. The proof that if λ≤ λˆ then λ′ ≥ λˆ follows from an
analogous computation. Next, we show that
|λ − λˆ| ≥ |λ′ − λˆ|. (44)
Again, we focus on λ≥ λˆ, the proof for λ≤ λˆ is analogous. If λ≥ λˆ, (44) becomes
λ − λˆ ≥ λˆ − λ′ ⇔ λ + λ′ ≥ 2λˆ. (45)
Observe that
λ + λ′ = λ (1 + α + (1 − α)θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(1 − α)θ0
≥ λˆ + λˆ(α + (1 − α)θ1) + (1 − α)θ0
= 2λˆ,
which yields (45). Together with the convergence established in Proposition 4,
we obtain |λt − λˆ| ↓ 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. We argue that
|λ′(α) − λ(α)| (46)
is decreasing in α. Inserting the definition of λ′(α) into (46), we obtain
(1 − α)|θ ∗(λ(α)) − λ(α)|.
For h< 0, we have λ(α)< λˆ(α) and thus θ ∗(λ(α))> λˆ(α)> λ(α). Therefore, we ob-
tain
(1 − α)(θ ∗(λ(α)) − λ(α)). (47)
Recall that
θ ∗(λ(α)) = θ1λ(α) + θ0. (48)
Taking the derivative of (47) with respect to α we obtain
−  θ1(λˆ(α) + h) + θ0 − (λˆ(α) + h) + (1 − α)∂ θ1
∂ α
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where we used (48) and the definition of λ(α). By definition of the long-run reputation
λˆ(α), it holds
λˆ(α) = θ1λˆ(α) + θ0. (50)













Substituting (50) and (51), simplifies (49) to
h





We want to argue that (52) is negative. This is equivalent to showing that the term in
brackets is positive as h< 0. From Step 3 of the proof of Proposition 5 we know that
(1−α)θ1 is increasing in α, i.e.,
− θ1 + (1 − α)∂ θ1
∂ α
≥ 0. (53)
Thus (52) is negative and the distance between λ′(α) and λ(α) is decreasing in α for
h< 0. The proof for h> 0 is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 7. We know from Lemma 2 that








and from Proposition 3 that
V (λ0,α) = v2λ
2
0 + v1λ0 + v0,








−  v2λ20 + v1λ0 + v0 . (54)
From here, we proceed in four steps.
Step 1: The difference V (λ0, 1)− V (λ0,α) is strictly convex, for all α < 1.
In order to determine the curvature of (54), we consider the coefficient of λ20, which is
1
4(1 − δ) −
1 − δα(2α − 1) −Æ(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2
2δ(1 − α)2 .
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Rewriting fractions to have the same denominator yields
(1 − α)2δ − 2(1 − δ) (1 − δα(2α − 1)) + 2(1 − δ)Æ(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2
4δ(1 − δ)(1 − α)2 . (55)
Note that the denominator of (55) is strictly positive for any α < 1. Let
a := (1 − α)2δ − 2(1 − δ) (1 − δα(2α − 1)) , and
b := 2(1 − δ)
q
(1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2.
The difference, (54), is strictly convex if and only if the numerator of (55) is strictly
positive, that is, if a+ b > 0. We start by considering the product (a+ b)(a− b)= a2 −
b2, that is 
(1 − α)2δ − 2(1 − δ) (1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − 4(1 − δ)2  (1 − δα(2α − 1))2 − δ(1 − α)2 .
After some algebra, we obtain
δ2(1 − α)2 (1 − α)2 − (1 − δ)  4 + 4α − 8α2 . (56)
The sign of (56) is determined by the sign of
(1 − α)2 − (1 − δ)  4 + 4α − 8α2 . (57)
As 4+ 4α− 8α2 = 4(1−α2)+ 4α(1−α)> 0, (57) is strictly increasing in δ. Consider
(57) for δ = 0,
(1 − α)2 −  4 + 4α − 8α2 = − 3(1 − α2) + 6α(1 − α) < 0.
Showing that (57) is strictly negative for δ = 0 implies that (a+ b)(a− b)= a2 − b2 is
strictly negative for all δ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, either a− b or a+ b must be negative but not
both. Since a+ b > a− b, we know that only a− b can be negative and, hence, a+ b is
positive which implies that (54) is strictly convex, as claimed.
Step 2: V (1, 1) is an upper bound for V (λ0,α).
In period t, the seller’s period profits from choosing θ †t are given by 







Note that (58) is strictly increasing in λt . Hence, obtaining the maximum of (58) for
λt = 1 in each period is an upper bound for V (λ0,α). For the case where α= 1, we have
λt = λ0 = 1 for all t ∈ {0,1, . . .}, and, therefore, the seller attains this upper bound by
Lemma 2. For α < 1, the seller’s value V (λ0,α) is smaller than the upper bound which
implies that (54) is positive for λ0 = 1.
Step 3: For any α < 1, V (0, 1) is strictly smaller than V (0,α).
From Lemma 2, we know that θ †t = 1/2, for all t ∈ {0,1, . . .}, if α= 1 and λ0 = 0. In
each period, the seller thus realizes demand of 1/2 at a constant price of 1/2 which
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yields a value of
1
4 (1 − δ) .
Now, consider the seller’s profit for the case whereα < 1when she equally sets θ †t = 1/2
for all t ∈ {0,1, . . .}. Again, she realizes demand of 1/2 in each period but at higher
prices for t ≥ 1 because α < 1 implies that λt > 0 for t ≥ 1. Consequently, V (0,1) is
strictly smaller than V (0,α) which implies that (54) is negative for λ0 = 0.
Step 4: Existence of λ¯0(α) ∈ (0,1).
We know from the previous steps that (54) is strictly convex, strictly positive at λ0 = 1,
and strictly negative at λ0 = 0. This implies that for any α < 1, there exists a unique cut-
off in (0,1). For any λ0 > λ¯0(α), (54) is strictly positive, and hence V (λ0, 1)> V (λ0,α).
Conversely, for any λ0 < λ¯0(α), (54) is strictly negative, and hence V (λ0, 1)< V (λ0,α).
For λ0 = λ¯0(α), (54) equals zero which concludes the proof.
4
Redistributional Effects of Health
Insurance in Germany: Private and
Public Insurance, Premia and
Contribution Rates?
This chapter develops a model of the German health insurance system for identifying re-
distribution streams and evaluating proposals to change the system. A population, char-
acterized by health and income, obtains health insurance either from a budget-balancing
public insurer or a more flexible, revenue-maximizing private insurer. Redistribution occurs
across health and income, and the private insurer extracts surplus, by attracting profitable
customers, which cannot be used for redistribution. We analyze changes in redistribution
when switching from the current contribution-based system to a premium-based system
with only one type of insurer. Furthermore, we study the properties of welfare-maximizing
fee schedules.
4.1 Introduction
In many industrialized countries health costs constitute a significant portion of GDP. As
health costs continue to increase due to technological progress, higher life expectancy,
and an aging population, and at the same time the prospects for the wider economy de-
cline with periods of low economic growth and high rates of unemployment, the question
arises of how the burden of financing health costs is currently distributed and how it
could be distributed in the future. Which parts of the population (will) subsidize which
other parts of the population through the health insurance system?
? Based on joint work with Linda Schilling (see Schickner and Schilling, 2016). We would like to thank
Deniz Dizdar, Eugen Kovac, Daniel Krähmer, Benny Moldovanu, and participants of the BGSE Micro Work-
shop, the BGSE Brown Bag Seminar, and the MPI Econ Workshop in Bonn for helpful comments and
suggestions.
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Understanding the organizational structure of the health insurance market is key to
understanding how the health insurance system redistributes income between different
parts of the population. As in many other countries, the question of how to organize the
market for health insurance is a topic of intense public debate in Germany. Several com-
peting policy proposals for changing the organizational structure of the health insurance
market are on the table, with commentators varying in their praise of the advantages
in terms of efficiency and equity of one or the other.
While economic theory has extensively studied abstract health insurance markets, in
particular the implications of private information and the resulting problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard, it comes at a surprise that relatively little work has been
done on explicitly modeling specific health insurance systems in order to substantiate
descriptive analysis and evaluate policy proposals.
In this chapter we provide an analytic framework for the German health insurance
system for assessing redistribution streams in the current health insurance system
and evaluating policy proposals aimed at changing the organizational structure of the
health insurance market.
We consider a model of the German health insurance market with three kinds of
agents.1 There is a continuum population of customers. Each customer is characterized
by his income and his health, which are positively correlated. Corresponding to the
customer’s health are his health costs. Health insurance is provided by two insurers,
a public insurer and a private insurer. Health insurance is obligatory. There exists an
income threshold, the opt-out threshold, below which customers must insure with the
public insurer; customers with income above the opt-out threshold can choose between
the public and the private insurer. Health insurance provides customers with a monetary
benefit; it reimburses their health costs up to a fixed level, the benefit level. We refer
to this monetary benefit as health benefit. Health insurers charge their customers a
fee to finance their expenditures. The public insurer charges a fixed percentage, the
contribution rate, of its customers’ income up to a contribution cap. The private insurer
is more flexible in that its fee may additionally condition on the health type. We assume
that all market participants can observe customers’ characteristics. Also, the private
insurer is obliged to charge a fee which is lower than the contribution cap. Whereas
the private insurer maximizes profits, the public insurer aims at running a balanced
budget, i.e., it balances the health benefits to its customers with the fees it collects from
its customers. We study the health insurance market in two periods. First, insurers set
their fees for every eligible customer. Then, customers choose their insurance.2
1 See Breyer (2004), Wörz and Busse (2005), or Grunow and Nuscheler (2014) for exhaustive descrip-
tions of the German health insurance system.
2 Although somewhat peculiar, the German health insurance system bears some similarities with the
health insurance systems in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and the Netherlands, cf. Thomson and
Mossialos (2006) and Panthöfer (2016). Also, other European countries have considered emulating the
German system, see Thomson and Mossialos (2006).
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To gain some intuition for our model, we start by analyzing the case when health
insurance is voluntary. In this case, there exists no equilibrium in the health insurance
market, i.e., the health insurance market collapses. Call a customer profitable if the
difference between his fee at the public insurer and his health benefit is positive and
unprofitable otherwise. Intuitively, if health insurance is voluntary, profitable customers
prefer to bear their health costs themselves. Thus, health insurers only attract unprof-
itable customers. In particular, there is a group of low-income customers who are only
eligible for public insurance and whose fees are strictly less than their health benefit.
This group insures with the public insurer, which makes it impossible for the public
insurer to run a balanced budget. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), this
unraveling of the market is not a result of asymmetric information but a result of the
way the market is organized, in particular the restriction that the public insurer’s fee
only depends on the income type and not on the health type. As a result, the public
insurer cannot fully account for customers’ health costs. In addition to potential issues
of asymmetric information, this result provides a rationale for why health insurance is
obligatory in Germany.
Turning to obligatory insurance, we derive a condition under which there exists an
equilibrium in the health insurance market. Roughly, the condition states that the popu-
lation’s health costs are not larger than the income of customers who must insure with
the public insurer. It is instructive to look at the strategy of the private insurer. Because
its fee can also depend on the customer’s health, the private insurer is more flexible than
the public insurer.3 In equilibrium, the private insurer distinguishes between profitable
and unprofitable customers. It tries to attract profitable customers by slightly undercut-
ting the public fee and to deter unprofitable customers by setting the highest possible
fee, i.e., the private insurer tries to cream skim customers. In equilibrium, all customers,
profitable and unprofitable, with income below the opt-out threshold choose public in-
surance. Profitable customers with income above the opt-out threshold join the private
insurer. Unprofitable customers with high income are indifferent between public and
private insurance because both insurers charge the highest possible fee.
The redistribution streams are as follows. Profitable customers with income below
the opt-out threshold subsidize all unprofitable customers which join the public insurer.
The private insurer uses its flexibility in setting fees to extract the surplus of profitable,
high-income customers and turns them into profits. These customers’ surplus is lost for
redistribution. Note that redistribution occurs across income and health.
It is interesting to observe that high-income customers would pay less if they were
forced to insure with the public insurer. In equilibrium, they join the private insurer at
a cost that is essentially equal to the fee of the public insurer. If they would join the
public insurer, their surplus could be used for redistribution which would allow for a
decrease in the contribution rate and thus a decrease in the fee they pay. Because the
3 It is convenient to assume that all insurers provide the same benefit level which allows us to focus on
fees. See Section 4.5 for the extension to heterogeneous benefit levels.
116 | 4 Redistributional Effects of Health Insurance in Germany
effect of a single customer on the contribution rate is negligible, the private insurer can
prevent this by marginally undercutting the public fee.
The opportunity to opt-out of the redistributive public system was originally granted
to enhance consumer choice and stimulate competition. However, our analysis indicates
that because the private insurer has more flexibility in setting its fee it can favorably se-
lect its customers which leads to a higher fee for all customers. Surplus from profitable
high-income customers is converted into profits for the private insurer and lost for re-
distribution through public insurance.
Our findings are consistent with the result in Pauly (1984) that cream skimming
may occur as a result of regulation of the fee structure. Cream skimming in the German
health insurance market is in line with the empirical findings of Grunow and Nuscheler
(2014) and Bünnings and Tauchmann (2015). Grunow and Nuscheler (2014) find that
private insurance customers who experienced a negative health shock are more likely
to switch to the public system, thereby imposing additional costs on the public system.
Bünnings and Tauchmann (2015) find that young, healthy, high-earning individuals
are more likely to leave the public sector.4
We then proceed by analyzing how changes in policy parameters affect the equi-
librium in the health insurance market. We find that increasing the opt-out threshold
decreases the contribution rate and thereby the fee of the entire population. Conse-
quently, all customers have higher utility. This is due to two effects: First, increasing
the opt-out threshold increases the part of the population which must insure with the
public insurer, thereby decreasing the range in which the private insurer may cream
skim. Second, the customers which join the public insurer as a result of the increase
in the opt-out threshold are on average more profitable than existing customers of the
public insurer because they have comparatively high income, and income and health
are correlated.
Next, we study structural changes in the population’s health and income. First, we
show that, surprisingly, systematic improvements of the population’s health and income
do not necessarily lead to a decrease in the contribution rate. For this purpose, we
identify subgroups of the population which determine whether a specific improvement
increases or decreases the contribution rate. The contribution rate may increase if
many healthy, medium-income customers of the public insurer become eligible to
choose between public and private insurance as a result of their income increase. These
profitable customers leave the public insurer and join the private insurer. Thus, govern-
ment programs aimed at increasing health or income may increase the contribution
rate because of the organization of the health insurance market. Second, inspired by
the increasing correlation between health and income (see, for example, Deaton and
4 For an empirical assessment of selection between public and private plans in the US health insurance
system see Brown et al. (2014), Newhouse et al. (2012), and Newhouse et al. (2015).
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Paxson, 1998), we study the effect of an increase in correlation between health and
income on the health insurance market.5 We specify conditions under which an increase
in correlation leads to an increase in the contribution rate. Intuitively, low-income
customers choose public insurance; high-income customers choose private insurance. If
the correlation between health and income increases, low-income customers also have
worse health. Consequently, to balance its budget, the public insurer has to increase the
contribution rate.
Having analyzed redistribution in the current German health insurance system, we
evaluate how proposals to reorganize the health insurance market, currently being put
forward by policy makers, would change redistribution. Two ideas have been at the
center of the discussion (see, e.g., Breyer, 2004; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bun-
desministerium der Finanzen, 2004; Wörz and Busse, 2005). First, to abandon the
difference in regulation between private and public insurers. Second, to replace the
income-dependent contribution by a flat fee which is independent of income and health,
a so called health premium. A comparable system is currently in place in Switzerland.
We adjust our model to incorporate these organizational changes and prove exis-
tence of equilibrium in the adjusted model. We find that in the premium-based system
redistribution occurs only across the health dimension not across the income dimension.
Consequently, compared to the contribution-based system, low-income customers suffer,
whereas high-income customers gain. We further analyze these findings by comparing
the (utilitarian) welfare of the population in the two systems. We identify two effects
that are important. Because the customers’ utility function is concave, redistributing
income from high-income customers to low-income customers increases welfare. This
redistribution effect speaks in favor of the contribution-based system in which the fee
depends on income. On the other hand, in the contribution-based system, the private
insurer extracts surplus from its customers which cannot be used for redistribution
via the public insurance. This competition effect speaks in favor of the premium-based
system in which insurers compete on equal grounds for customers from the entire
population. Consequently, we obtain the following two results: If the opt-out threshold
is sufficiently high, i.e., the influence of private insurance on the contribution-based
system sufficiently low, the current contribution-based system yields higher welfare
than the premium-based system. However, introducing a simple, budget-balanced
income redistribution scheme (income tax) into the premium-based system permits to
obtain the same level of welfare as one could obtain in the current German system,
given the most favorable specification of the policy parameters. This implies that a
change of the current system to a premium-based system ought to be accompanied by
an appropriate increase in redistribution through, e.g., income taxation.
5 For an analysis of the causal effect of income on health, using the German reunification as a natural
experiment, see Frijters et al. (2005).
118 | 4 Redistributional Effects of Health Insurance in Germany
Motivated by the preceding analysis, we then study properties of welfare-
maximizing fee schedules if health insurance is provided exclusively by a benevolent
authority who has to finance the aggregate health expenditures. This gives practical
insights into how to adjust the regulation of fee schedules to improve welfare. Equiva-
lently, it sheds light on the optimal adjustment of income taxation when introducing a
premium-based system.
First, we consider the case when the fee may condition on health and income. In this
case, we derive the welfare-maximizing fee schedule in closed form. Let a customer’s
net income be his income minus his health costs. The optimal scheme exhibits strong
redistributional features. First, it charges each customer the health costs he imposes on
the system. Second, it charges/reimburses eachmember of the population the difference
between his net income and the average net income in the population.
Second, inspired by the fee of the public insurer which only depends on income, we
study properties of the welfare-maximizing fee schedule that only depends on income.
We show that the optimal fee schedule increases quicker than income itself. This stands
in stark contrast to the fee of the public insurer which is a percentage of income and
therefore increases slower than income. Intuitively, the fee schedule tries to mimic the
strong redistributional features of the welfare-maximizing fee schedule that conditions
on both health and income. As income increases by one unit, net income increases
by more than one unit because higher income entails lower health costs due to the
correlation between health and income. The fee schedule aims at compensating this
increase and therefore increases by more than one as well.
Related Literature. The related literature can be roughly grouped into two
strands: on the one hand, the theoretical literature on insurance; on the other hand,
policy-oriented papers addressing specifically the German health insurance system.
The theoretical literature has mostly analyzed abstract insurance markets, focusing
on the implications of private information. The seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) demonstrates that competitive insurance markets can fail as a consequence of
asymmetric information. Combining ideas from Rothschild-Stiglitz and optimal income
taxation (see Mirrlees, 1971), Rochet (1991) and Cremer and Pestieau (1996) argue
that social insurance is desirable to supplement an optimal income tax if productivity
and health risk are negatively correlated, that is, a more productive individual has a
lower health risk. See also Blomqvist and Horn (1984). Nishimura (2009) and Boad-
way et al. (2006) extend this idea to include adverse selection and moral hazard in the
health insurance market. Neudeck and Podczeck (1996) study different insurance sys-
tems within the Rothschild-Stiglitz model. They show how various combinations of pri-
vate and public insurance, among them a German-style system, can implement second-
best. Employing the Rawlsian welfare criterion, Franc and Abadie (2004) study when
opting-out of public insurance is optimal in the Rochet model.
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Besley (1989) and Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) discuss the welfare implications
of moral hazard for insurance systems in which private insurance is supplementary to
public insurance. Petretto (1999) studies the optimal design of such a system under
efficiency and equity considerations.
In contrast to this strand of literature, we explicitly model the organizational struc-
ture of a specific health insurance system and study its redistributional implications,
abstracting from issues of private information.
Cream skimming of private insurers due to the organizational structure of the Ger-
man health insurance system has been described in, e.g., Breyer (2004), Jacobs and
Schulze (2004), Wasem et al. (2004), Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesminis-
terium der Finanzen (2004), and Thomson and Mossialos (2006). Our work comple-
ments these papers by providing an analytical framework to corroborate their observa-
tions.
In contemporary, independent work Panthöfer (2016) studies selection in the
German health insurance system by augmenting a Rothschild-Stiglitz model to
fit the German health insurance system. In a subsequent empirical analysis, he finds
evidence for risk selection: Good risks leave the public system and join the private sector.
Our comparison of the redistributional effects of financing the insurance system
through income-dependent contributions and income-independent premiums relates
to the seminal work of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). They show that in the presence of
private information any Pareto-efficient allocation can be implemented solely relying
on income taxation. No additional income redistribution, e.g. through contributions
in the health insurance system, is necessary. In a policy-oriented approach, Breyer
and Haufler (2000) put forward two arguments against income redistribution through
health contributions: first, the facilitated adoption of incentive-compatible health
insurance contracts, and, second, a reduction of the excess burden from implicit income
taxation. Abstracting from informational considerations, Buchholz (2005) and Haufler
(2004) provide equivalence results between the redistributional effect of contributions
and the redistributional effect of premiums combined with an appropriate adjustment
of income taxation.
By deriving an analogous equivalence result in an equilibrium model, our analysis
underpins their findings.
Fehr and Jess (2006) and Schubert and Schnabel (2009) simulate computable
general equilibrium models to assess the economic implications of introducing various
variants of a premium system. Kemnitz (2013) compares the effect of a contribution-
based financing scheme and a premium-based financing scheme on competition of
health insurers in a duopoly model. Gouveia (1997) studies an abstract model in which
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the population votes to determine the level of state provision of health services. Breyer
(2001) applies this model to compare the premium-based Swiss health insurance
system to the contribution-based German health insurance system. His analysis predicts
higher health benefits and consequently higher health costs in a contribution-based
system. Kifmann (2005) analyzes a model in which the population democratically votes
on its health insurance system. He shows that a contribution-based system is likely to
arise in a democracy. In a similar vein, Hansen and Keiding (2002) analyze welfare
differences between provision of health insurance through a competitive market and a
system with compulsory insurance but democratic choice of the level of health benefits.
They show that under some conditions the competitive market may outperform the
compulsory, democratic system.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we provide a formal
description of the health insurance market. In Section 4.3 we prove existence of equi-
librium and analyze changes in policy parameters and the distribution of health and
income. In Section 4.4 we compare the current health insurance system to a premium-
based health insurance system and study welfare-maximizing fee schedules. Section 4.5
discusses extensions of the model, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Model
In the health insurance market a population of customers purchases health insurance
contracts from either of two insurers: a private health insurer and a public health insurer.
4.2.1 Population
The population consists of a unit mass continuum of customers. Every customer is char-
acterized by his health type h and his income type e; a high value of h corresponds
to a good state of health. Types are distributed according to a distribution with dis-
tribution function F(h, e) with compact and connected supportH ×E = [0, h¯]× [0, e¯].
The distribution has a strictly positive, twice differentiable density f (h, e). We assume
that health type and income type are affiliated.6 Associated with a customer’s health
type h are health costs c(h) where c(·) is a continuous, positive, and strictly decreas-
ing function. Every customer is endowed with a strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
twice continuously differentiable utility function u(w) over wealth w which is, for an
uninsured customer, the difference between income and health costs
w = e − c(h).
Customers’ health and income type are observable by all agents in the market.
6 Affiliation is a strong form of positive correlation and widely used in Auction Theory, cf. Milgrom and
Weber (1982).
4.2 Model | 121
4.2.1.1 Choice of Insurance
Health insurance is compulsory, i.e., every customer must choose a contract. A customer
has to insure with the public insurer if his income is less than the opt-out threshold K1;
otherwise, he is eligible to choose between private and public insurance. Neither insurer
is allowed to exclude customers from its service, that is, both insurers have to offer a
contract to every eligible customer.
4.2.1.2 Contracts
A health insurance contract is defined by its fee p(h, e) and the maximum monetary
reimbursement of health costs, benefit level L. We assume that both insurers offer the
same fixed benefit level L.7 Denote by C (h, e) the set of contracts available to a type-
(h, e) customer. Upon signing a contract, a customer pays p(h, e) and receives amonetary
reimbursement of min(c(h), L), the health benefit.8 For a fixed contract, we refer to
min(c(h), L)− p(h, e) as the customer’s net benefit. Formally type-(h, e)’s problem is to
choose (L, p(h, e)) such that
(L, p(h, e)) ∈ arg max
(L,p)∈C (h,e)
u(e + min(L − c(h), 0) − p(h, e)). (1)
4.2.2 Public Health Insurance
The public health insurer (PU) charges its customers a fixed percentage α, the contri-
bution rate, of their income. Above income K2, however, the fee remains constant; we
refer to K2 as the contribution cap. Therefore, the public fee is
pPU(e) = αmin(K2, e). (2)
PU’s fee does not depend explicitly on the customer’s health type. PU commits to oper-
ate with a balanced budget, i.e., it equates revenues and expenditures. Formally, PU’s
objective is to set α ∈ [0,1] such that
α E[min(K2, e)1{PU(α)}] = E[min(L, c(h))1{PU(α)}], (3)
where {PU(α)} denotes the set of PU customers, and the expectation is taken with
respect to F(·).
7 Thomson et al. (2002) note that the difference in the benefit level between public and private insur-
ance is small. Whereas private insurance is more generous with respect to some treatments such as dental
care, public insurance is more generous with respect to others, for example, psychotherapy. See also Section
4.5 for a discussion what happens if we relax this assumption.
8 The minimum function allows us to model overinsurance, i.e., the case when L > c(h).
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4.2.3 Private Health Insurance
The private health insurer (PR) charges each customer a fee pPR(h, e) that may depend
on the customer’s health type and income. We call the function pPR(·) PR’s fee schedule.
PR is obliged to set a fee below αK2, i.e., pPR(h, e)≤ αK2 for all health and income
types. We refer to a fee pPR(h, e) satisfying this requirement as feasible fee and to pPR(·)
as feasible fee schedule. PR aims at maximizing profit, i.e., fees collected minus health
benefits. Thus, PR’s objective is to choose pPR(·) such that
pPR(·) ∈ arg max
p(·) feasible
E[(p(h, e) − min(L, c(h))) 1{PR(α)} ], (4)
where {PR(α)} denotes the set of PR customers.9
4.2.4 Remarks
In contrast to PR, PU does not maximize profits but aims at balancing its budget. Legally,
public insurers in Germany are not private companies but “public bodies”, see Jacobs
and Schulze (2004), or as Bauhoff (2012) notes, “(...) sickness funds are non-profit insti-
tutions (...)”. Thus, one interpretation of a budget-balancing PU is that it is an institution
set up by a benevolent regulator to cover the population’s health benefits at minimal
cost. Alternatively, we can interpret PU as a proxy for an entire competitive market of
public insurers.
To single out the effect of the organizational structure of the health insurance mar-
ket, we assume that insurers observe customers’ characteristics, in particular their health
type, thereby shutting down confounding channels such as adverse selection as a result
of private information. We believe that this assumption is reasonable for two reasons.
First, (private) insurers require potential customers to fill in binding questionnaires
about their medical history. Second, insurers can draw on internal statistics to estimate
precisely the likelihood that a customer falls sick with a certain disease.10 For a some-
what critical view on the practical importance of asymmetric information in health in-
surance markets see Pauly (1984) and Siegelman (2004). Both authors also emphasize
the importance of studying the organizational and institutional setting of health insur-
ance markets over the implications of asymmetric information. See Breyer (2004) for a
similar conclusion in the realm of European health insurance markets. On the empirical
side, the finding of asymmetric information in insurance markets is mixed. For a liter-
ature overview see Siegelman (2004), Cohen and Siegelman (2010), and Einav et al.
(2010). These studies conclude that the importance of asymmetric information varies
significantly across markets. In a similar spirit, see also Finkelstein and Poterba (2004).
9Note that PU’s and PR’s objective are only well-defined if {PU(α)} and {PR(α)} are measurable. In
the following, we abstract from these measurability issues and restrict attention to cases where {PU(α)}
and {PR(α)} are measurable.
10 In Section 4.5, we study the case when insurers observe only a health signal which is correlated to
the true health type.
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As customers decide on their insurance contract after observing their type, cus-
tomers face no uncertainty about future income and health costs. Thus, the motive to
insure is imposed by regulation, more precisely, the fact that health insurance is oblig-
atory. This assumption simplifies the analysis and allows for a clean investigation of
redistribution streams.
4.3 Equilibrium
4.3.1 Timing and Equilibrium Concept
Agents interact on the health insurance market in two periods. In the first period, PU
and PR simultaneously devise fees for all customer types; in the second period, every
customer chooses from his set of contracts. We are now in the position to define an
equilibrium of the health insurance market.11
Definition 1. An equilibrium of the health insurance market is a tuple 
α∗, p∗PR(·), (L∗, p∗(h, e))

such that
(i) α∗ satisfies (3) given p∗PR(·) and (L∗, p∗(h, e)),
(ii) p∗PR(·) solves (4) given α∗ and (L∗, p∗(h, e)),
(iii) (L∗, p∗(h, e)) solves (1), for all α ∈ [0, 1], feasible pPR(·), and h, e.
4.3.2 Voluntary Health Insurance
Before establishing equilibrium existence, we study the health insurance market when
relaxing the assumption that health insurance is obligatory. In this case, instead of pur-
chasing contracts from PU and PR, every customer may choose to be uninsured and bear
health costs himself. As is not uncommon in models of insurance, voluntary insurance
leads to a complete unraveling of the health insurance market:
Proposition 1. For any positive benefit level there exists no equilibrium in the health in-
surance market if health insurance is voluntary.
We provide intuition for Proposition 1; formal details of this and all following proofs
can be found in the Appendix. If health insurance is voluntary, a customer is willing to in-
sure only if a contract offers him a net benefit, that is, if the difference between health
benefits and fee is positive. All customers whose contract set contains only contracts
with negative net benefit decide to remain uninsured. A net benefit for the customer
translates one-to-one into a loss in profits for the insurer. Hence, only customers who
inflict a (weak) loss on the health insurer choose to be insured. PR can avoid the loss
on most parts of the population as it can finetune its contract to customer’s health and
11 Besides the measurability issue mentioned above, our equilibrium concept coincides with the defini-
tion of pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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income. PR may only incur a loss if the upper bound on its fee binds, restricting PR’s abil-
ity to deter unprofitable customers. This might occur for rich and unhealthy customers.
PU is less flexible because it only discriminates along the income dimension. As a con-
sequence, for positive benefit level, PU cannot avoid a loss on comparatively poor and
unhealthy customers. These customer want to insure; since their income is sufficiently
low, PR can deter them from insuring privately. Thus, they insure with PU. As a result,
PU is unable to run a balanced budget, and, hence, there exists no equilibrium.
To sum up, if health insurance is voluntary, customers who are attractive from the
insurers’ perspective remain uninsured, leaving insurers with unprofitable customers.
This makes health insurance non-viable. Note that in contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), market breakdown is not a result of asymmetric information since customer
types are observable but purely a consequence of the organizational structure of the
health insurance market. Proposition 1 provides a rationale for why health insurance is
obligatory in Germany and more generally in many health insurance markets.
4.3.3 Equilibrium Existence
Retaining obligatory health insurance, we prove existence of equilibrium in the health in-
surance market. We proceed backward from the second period, first studying customers’
optimal insurance choice.
Lemma 1. Given any contribution rate set by PU and any feasible fee schedule of PR, it is
optimal for customers to choose the insurance which offers the contract with the lowest fee.
Customers whose income is below the opt-out threshold can only choose PU’s con-
tract. All other customers have the choice between PU and PR. As the utility function is
strictly increasing, every customer chooses the contract which offers him the largest net
benefit. Since the benefit level is fixed and equal for PU and PR, it is the contract’s fee
that determines the net benefit and, thereby, its attractiveness for customers.
In the following, we assume that customers choose PR when they are indifferent,
i.e., if both insurers charge the same fee.12
Having determined the population’s optimal insurance choice, we analyze PR’s opti-
mal fee schedule. We call a customer profitable if, for a given contribution rate, the fee
PU charges exceeds his health benefits; otherwise, we call the customer unprofitable.
Lemma 2. Given customers’ optimal choice and any contribution rate set by PU, it is op-
timal for PR to set its fee equal to PU’s fee if a customer is profitable and to set the highest
possible fee if a customer is unprofitable.
For a profitable customer, PR faces the trade-off between attracting the customer and
charging a high fee. If PR’s fee exceeds PU’s fee, the customer rejects PR’s contract and
chooses PU. If PR’s fee is strictly less than PU’s fee, PR can increase profits by increasing
12 See also the remarks following Theorem 1.
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its fee slightly without losing the customer. Hence, it is optimal for PR to set its fee
exactly equal to PU’s fee for all profitable customers.
If a customer is unprofitable and PR sets a fee below PU’s fee, PR incurs a loss.
Because PR may not reject customers, PR tries to deter unprofitable customers by
setting its fee as high as possible. Note that PR may not deter all unprofitable customers
because of the upper bound on its fee.
In contrast to PU, PR sets a flexible fee and discriminates based on both health and
income. The above argument shows that PR exploits its greater flexibility to cream skim
all profitable customers with sufficiently high income, i.e., with income exceeding the
opt-out threshold. In fact, if it would not be for the opt-out threshold, PR could cream
skim all profitable customers in the population which would make it impossible for PU
to run a balanced budget. Hence, the opt-out threshold is essential for the existence of
equilibrium in the health insurance market.
This observation motivates the following assumption which wemaintain throughout
this chapter.
Assumption 1. (Viable health insurance market.) The aggregate income of customers with
income below the opt-out threshold and below the contribution cap exceeds the entire pop-
ulation’s health benefits:
E[min(L, c(h))] < E[e1{e<min(K1,K2)}].
Roughly, Assumption 1 says that the total income of all customer who must insure
with PU covers the health costs of the whole population. It guarantees that the popu-
lation structure is such that, at least potentially, PU can run a balanced budget. There
are several reasons why Assumption 1 may be satisfied; some of which of may lie under
the direct control of an exogenous regulator (benefit level, opt-out threshold, contribu-
tion cap) some of which may not (health costs). In particular, Assumption 1 holds if the
benefit level is sufficiently low or the opt-out threshold is sufficiently high. With this
assumption in place, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Assume that the health insurance market is viable. Then the health insurance
market has an equilibrium. Furthermore, the equilibrium contribution rate α∗ is unique if
customers and PR behave as described in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the intermediate value theorem. The key step is
to establish continuity of PU’s objective in the contribution rate. See the Appendix for
details.
In equilibrium, customers with income below the opt-out threshold choose PU.
Above the opt-out threshold customers who are profitable insure with PR; unprofitable
customers insure with PU. However, all customers, profitable or unprofitable, with in-























Figure 1. Customers’ insurance choice by customer type for the cases (a) K1 < K2 and (b)
K2 < K1. The green area is composed of PU customers, the red area of PR customers. The
cross-hatched area represents unprofitable customers, and the area with diagonal stripes
profitable customers.
come above the contribution cap and above the opt-out threshold choose PR. See Figure
1 for a graphical illustration.
Interestingly, independent of their insurance choice, all customers pay the amount
they would pay if they insured with PU. That is, PR’s fee is coupled to PU’s fee in equi-
librium. Intuitively, its monopolistic power in the private sector allows PR to charge
customers a fee that makes them indifferent to choosing their outside option which is
insuring with PU.13 Attracting profitable customers entails two positive effects for PR:
First, there is an immediate gain in profits. Second, if PU loses profitable customers to
PR, PU has to increase the contribution rate which leads to a higher fee for all customers.
This in turn allows PR to increase fees for all its customers as their outside option has
13We study the case of competing private insurers in Section 4.5.
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become less attractive. In fact, note that if profitable customers with income above the
opt-out threshold would collectively choose to insure with PU instead of PR, PU could
adjust the contribution rate downward which would lead to a lower fee for the entire
population. Intuitively, PR prevents this by slightly undercutting PU’s fee.
What are the redistributional effects of the health insurance market? Profitable cus-
tomers with income below the opt-out threshold subsidize all unprofitable customers of
PU. Furthermore, the relative profitability of these two customer groups determines the
fee for the entire population through their effect on the contribution rate. The surplus
of profitable customers with high income above the opt-out threshold is transformed
one-to-one into a profit for PR and is lost for the population. PR may incur a loss on
unprofitable customers with income above the contribution cap and above the opt-out
threshold. However, as a consequence of the organizational structure of the health
insurance market, PR obtains an overall profit: PU runs a balanced budget; relative
to PU, PR attracts customers with higher income. As health and income are positively
correlated, a higher income entails also a better health type. Thus, PR draws upon
a more lucrative part of the population and earns positive profits. See the proof of
Theorem 1 for details.
A couple of technical remarks are in order. First, as can be seen from the proof of
Theorem 1, the assumption that health and income are affiliated is not required for the
existence of equilibrium.
Second, note that PU’s contribution rate is only unique given the behavior of cus-
tomers and PR. However, customers indifference behavior is not unique. Our specifica-
tion that customers choose PR if they are indifferent resolves existence issues which
stem from profitable customers with income exceeding the opt-out threshold: If these
customers would choose PU when they are indifferent, PR would like to set a fee ar-
bitrarily close but not equal to PU’s fee. However, one could imagine other, plausible
specifications for unprofitable customers with income above the contribution cap and
above the opt-out threshold. For example, these customers could join PU. This could be
justified as follows. Bauhoff (2012) shows that insurers do not not only cream skim ex-
plicitly based on prices but also implicitly, for example, by signaling poor service quality
through delayed responses. A general theme of our model is that PR is more flexible
than PU, thus, it is plausible to assume that PR is also more successful in deterring cus-
tomers implicitly. Even if PR is only slightly better at deterring customers implicitly, all
profitable customers with income above the opt-out threshold join PR, and all unprof-
itable customers with income above the opt-out threshold join PU. For this and other
specifications an analogous analysis applies.
Relatedly, PR’s optimal fee schedule may not be unique (even on a set with positive
measure): In order to deter unprofitable customers with income between the opt-out
threshold and the contribution cap, PR can set any fee that exceeds PU’s fee. Note,
however, that this does not change customers decisions and thus the equilibrium contri-
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bution rate is the same as under Lemma 2. Furthermore, our specification is particularly
robust to tremble-like errors in the behavior of customers.
4.3.4 Comparative Statics in Policy Parameters
Having established existence of equilibrium, we analyze how changes in the opt-out
threshold, the contribution cap, and the benefit level affect the equilibrium in the health
insurance market. As these three parameters might be controlled by an exogenous reg-
ulator, we refer to them as “policy” parameters.
Proposition 2. An increase of the opt-out threshold decreases the contribution rate.
First, consider the case where both the old opt-out threshold and the new opt-out
threshold are below the contribution cap. Recall that PR cream skims customers in the
population with income between the opt-out threshold and the contribution cap, i.e.,
profitable customers in this range insure with PR, whereas unprofitable customers in
this range insure with PU. An increase in the opt-out threshold limits PR’s possibility to
cream skim profitable customers. Some of the profitable customers are forced to insure
with PU under the new opt-out threshold. No additional unprofitable customers join PU
because they insured with PU already under the old opt-out threshold. Thus, all new
PU customers are profitable which allows PU to adjust the contribution rate downward.
Next, consider the case where the old and the new opt-out threshold lie above
the contribution cap. In this case, all customers with income below the the opt-out
threshold insure with PU; customers with income above the opt-out threshold insure
with PR. An increase in the opt-out threshold forces additional customers to insure
with PU. In contrast to the first case, some of these customers might be unprofitable.
However, compared to existing PU customers, the new customers have higher income.
As income and health are correlated, a higher income entails (on average) also a better
health type. These two factors allow PU to decrease the contribution rate.
Surprisingly, limiting their choice benefits customers in that it decreases the contri-
bution rate and thus their fee. As PR’s fee is coupled to PU’s fee in equilibrium not only
PU customers benefit from the lower contribution rate but all customers do. Intuitively,
with a higher opt-out threshold, more profitable customers are forced to insure with
PU rather than being cream skimmed by PR. These profitable customers’ surplus is re-
distributed to all other customers in the population (including themselves) rather than
translated into a profit for PR. PR’s profits decrease because PR loses profitable parts of
the population to PU and has to charge a lower fee to attract customers. Observe that
from the customers’ perspective, it would be desirable to set the opt-out threshold as
high as possible, essentially eliminating PR from the market. This provides a theoretic
foundation for the arguments in Breyer (2004) to increase compulsory membership in
public insurance to the entire population.
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Proposition 3.
(i) If the contribution cap is above the opt-out threshold, a decrease of the contribution
cap to a level that is still above the opt-out threshold decreases the contribution rate.
(ii) If the contribution cap is below the opt-out threshold, a decrease of the contribution
cap increases the contribution rate.
Consider first the case where the old and the new contribution cap lie above the opt-
out threshold. In this case, lowering the contribution cap decreases the range of income
in which PR can cream skim customers because PR faces a lower upper bound on its fee.
As a result, PR can deter fewer unprofitable customers from its service. Furthermore, PR
does not attract any new profitable customers. PU loses unprofitable customers while
retaining all profitable customers. Also, note that the fees that all remaining PU cus-
tomers pay are not reduced by the change since these customers have income below the
contribution cap. Therefore, PU can adjust the contribution rate downward.
Intuitively, after the decrease, profitable customers with income below the opt-out
threshold subsidize a smaller number of unprofitable customers which allows for a
decrease in the contribution rate. Consequently, all customers pay less, and PR’s profits
decrease.
Now consider the case where both the old and the new contribution cap lie below
the opt-out threshold. In this case, customer sets do not change through the decrease
of the contribution cap. However, PU is forced to reduce its fee for those customers for
whom the old contribution cap was binding. To compensate this loss, PU has to adjust
the contribution rate upward. Thus, customers’ fees increases, and PR’s profits increase.
Proposition 4. An increase of the benefit level increases the contribution rate.
An increase in the benefit level affects PU in two ways. First, existing PU customers
for whom the old benefit level was binding become less profitable. Additionally, if the
opt-out threshold is below the contribution cap, there is an income range where PR
cream skims. Some of the customers with income in this range are profitable under
the old benefit level but become unprofitable under the new benefit level. Under the
new benefit level, PR deters these customers who thus join PU. As a result of these
two effects, PU has to adjust the contribution rate upward to cover the increased health
benefits of its customers. The effect on customers’ utility is twofold. On the one hand,
all customers face a higher fee; on the other hand, some customers enjoy more health
benefits. Accordingly, PR can charge a higher fee but also needs to cover higher health
benefits.
4.3.5 Structural Population Changes
In this section we study how structural changes in the population’s health and income
affect the health insurance market. To this end, we analyze two different changes in the
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underlying distribution of health and income: a systematic improvement of health and
income and an increased correlation between health and income.
4.3.5.1 Systematic Improvement of Health and Income
First, we investigate the effect of a systematic improvement of the population’s income
and health on the contribution rate and PR’s profit.14
Intuitively, as the population’s income and health improve, the population should
spend a lower percentage of its income on health insurance given that the benefit level
stays constant. Indeed, if the entire population would insure with the budget-balancing
PU, the contribution rate could be adjusted downward. However, to account for the
precise organizational structure of the market a more thorough analysis is needed.
We start by analyzing how customer sets change as the distribution changes. It is
instructive to divide the population into four subgroups and study the effect of a sys-
tematic improvement on each of these subgroups separately.
Let {PU+(α∗)} be the set of profitable PU customers and {PU−(α∗)} the set of un-
profitable PU customers. Analogously, let {PR+(α∗)} be the set of profitable PR cus-
tomers and {PR−(α∗)} the set of unprofitable PR customers.
Profitability and unprofitability are defined relative to the original distribution and
the corresponding contribution rate α∗.
First, consider the effect on the subgroup of unprofitable PU customers, {PU−(α∗)}.
As health and income improve, PU’s profits from this subgroup unambiguously increase:
customers who remain in the group even after the improvement are less unprofitable
than before; additionally, some unprofitable customers leave {PU−(α∗)} to join one of
the other subgroups.
Second, consider how PR’s profit is affected on the set of its unprofitable customers,
{PR−(α∗)}. Customers remaining in the group even after the improvement are less un-
profitable than before, and some unprofitable customers join {PR+(α∗)}. This effect in-
creases PR’s profit. On the other hand, there is an inflow of new unprofitable customers
from {PU−(α∗)}. These customers are unprofitable before and after the change of dis-
tribution but had income lower than the contribution cap before the change and income
exceeding the contribution cap after the change. This effect decreases PR’s profit. Which
of the two effects dominates depends on the precise change in health and income.
Third, we analyze the effect on PR’s profit generated from {PR+(α∗)}: Customers re-
maining in the group are more profitable than before. Additionally, there is an inflow of
new profitable customers from all other subgroups. Thus, PR’s profit from this subgroup
increases.
14 Technically, we consider a stochastic improvement of f (h, e) to a distribution with density function
f˜ (h, e) in the sense of (multivariate) first-order stochastic dominance. See the Appendix for a definition
and technical details.
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Finally, consider {PU+(α∗)}. Again, customers remaining in this group are more
profitable than before. Also, there is an inflow of new profitable customers from
{PU−(α∗)}. These two effects suggest that PU’s profit should increase. However,
there is a countervailing effect. Profitable PU customers whose income exceeds the
opt-out threshold after the change are attracted by PR which decreases PU’s profit on
{PU+(α∗)}. Therefore, the overall change in profit depends on the exact changes in
health and income.
Even though we cannot determine the sign of the change in profits on {PR−(α∗)}
and {PU+(α∗)} in general, we can derive an upper bound on a potential loss. In fact,
a negative change in profits on {PR−(α∗)} never outweighs the increase in profits
on {PU−(α∗)}. To see this, observe that the loss in profit on {PR−(α∗)} is caused
by unprofitable customers switching from {PU−(α∗)} to {PR−(α∗)}. Thus, the loss
on {PR−(α∗)} corresponds one-to-one to a gain in profit on {PU−(α∗)}. All other
effects increase profit. Put differently, profit on {PR−(α∗)}∪ {PU−(α∗)} increases. An
analogous argument applies to the change in profit on {PU+(α∗)}.
Our analysis reveals that the systematic improvement of health and income may
affect the overall profit of PU and PR positively or negatively, depending on the precise
inflow and outflow into and from {PU+(α∗)} and {PR−(α∗)}. However, as noted above,
the overall effect is positive. Thus, it cannot be that PU’s and PR’s profits decrease. The
change in PU’s profit determines whether PU adjusts the contribution rate upward or
downward in response to the systematic improvement. As PR’s profit is increasing in the
contribution rate, this effect may reinforce or counteract the initial change in PR’s profit.
The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 5. Consider a systematic improvement of the population’s health and income.
Then always exactly one of the following three scenarios arises:
(i) If the loss in PU’s profit on {PU+(α∗)} outweighs the gain in profit on {PU−(α∗)},
then the contribution rate increases and PR’s profit increases.
(ii) If the loss in PR’s profit on {PR−(α∗)} outweighs the gain in profit on {PR+(α∗)},
then the contribution rate decreases and PR’s profit decreases.
(iii) Else the contribution rate decreases and PR may profit or lose.
Proposition 5 sorts the wide range of possible systematic improvements of health
and income into three categories according to their effect on the contribution rate and
PR’s profit. Given that the class of improvements we consider unambiguously increase
health and income for the entire population, these categories are surprisingly manifold.
In particular, there exist cases in which customers have to pay a higher percentage of
their income for health insurance. Intuitively, this is because an improvement might
allow PR to absorb profitable PU customers which urges PU to increase the contribution
rate in order to run a balanced budget.
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This observation has important implications. The current organization of the health
insurance market might mitigate policy programs and campaigns targeted to improve
the population’s health in order to decrease the contribution rate.
4.3.5.2 Increase in Correlation Between Health and Income
Motivated by empirical studies which document an increase in correlation between
health and income, see e.g. Deaton and Paxson (1998), we investigate how changes
in the correlation affect the health insurance market. For a meaningful comparison of
the correlation of two health-income distributions, we consider health-income distribu-
tions which are ranked according to the supermodular order and thus have the same
marginal distributions of health and income.15 Specifically, start with a distribution f
and consider a distribution g that is larger than f in the supermodular order. For the
case when the opt-out threshold exceeds the contribution cap, we obtain the following
clear-cut result.
Proposition 6. If the opt-out threshold exceeds the contribution cap, an increase in the
correlation between health and income increases the contribution rate.
To gain intuition for our result, it is instructive to decompose the transition from f
to g into several substeps. Consider the two-dimensional space of health and income
types. Start with the health-income distribution f . Now fit a rectangle into the health
income space and consider a transformation that shifts probability mass from the
bottom right corner of the rectangle to the bottom left corner and the same probability
mass from the upper left corner to the upper right corner. This transformation increases
correlation between health and income while keeping the marginal distributions of
health and income fixed. Intuitively, we can construct g from f by applying several of
these transformations to f .16
If the correlation-increasing transformation is such that all four corners of the rect-
angle lie within within the set of PR customers, PU is unaffected and the contribution
rate remains the same. Similarly, in case the four corners of the rectangle lie within
the set of PU customers, PU does not need to adjust the contribution rate because the
marginal distributions of health and income conditional on being a PU customer are
unchanged. Lastly, consider the case when the left corners of the rectangle are in the
set of PU customers whereas the right corners of the rectangle lie within the set of
PR customers. As a consequence of this transformation, the income distribution of PU
customers is not altered, however, the health distribution of PU customers worsens.
Therefore, PU has to increase the contribution rate to run a balanced budget. Taking
all three cases together, we see that PU increases the contribution rate if correlation
between health and income increases. From a broader perspective, PU customer have
comparatively low income, whereas PR customer have comparatively high income. If
15 See the Appendix for a formal definition.
16 Cf. Meyer and Strulovici (2015) for a way to make this intuition rigorous.
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the correlation between health and income increases, PU’s low-income customers have
also a worse health type which forces PU to increase the contribution rate.
If the opt-out threshold lies below the contribution cap, there exists an income
range where PR cream skims. Graphically, PU and PR customers are not separated any
longer by a single cutoff in the income dimension. Thus, we have to consider additional
correlation-increasing transformations. Consider the transformation where only the up-
per right corner of the rectangle is in the set of PR customers; all other corners lie in the
set of PU customers. For this transformation there are two conflicting effects. On the one
hand, the income distribution of PU customers worsens. On the other hand, unprofitable
customers leave PU. It depends on the distribution f which of the two effect dominates,
and, consequently, whether PU adjusts the contribution rate upward or downward. All
other transformations entail a decrease in the contribution rate. Overall, in this case, it
depends on the specific increase in correlation and on how much weight is put on which
transformation whether PU adjusts the contribution rate upward or downward.
4.4 Applications
We apply our model to address two policy questions. First, we study how customer wel-
fare changes if the health insurancemarket changes from the current contribution-based
system to a premium-based system. We identify the population subgroups that benefit
from such a change and the population subgroups that suffer. Second, we characterize
the theoretically welfare-optimal fees. Understanding the properties of welfare-optimal
fees yields additional insights into how to adjust the organization of the health insurance
market to improve customer welfare.
4.4.1 Health Premia
In recent years, discussions to change the health insurance market have centered
around two ideas. First, an abolishment of the difference between private and public
insurers. Second, a change from an income-dependent, contribution-based fee schedule
to a premium-based fee schedule, i.e., a schedule in which fees do not depend on the
customer’s income and health.
We adjust the model outlined in Section 4.2 to accommodate these two features
of a premium-based health insurance market. Subsequently, we apply our two models
to compare the premium-based health insurance market with the contribution-based
health insurance market. To make the two models comparable, we alter only the
insurance provision sector and leave all other characteristics, such as the population’s
health and income distribution and the customers’ objective, unchanged.
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In the premium-based health insurancemarket any customermust insure with either
of two identical premium insurers, henceforth PMi , i ∈ {1, 2}.17 Customers can choose
freely between PM1 and PM2, independent of their income and health. PM1 and PM2
offer the same benefit level and face the same health costs. PMi aims at balancing its
budget by charging all its customers premium Ai , i.e.,
E[min(c(h), L)1{PMi(Ai)}] = E[Ai1{PMi(Ai)}], (5)
where {PMi(Ai)} denotes the set of PMi ’s customers given premium Ai .
18 The timing
is unchanged. First, PM1 and PM2 simultaneously set their premium, then customers
choose their preferred insurer. We define equilibrium analogously to Section 4.3.
Proposition 7. There exists an equilibrium in the premium-based health insurancemarket.
In every equilibrium, all customers pay the premium
A∗ = E[min(c(h), L)]. (6)
As before, customers choose the insurance that gives them a higher net benefit.
Because the benefit level is equal, customers choose the insurer with lower fee, i.e.,
the insurer with lower premium. Thus, if PMi ’s premium is strictly lower than PM−i ’s
premium, all customers choose PMi . As PMi has to cover the health benefits of the
entire population and charges every customer the same premium, budget-balancing
implies that the equilibrium premium is equal to the average health benefit, i.e., (6).
If PM1 and PM2 charge the same premium, customers might split between insurers.
Together, PM1 and PM2 bear the health costs of the entire population. Because PM1
and PM2 charge the same premium and each insurer charges all its customers the same
premium, there is a single premium in equilibrium. Budget-balancing implies that also
in this case the equilibrium premium is equal to the average health benefit.
How does the change to a premium-based system affect redistribution in the popu-
lation? Proposition 7 reveals that in a premium-based system every customer pays the
average health benefit of the population, independent of his income. This implies that
redistribution occurs only along the health dimension, i.e., customers with a good health
type subsidize customers with a bad health type. In contrast to the contribution-based
system, there is no redistribution across the income dimension. Thus, the premium-
based system disentangles the mixture of redistribution across health and redistribution
across income which is inherent to the contribution-based system. As a consequence, we
obtain the following corollary
17 Analogous results hold if there are more than two premium insurers.
18Wemodel premium insurers in the spirit of the public insurer in the contribution-based system. Results
are virtually unchanged if we assume that premium insurers maximize profits.
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Corollary 1. There exists an income threshold such that all customers with income below
the threshold have higher utility in the contribution-based system, and all customers with
income above the threshold have higher utility in the premium-based system.
Ceteris paribus, customers with higher income pay more in the contribution-based
system, and customers with lower income pay less in the contribution-based system. As
health benefits remain equal, customers with higher income have a lower utility and
customers with lower income have a higher utility in the contribution-based system.
To maintain the current level of income redistribution, the introduction of a
premium-based system would thus have to be accompanied by an adjustment of
income taxation. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the observations of
Breyer (2004) and Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen
(2004).
We further assess and quantify the implications of redistribution on the population’s
utility in the premium-based system and in the contribution-based system. To this end,
we compare the population’s welfare in the two systems. We adopt the utilitarian wel-
fare criterion, i.e., our welfare function is the sum (integral) of utilities of all customers
in the population. Recall from Proposition 2 that an increase of the opt-out threshold
decreases the contribution rate and consequently the fee of all customers in the popula-
tion. Thus, as the opt-out threshold increases, all customers enjoy a higher utility, i.e.,
welfare increases. Welfare in the contribution-based system reaches its maximum once
the opt-out threshold is so high that the entire population must insure with PU. We refer
to this specific contribution-based system as contribution-based system without PR.
Proposition 8.
(i) For high levels of the opt-out threshold, the contribution-based system has higher
welfare than the premium-based system.
(ii) In the premium-based system, there exists a budget-balanced income redistribution
scheme such that welfare is the same as in the contribution-based system without PR.
To understand the result, observe that there are two opposing effects. On the
one hand, in the contribution-based system PR makes profits and thereby extracts
surplus that is not used to cover the population’s health benefits. In the premium-
based system neither insurer makes profits because premium insurers compete on
equal grounds over the entire population.19 This competition effect reduces welfare
in the contribution-based system compared to the premium-based system. On the
other hand, due to concavity of the population’s utility function, it increases welfare
if low-income customers pay relatively less and high-income customers pay rela-
tively more. This redistribution effect speaks in favor of the income-dependent fee
of the contribution-based system compared to the flat fee of the premium-based system.
19 Recall, that this is true even if we assume that both premium insurers are profit-maximizing.
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With a higher opt-out threshold, PR extracts less surplus which attenuates the first
effect. Thus, for a sufficiently high opt-out threshold, the second effect dominates, and
the contribution-based system yields higher welfare. Conversely, combining the intro-
duction of a premium-based system with a redistribution of income from high incomes
to low incomes compensates for the second effect. Consequently, the premium-based
system accompanied by an appropriate income redistribution scheme yields higher
welfare than the contribution-based system.
We conclude that an easy-to-implement policy recommendation to increase welfare
is to increase the opt-out threshold. If the health insurance market is changed more fun-
damentally to a premium-based system, it would increase welfare tomake the redistribu-
tion of income that is implicit in the contribution-based system explicit by, e.g., adjusting
income taxation in favor of low incomes. Overall, when taking optimal policy parameter
choice in the contribution-based system and income taxation in the premium-based sys-
tem into account, there is no inherent advantage of one system over the other. This find-
ing is in line with the observations of Haufler (2004) and Buchholz (2005). However, the
advantage of one system over the other may lie beyond our model. Breyer and Haufler
(2000) and Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004),
for example, advocate a switch to a premium-based system on grounds of smaller trans-
action costs, less administrative costs, more transparency, and the possibility to adopt
more incentive-compatible insurance contracts.
4.4.2 Welfare-Optimal Fees
In view of Proposition 8, we are now interested in welfare-optimal fee schedules that fi-
nance a given level of health benefits. Understanding why these fee schedules maximize
welfare, gives us further insights into how to adjust the health insurance market in order
to increase welfare. Specifically, we consider the following problem: Health insurance is
exclusively provided by a benevolent authority that chooses a fee schedule to maximize
welfare subject to the constraint of providing a given benefit level. First, we explicitly
derive the welfare-optimal fee schedule that may condition on both health and income.
Proposition 9. For given health benefits, the welfare-maximizing fee schedule that may
condition on health and income, popt(h, e), is given by
popt(h, e) = min(c(h), L) + e − c(h) − E [e − c(h)] . (7)
Observe that popt(h, e) conditions on customer’s health. Intuitively, popt(h, e)
consists of two components. The first component charges each customer his health
benefits. The second component associates to every customer his net income, i.e., his
income minus health costs. If a customer’s net income is high relative to the average net
income, his fee is increased by the difference. If a customer’s net income is low relative
to the average net income, his fee is reduced by the difference. The first component
guarantees that the population’s health benefits are covered; the second component
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is a budget-balanced redistribution scheme from customers with high net income to
customers with low net income. The redistribution scheme accounts for the positive
effect of equating utility across customers on welfare, that stems from the concavity of
customers’ utility function.
In the contribution-based system, PU’s fee only depends on income. Therefore, we
are now interested in the properties of welfare-optimal fee schedules that only depend
on income, and whether PU’s fee satisfies these properties. Also, recall that welfare in
the premium-based system can be increased if the introduction of a premium-based sys-
tem is combined with an appropriate redistribution in the income dimension. Studying
characteristics of welfare-optimal fee schedules that only depend on income, translates
one-to-one into studying the characteristics of welfare-optimal income redistribution
schemes in the premium-based system. Technically, we assume for the next result that
the density of the distribution of health conditional on income is continuously differen-
tiable.
Proposition 10. For the welfare-maximizing fee schedule that only depends on income,




Clearly we have that welfare under popt(h, e) is higher than welfare under pˆopt(e).
However, Proposition 10 shows that pˆopt(e) takes into account the correlation between
higher income and better health. Recall that concavity of customers’ utility function
implies that it increases welfare to give customers similar utility levels. That is why
popt(h, e) redistributes income from customers with high net income to customers with
low net income. An increase in customer’s income by one increases his net income
by more than one because a higher income is associated with better health and thus
lower health costs through the correlation of health and income. Consequently, pˆopt(e),
which tries to balance net incomes across customers, has not only to neutralize the
increase of income but also the positive effect on health. Hence, pˆopt(e) increases faster
than income itself.
Observe that this stands in marked contrast to PU’s fee. PU’s fee increases at a rate
equal to the contribution rate, which is less than one, and remains constant above the
contribution cap. This indicates that a reform to adjust PU’s fee schedule to take the
positive correlation of health and income into account has the potential of increasing
welfare. On a similar note, if the introduction of a premium-based system is combined
with an adjustment of income taxation to compensate for the redistribution that is lost
through the abolishment of the contribution-based system, it increases welfare if the
adjustment of income taxation accounts for the correlation between health and income.
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4.5 Extensions
4.5.1 Health Signals
As noted in the remarks following the description of the model, we assume that insurers
observe customers’ characteristics, in particular their health type, to single out the
effect of the organizational structure of the health insurance market. As mentioned, we
think that this assumption is plausible given that (private) insurers ask their customers
to complete health questionnaires and can make statistical predictions about the
probability that a customer becomes sick.
Nevertheless, to demonstrate robustness of our findings to private information of
customers, we consider the following variation of our model. In addition to his income
and health type, each customer is characterized by a health signal. We can interpret the
health signal, e.g., as the customer’s answer to a health questionnaire. The customer’s
health signal is positively correlated with his health type.20 Insurers observe customers’
health signal but not their health type. As PU discriminates only based on income, PU
is not directly affected. However, PR’s ability to discriminate across health types is
hampered; PR has to devise a fee schedule that only depends on income and health
signal to maximize profits.
We can reproduce our findings from Section 4.3 following the same steps: As be-
fore, customers choose the insurer which charges the lower fee. For insurers, observe
that we can replicate our analysis by replacing the health benefit by the expected health
benefit conditional on income and health signal. Intuitively, as PR cannot observe cus-
tomers’ health, it estimates health using income and health signal. Due to positive cor-
relation, high income and a favorable health signal are indicative of a good health type.
Consequently, PR partially retains its ability to distinguish profitable and unprofitable
customers.
4.5.2 Endogenous Health Benefits
So far we have assumed that insurers provide the same benefit level. A careful in-
spection of the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1 reveals that customers choose
the insurance which offers the higher net benefit, i.e., health benefit minus fee. It is
convenient to set benefit levels equal to focus on fees. However, note that the analysis
is virtually unchanged if, say, PR provides an exogenously higher benefit level. In
equilibrium PR charges higher fees such that the net benefit is unchanged. Does this
conclusion remain true if PR chooses the benefit level endogenously?
To answer this question, consider the following variant of our model. PR offers
customers two contracts: a simple contract reminiscent of PU’s contract and a more
20 Specifically, we assume that health signal and health type are affiliated.
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elaborate contract tailored to its customers. Specifically, the first contract provides the
same benefit level as PU, and the contract’s fee corresponds to the highest fee which
PU charges, i.e., contribution rate times contribution cap.21 For the second contract, PR
chooses benefit level and devises an income- and health-dependent fee schedule.
The equilibrium in this health insurance market parallels the equilibrium derived in
Section 4.3. The sets of PU and PR customers are unchanged. PR finetunes the elaborate
contract to cream skim profitable customers with income above the opt-out threshold.
Unprofitable customers with income above the opt-out threshold and the contribution
cap choose PR’s simple contract. In equilibrium only the net benefit of the elaborate
contract is determined, echoing the remarks made at the beginning of this section. Thus,
without additional assumptions no prediction about the relative benefit level of PU and
PR can be made.
4.5.3 Private Competition
Hitherto, we assumed that there is a single, profit-maximizing private insurer. Motivated
by reforms to increase the competition between private insurers by allowing customers
to transfer their accumulated savings when switching between private insurers, we
are now interested in how redistribution streams change if there is competition among
private insurers.
To this end, assume that in addition to PU and the population there are two private
insurers, PR1 and PR2.
22 All insurers provide the same benefit level. PR1 and PR2 maxi-
mize profits by devising a fee schedule that conditions on customers’ health and income.
In the first period, insurers simultaneously design their contracts. In the second period,
customers choose the contract that maximizes their utility. For simplicity assume that
customers randomize with equal probability if they are indifferent between PR1 and
PR2.
In equilibrium the set of PU customers is unchanged. Former PR customers split
equally between PR1 and PR2. The fee of PR1 customers and PR2 customers is equal
to the minimum of their health benefit and the upper bound on PRs’ fee, in particular,
they pay less than before. Intuitively, competition pushes the fee which PR1 customers
and PR2 customers have to make down to the cost they impose on the insurer, i.e.,
their health benefit. Redistribution streams are as follows. Profitable customers with
income below the opt-out threshold pay more than their health benefit and subsidize
unprofitable parts of the population. Customers with income above the opt-out threshold
opt out of this redistribution scheme by insuring with one of the PRs and pay an amount
equal to or less than their health benefit.
21 In the German health insurance system, private insurers have to offer this baseline contract to every
customer.
22 Analogous results hold if there are more than two private insurers.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter develops a model of the German health insurance system for analyzing how
it redistributes income between different parts of the population and evaluating policy
proposals aimed at changing the system. We first show that if health insurance is volun-
tary, the health insurance market collapses because profitable customers decide to bear
their health costs themselves. When health insurance is obligatory, we prove existence of
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the private insurer tries to cream skim, i.e., it tries to attract
profitable customers and deter unprofitable customers. Redistribution occurs across
health and income; profitable public insurance customers with intermediate income
subsidize all other public insurance customers. The surplus of profitable, high-income
customers is transformed into profits for the private insurer and lost for redistribution.
We argue, therefore, that, if a larger part of the population is forced to insure with the
public insurer, then the entire population enjoys higher utility. Having analyzed the
current German health insurance system in detail, we compare it to a system in which
there is only one type of insurer, and insurers compete in premia, i.e., fees that are
independent of income and health. In this premium-based system redistribution occurs
only across health types. We argue that combining the introduction of a premium-based
system with an appropriate adjustment of income taxation increases the population’s
welfare. Turning to a more careful welfare comparison of the current German system
and the premium-based system, we identify two effects that determine the welfare
ranking of the two systems: the redistribution effect and the competition effect. In
the last part of the chapter, we study the properties of welfare-maximizing fee schedules.
We identify four avenues for future research. First, we think it would be interesting
to apply our model to investigate further policy proposals to change the organization
of the German health insurance market and their redistributional implications. Second,
as repeatedly switching between the public and the private insurance sector is difficult
in the current system, we focused on a static model in which customers choose their
insurance once. Policy proposals to increase the competition and mobility between the
public and the private insurance sector make it interesting to analyze a dynamic model
in which customers can switch back and forth between the two sectors. Third, whereas
private and public insurance are substitutes in Germany, many countries such as France
and England have health insurance systems in which private insurance complements
public insurance. Analyzing the organizational structure of these health insurance sys-
tems would shed light on how redistribution streams in these systems differ from the
redistribution streams in the German system. Last, we believe that it would be fruitful
to introduce private information more thoroughly into our model to study how it inter-
acts with the organizational structure of the market, in particular, introducing private
information could yield additional insights into the comparison of the premium-based
system and the contribution-based system.
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Appendix 4.A Appendix: Proofs
4.A.1 Proofs for Voluntary Health Insurance
Proof of Proposition 1. If health insurance is voluntary, every customer type’s con-
tract set contains, in addition to PU’s and PR’s contract, contract (0, 0), i.e., (0,0) ∈
C (h, e), ∀(h, e). Assume there exists an equilibrium (α∗, p∗pr , (L∗, p∗(h, e))). Optimal
choice of customers requires:
u(e + min(L∗ − c(h), 0) − p∗(h, e)) ≥ u(e + min(L′ − c(h), 0) − p(h, e)),
for all contracts (L′, p(h, e)) ∈ C (h, e). As the utility function is strictly increasing, this
is equivalent to
min(L∗, c(h)) − p∗(h, e) ≥ min(L′, c(h)) − p(h, e),
for all contracts (L′, p(h, e)) ∈ C (h, e). In particular, with voluntary health insurance
we have that
min(L∗, c(h)) − p∗(h, e) ≥ 0.
Rearranging terms gives
p∗(h, e) − min(L∗, c(h)) ≥ 0. (8)
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(8) implies that PU and PR incur a weak loss for every insured customer. We will now
argue that (8) holds with strict inequality on a set of PU customers with positivemeasure.
Thus, PU’s equilibrium condition
α∗ E[min(K2, e)1{PU(α∗)}] = E[min(L, c(h))1{PU(α∗)}]
does not hold, a contradiction. Consider the part of the population with e < K2 and
α∗min(K2, e) − min(L, c(h)) < 0.
Because K2, L, c(h)> 0 and the support of income is [0, e¯] this part of the population
has positive measure. These customers prefer to be insured with PU over remaining
uninsured. Also, PR does not want to attract this part of the population because PR
would need to set pPR(h, e)≤ α∗min(K2, e), incurring a loss on these customers. As
e < K2, PR can set pPR(h, e)≥ α∗min(K2, e) to deter these unprofitable customers.
Therefore, we have p∗PR(h, e)≥ α∗min(K2, e). To sum up, we have argued that this part
of the population will insure with PU which concludes the proof.
4.A.2 Proofs for Equilibrium Existence
Proof of Lemma 1. Given any contribution rate α ∈ [0, 1] and any feasible choice of
pPR(·), the contract set of a customer with type (h, e) is
C (h, e) =
¨
{(L,αmin(K2, e))} if e < K1,
{(L,αmin(K2, e)), (L, pPR(h, e))} else.
It is optimal for a type-(h, e) customer to choose (L, p∗(h, e)) ∈ C (h, e) if and only if
u(e + min(L − c(h), 0) − p∗(h, e)) ≥ u(e + min(L − c(h), 0) − p(h, e)),
for all (L, p(h, e)) ∈ C (h, e). As u(·) is strictly increasing, this is equivalent to
min(L, c(h)) − p∗(h, e) ≥ min(L, c(h)) − p(h, e),
for all (L, p(h, e)) ∈ C (h, e). Because health benefits L are equal, the latter expression
reduces to
p∗(h, e) ≤ p(h, e),
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix any contribution rate α. Consider a feasible fee schedule p(·).
Optimal customer choice, Lemma 1, implies that the set of PR customers is given by
{PR(α)} = {(h, e) : e ≥ K1, p(h, e) ≤ αmin(K2, e)}.
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(p(h, e) − min(L, c(h))1{e≥K1 , p(h,e)≤αmin(K2 ,e)}(h, e) f (h, e) dh de.
Because PR’s objective involves no derivatives of p(h, e), we can solve it pointwise. Care-
fully inspecting




αmin(K2, e) if αmin(K2, e) ≥ min(L, c(h)),
αK2 else,
is an optimal policy.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let customers’ and PR’s behavior be as described in Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, respectively. Fix a contribution rate α. Formally, the set of PU customers is
{PU(α)} = {(h, e) : e < K1}∪˙{(h, e) : K1 ≤ e < K2, αe < min(L, c(h))},
and the set of PR customers is
{PR(α)} ={(h, e) : e ≥ K1, αmin(K2, e) ≥ min(L, c(h))}
∪˙{(h, e) : e ≥ max(K1,K2), αK2 < min(L, c(h))}.
PU seeks a contribution rate α∗ such that











An equilibrium contribution rate α∗ corresponds to a fixed point of T(·). First, we show
that T(·) is well-defined, i.e., that the denominator cannot become zero:
E

min(K2, e)(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, αe<min(L,c(h))})
 ≥ E e1{e<min(K1,K2)} > 0,
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where the last inequality follows from the assumption that f (h, e) has full support and
the fact that K1 and K2 are strictly positive.
Existence. We prove existence of a fixed point using the intermediate value theorem.
First, note
T(0) =
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2})]
E[min(K2, e)(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2})]
> 0.
The inequality follows from both, numerator and denominator, being strictly positive
because of full support of f (h, e) and K1,K2, L, c(·)> 0. Second, we have
T(1) =
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[min(K2, e)(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , e<min(L,c(h))})]
≤ E[min(L, c(h))]E[e1{e<min(K1 ,K2)}]
< 1,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1. It remains to be shown that T(·) is
continuous.23 First, consider the numerator of T(·). The first addend does not depend






min(L, c(h))(1{K2>e≥K1, αe<min(L,c(h))}) f (h, e) de dh .













min(L, c(h))1{K2>e≥K1} 1{α˜<min(L,c(h))e ≤α} f (h, e) de dh. (9)
Because f (h, e) has no atoms, the integrand converges pointwise to zero as α˜→ α.
Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem, (9) converges to zero as α˜→ α.
Continuity of the denominator follows from an analogous argument. Hence, T(·) is con-
tinuous, and the existence of a fixed point follows from the intermediate value theorem.
Uniqueness. If K1 ≥ K2, T(·) is constant in α and thus the fixed point is unique. For
K2 > K1 we argue that
(i) T(·) is increasing left of the first fixed point,
(ii) T(·) is decreasing right of the first fixed point,
23 Continuity does not follow from standard results for parameter integrals because these require that
the integrand is a continuous function of α for almost all h, e.
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together with the existence result above, this yields uniqueness of α∗. Note the following












For (i) recall that T(0)> 0. Let α˜,α be left of the first fixed point and α˜ > α, then






E min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1 , α˜<min(L,c(h))e }) f (h, e) de dh∫
H
∫





E min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1}(1{α<min(L,c(h))e ≤α˜} + 1{α˜<min(L,c(h))e })) f (h, e) de dh∫
H
∫
E e(1{e<K1} + 1{K2>e≥K1}(1{α<min(L,c(h))e ≤α˜} + 1{α˜<min(L,c(h))e })) f (h, e) de dh
.
(11)





E min(L, c(h)) 1{K2>e≥K1, α<min(L,c(h))e ≤α˜} f (h, e) de dh∫
H
∫
E e1{K2>e≥K1, α<min(L,c(h))e ≤α˜} f (h, e) de dh
≤ α˜. (12)
Using T(α˜)> α˜ and (12), we apply (10) to obtain T(α˜)> T(α).
For (ii) assume that T(α) is not decreasing right of the first fixed point. Because T(1)< 1
and T(·) is continuous, there exist α˜,α, α˜ > α, such that α >max(T˜(α˜), T˜(α)) and
T˜(α˜)> T˜(α). However, replicating the computations in (11) and (12), we observe
T˜(α˜) − T˜(α) ≤ 0,
a contradiction. We conclude that there exists a unique contribution rate α∗ that
balances PU’s budget.
Profits of PR. Start by observing that
1{PR(α)} = 1{e≥maxK1, minmin(L,c(h))α , K2}









is decreasing in h and e. Furthermore, min(K2, e) is increasing in e, and min(L, c(h)) is
decreasing in h. These observations together with the fact that f (h, e) is affiliated, i.e.,
log-supermodular, allow us to apply the Fortuin-Kasteleyn-Ginibre (FKG) inequality to

















 ≤ E [min(K2, e)] E 1{PU(α)} .
































(α∗min(K2, e) − min(L, c(h)))1{PR(α∗)}
 ≥ 0,
which concludes the proof.
4.A.3 Proofs for Comparative Statics in Policy Parameters
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an increase of K1 to K˜1, K1 ≤ K˜1. For this proof, we
make the dependence of T(·) on K1 explicit and write TK1(·). Similarly, we denote the
set of PU customers by {PUK1(α)}. Let the contribution rates α
∗ and α˜∗ be the unique
fixed points of TK1(·) and TK˜1(·) respectively. We argue that TK1(α˜∗)≥ TK˜1(α˜∗) which




≥ E[min(L, c(h))1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}]E[min(K2, e))1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}]
. (14)
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. First, let K1 ≤ K˜1 ≤ K2. Observe that
1{PUK1 (α˜∗)} = 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜1} − 1{K1≤e<K˜1 , α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))} + 1{K˜1≤e<K2 , α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}
− 1{K1≤e<K˜1 , α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}.
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Hence, we can rewrite (14) as
E[min(L, c(h))(1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)} − 1{K1≤e<K˜1 , α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))})]





Similarly as in (10), we have
a − b







for c − d > 0, a, b, c, d ≥ 0. Therefore, (15) is equivalent to
E[min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
E[min(K2, e)1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
≤ E[min(L, c(h))1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}]E[min(K2, e))1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}]
.
Exploiting the indicator function of term on the left side of the above inequality and the
fact that α˜∗ is a fixed point of TK˜1(·), we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
E[min(K2, e)1{K1≤e<K˜1, α˜∗e≥min(L,c(h))}]
≤ α˜∗ = E[min(L, c(h))1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}]E[min(K2, e))1{PUK˜1 (α˜∗)}]
.
Thus, (14) holds in this case.
Case 2. Second, consider the case K2 ≤ K1 ≤ K˜1. (14) becomes
E[min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}]
E[min(K2, e)1{e<K1}]
≥ E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜1})]E[min(K2, e)(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜1})]
.
Using (10), the latter inequality is equivalent to∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))1{e<K1} f (h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h





h min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e} f (h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)1{K1≤e} f (h, e) dh de
.
(16)
Now, we proceed as in the proof Theorem 1 where we showed that PR’s profit is positive.
Note that 1{e<K1} is a decreasing function of h, e, and that 1{K1≤e} is an increasing func-
tion of h, e. Together with the affiliation of f (h, e) and the monotonicity of min(L, c(h))
and min(K2, e), these observations imply, using the FKG inequality,∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(L, c(h))1{K1≤e} f (h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h





h min(L, c(h)) f (h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e) f (h, e) dh de




h min(L, c(h)) f (h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h





h min(L, c(h))1{e<K1} f (h, e) dh de∫ K˜1
0
∫ h
h min(K2, e)1{e<K1} f (h, e) dh de
.
Thus, (16) holds, implying that (14) holds also in this case. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. We proceed similar as in the proof of Proposition 2. Consider
a decrease of K2 to K˜2, K˜2 ≤ K2. For this proof, we make the dependence of T(·) on K2
explicit and write TK2(·). Similarly, we denote the set of PU customers by {PUK2(α)}.
Let the contribution rates α∗ and α˜∗ be the unique fixed points of TK2(·) and TK˜2(·)
respectively.
Proof of (i). First, consider the case K1 ≤ K˜2 ≤ K2. We argue that TK2(α˜∗)≥ TK˜2(α˜∗)








1{PUK2 (α˜∗)} = 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K˜2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))} − 1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}
= 1{PUK˜2 (α˜∗)} − 1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}.
Hence, we can rewrite (17) as
E[min(L, c(h))(1{PUK˜2 (α˜∗)} + 1{K˜2≤e<K2 , α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]





where we used the indicator functions to simplify the denominators. The latter inequal-
ity is equivalent to
E[min(L, c(h))1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[e1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}]
≥ E[min(L, c(h))1{PUK˜2 (α˜∗)}]E[e1{PUK˜2 (α˜∗)}]
by (10). Exploiting the indicator function of term on the left side of the above inequality
and the fact that α˜∗ is a fixed point of TK˜2(·), we obtain
E[min(L, c(h))1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))})]
E[e1{K˜2≤e<K2, α˜∗e<min(L,c(h))}]
≥ α˜∗ = E[min(L, c(h))1{PUK˜2 (α˜∗)}]E[e1{PUK˜2 (α˜∗)}]
.
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Thus, (17) holds.
Proof of (ii). Second, consider the case K˜2 ≤ K2 ≤ K1. Observe that T(·) is constant in α




≥ E[min(L, c(h))1{e<K1}]E[min(K2, e))1{e<K1}]
,
which holds as K˜2 < K2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an increase of L to L˜, L ≤ L˜. For this proof, we make
the dependence of T(·) on L explicit and write TL(·). Similarly, we denote the set of PU
customers by {PUL(α)}. Let the contribution rates α
∗ and α˜∗ be the unique fixed points
of TL(·) and TL˜(·) respectively. We argue that TL˜(α∗)≥ TL(α∗)= α∗ which implies α˜∗ ≥
α∗ because the fixed point is unique. TL˜(α∗) is given by
E[min( L˜, c(h))1{PU L˜(α∗)}]
E[min(K2, e))1{PU L˜(α∗)}]
.
Consider the numerator of this fraction:
E[min( L˜, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))})]
= E[min( L˜, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min(L,c(h))} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))})]
≥ E[min( L˜, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2 , min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))})]
≥ E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2 , min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))})].
To get from the second to the third line, we exploit the third indicator function. From
the third to the fourth line we use min(L, c(h))≤min( L˜, c(h)). Thus, we obtain
TL˜(α
∗)
≥ E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α
∗e1{K1≤e<K2 , min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))})]
E[e (1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min( L˜,c(h)})]
=
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min(L,c(h))})] + E[α∗e1{K1≤e<K2 , min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))})]
E[e (1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2 , α∗e<min(L,c(h)})] + E[e1{K1≤e<K2 , min(L,c(h))≤α∗e<min( L˜,c(h))}]
.
Observe that
E[min(L, c(h))(1{e<K1} + 1{K1≤e<K2, α∗e<min(L,c(h))})]



















for a, b, c, d > 0, we conclude that
TL˜(α
∗) ≥ α∗.
4.A.4 Proofs for Structural Population Changes
4.A.4.1 Proofs for Systematic Improvement of Health and Income
Preliminaries.Wemake the dependence of the expectation operator on the distribution
f explicit andwriteE f [·]. Throughout the proof we use the following characterization of
(multivariate) first-order stochastic dominance, cf. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007),
Theorem 2. Consider two probability distributions over Rn with densities f˜ and f re-
spectively. f˜ first-order stochastically dominates f if and only if E f˜ [φ]≥ E f [φ] for all
increasing functions φ : Rn→ R for which the expectations exist.
Let f˜ (h, e) first-order stochastically dominate f (h, e). Other than that, we assume that
f˜ (h, e) satisfies the same assumptions as f (h, e). As before, we are interested in fixed
points of the function
T f (α) =
E f [min(c(h), L)1{PU(α)}]
E f [min(K2, e)1{PU(α)}]
, (19)
where we made the dependence of T(·) on the distribution explicit. By the proof of The-
orem 1, T f (α) has a unique fixed point α
∗ and is increasing for α≤ α∗ and decreasing
for α≥ α∗. Denote by α∗ the equilibrium contribution rate associated with f (h, e) and
by α˜∗ the equilibrium contribution rate associated with f˜ (h, e). If we argue that
T f˜ (α
∗) ≥ (≤)T f (α∗) = α∗,
then we know that α˜∗ ≥ (≤)α∗.
Start by observing that
E f˜ [α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L)] ≥ E f [α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L)] = 0. (20)
because α∗min(K2, e)−min(c(h), L) is an increasing function of (h, e). Hence,
if the entire population would insure with PU, the contribution rate could be
adjusted downward. Also, note that PR’s profit from an (h, e)-type customer,
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(αmin(K2, e)−min(c(h), L))1{PR(α)}, is an increasing function of α, for all h, e.
Formally, the decomposition outlined in the text is given by
{PU+(α∗)} = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L) ≥ 0, e < K1}, (21)
{PU−(α∗)} = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L) < 0, e < max(K1,K2)}, (22)
{PR+(α∗)} = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L) ≥ 0, e ≥ K1}, (23)
{PR−(α∗)} = {(h, e)| α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L) < 0, e ≥ max(K1,K2)}. (24)
Define E f˜ − f [·] := E f˜ [·]−E f [·]. Consider the difference in insurers’ profit under f˜ (h, e)
and f (h, e) on each set of customers (21)-(24),
E f˜ − f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PU+(α∗)}], (25)
E f˜ − f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PU−(α∗)}], (26)
E f˜ − f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR+(α∗)}], (27)
E f˜ − f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR−(α∗)}]. (28)
By (20) we have
(25) + (26) + (27) + (28) ≥ 0. (29)
We verify the statements about the impact of customers’ movements on insurers’ profit
from each subgroup made in the main body of the text. Checking monotonicity of the
appropriate functions and applying Theorem 2 yields (26)≥ 0, (26)+(28)≥ 0, (27)≥ 0,
and (27)+(25)≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of (i). By assumption (25)+(26)≤0, which is equivalent to
α∗ = T f (α∗) ≤ T f˜ (α∗),
hence, α˜∗ ≥ α∗. Furthermore, by (25)+(26)≤0 and (29), we have 0≤(27)+(28), i.e.,
E f˜ [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR(α∗)}] − E f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR(α∗)}] ≥ 0. (30)
(30) and α˜∗ ≥ α∗, together with monotonicity of PR’s profit in α show that PR’s profit
increase under f˜ .
Proof of (ii). By assumption (27)+(28)≤ 0. This implies (25)+(26)≥ 0, i.e.,
α∗ = T f (α∗) ≥ T f˜ (α∗),
therefore, α˜∗ ≤ α∗. Also, by (27)+(28)≤ 0,
E f˜ [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR(α∗)}] − E f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR(α∗)}] ≤ 0. (31)
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(31) and α˜∗ ≤ α∗ show that PR’s profit decreases.
Proof of (iii). By assumption (25)+(26)≥ 0, which is equivalent to
α∗ = T f (α∗) ≥ T f˜ (α∗),
and hence, α˜∗ ≤ α∗. Furthermore, (27)+(28)≥ 0, i.e.,
E f˜ [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR(α∗)}] − E f [(α∗min(K2, e) − min(c(h), L))1{PR(α∗)}] ≥ 0. (32)
The positive effect of the shift from f to f˜ on PR’s profit, (32), may be mitigated by the
decrease of the equilibrium contribution rate. The exact effect on PR’s profit depends
on the specific shift f˜ .
4.A.4.2 Proofs for Increase in Correlation Between Health and Income
Preliminaries.Wemake the dependence of the expectation operator on the distribution
f explicit and write E f [·]. Throughout the proof we use the following characterization
of the supermodular order, cf. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
Theorem 3. Consider two probability distributions over Rn with densities g and f respec-
tively. g is larger than f in the supermodular order if and only if Eg[φ]≥ E f [φ] for all
supermodular functions φ : Rn→ R for which the expectations exist.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that g(h, e) is larger than f (h, e) in the supermodular
order. Other than that, we assume that g(h, e) satisfies the same assumptions as f (h, e).
As before, we are interested in fixed points of the function
T f (α) =
E f [min(c(h), L)1{PU(α)}]
E f [min(K2, e)1{PU(α)}]
, (33)
where we made the dependence of T(·) on the distribution explicit. By the proof of The-
orem 1, T f (α) has a unique fixed point α
∗ and is increasing for α≤ α∗ and decreasing
for α≥ α∗. Denote by α∗ the equilibrium contribution rate associated with f (h, e) and
by α˜∗ the equilibrium contribution rate associated with g(h, e). If we argue that
Tg(α
∗) ≥ T f (α∗) = α∗,
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min(K2, e)1{e<K1}g(e) de = E f [min(K2, e)1{e<K1}],
(35)
where the last equality follows from the fact that g and f have the same marginals.
Second, we analyze the numerator of (34). Let e′ ≥ e and h′ ≥ h, then
min(c(h′), L)1{e′<K1} + min(c(h), L)1{e<K1} ≥ min(c(h′), L)1{e<K1} + min(c(h), L)1{e′<K1}
because min(c(h), L) is decreasing in h. Consequently, min(c(h), L)1{e<K1} is supermod-
ular, and by definition of the supermodular order we obtain
Eg[min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}] ≥ E f [min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}]. (36)





≥ E f [min(c(h), L)1{e<K1}]E f [min(K2, e)1{e<K1}]
= T f (α
∗) = α∗
which concludes the proof.
4.A.5 Proofs for Applications
4.A.5.1 Proofs for Health Premia
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix any two premia A1 and A2 set by PM1 and PM2, respectively.
The contract set C (h, e) of a customer with type (h, e) is
C (h, e) = {(L,A1), (L,A2)}.
Because health benefits are equal, it is optimal for every customer to choose contract
(L,Ai) with Ai = min(A1,A2).
Start by observing that the following is an equilibrium: A1 ≥ A2, A2 = E[min(c(h), L)]
and all customers choose PM2. We now deduce more generally that the premium paid
by all customers is E[min(c(h), L)] in any equilibrium of the premium-based health
insurance market. It is convenient to denote by β(h, e) ∈ {0,1} customer-(h, e)’s choice
of insurance, where β(h, e)= 1 means that the customer chooses PM1, and β(h, e)= 0





∗(h, e)) be an equilibrium of the
premium-based health insurance market.
Case 1. If A∗1 > A∗2, then β∗(h, e)= 0, for all (h, e). PM2’s equilibrium condition requires
A∗2 = E[min(c(h), L)]. The case A∗1 < A∗2 is symmetric.
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Case 2. If A∗1 = A∗2, PM1’s and PM2’s equilibrium condition requires






E [(1 − β∗(h, e))min(c(h), L)] = E A∗2(1 − β∗(h, e)) . (38)
Adding up (37) and (38) and using A∗1 = A∗2 yields
E [min(c(h), L)] = A∗1 = A∗2,
which concludes the proof.24
Proof of Corollary 1. Comparing the income-dependent fee of the contribution-based
system
α∗min(K2, e)
to the constant fee of the premium-based system
E[min(L, c(h))]
yields the existence of a threshold e∗ ∈ [0, e¯] such that for all e < e∗ we have
α∗min(K2, e)< E[min(L, c(h))], and for all e > e∗ we have α∗min(K2, e)>
E[min(L, c(h))]. As health benefits are equal in both system customers with in-
come e > e∗ enjoy a higher utility and customers with income e < e∗ enjoy a lower
utility in the premium-based system.




≥ E[min(L, c(h))]E[min(K2, e)] ,
where the equality follows from α∗ being a fixed point of T(·), and the inequality follows
from (13). Therefore, we can conclude that
α∗min(K2, e¯) ≥ E[min(L, c(h))]E[min(K2, e)] min(K2, e¯) > E[min(L, c(h))].
Second, note that
α∗min(K2, 0) = 0 < E[min(L, c(h)],
which concludes the proof.
24 As before, we restrict attention to equilibria where β(·, ·) is measurable with respect to (h, e). Note that
the result still holds if customers are allowed to randomize, i.e., if β(h, e) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability
that customer-(h, e) chooses PM1.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Fix a fee p(h, e) for each customer type. Given this set of fees,
welfare is
W (p(h, e)) = E [u(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(h, e))] .
Proof of (i). Set K1 = e¯. Recall that the fee in the contribution-based system is
α∗min(K2, e), whereas it is A∗ = E[min(L, c(h))] in the premium-based system. As
K1 = e¯, budget-balancing of PU implies
α∗ E[min(K2, e)] = E[min(L, c(h))] = A∗.
To save on notation, define ψ(h, e)= min(c(h), L)− c(h)+ e and note that ψ(·, ·) is
increasing in both arguments. Consider the welfare difference between the premium-
based system and the contribution-based system
E [u (ψ(h, e) − α∗ E[min(K2, e)])] − E [u (ψ(h, e) − α∗min(K2, e))]
< E

u′ (ψ(h, e) − α∗min(K2, e)) (α∗min(K2, e) − α∗ E[min(K2, e)])

, (39)
where the inequality follows from strict concavity of u(·). Observe that
1. u′ (ψ(h, e)−α∗min(K2, e)) is decreasing in (h, e) because u′(·) is decreasing and
ψ(h, e)−α∗min(K2, e) is increasing in (h, e) as α∗ ≤ 1.
2. α∗min(K2, e)−α∗ E[min(K2, e)] is weakly increasing in (h, e).
Hence, the FKG inequality implies that (39) is bounded above by
E

u′ (ψ(h, e) − α∗min(K2, e))

E [α∗ (min(K2, e) − E[min(K2, e)])] = 0,
where the last equality follows from
E [α∗ (min(K2, e) − E[min(K2, e)])] = 0. (40)
Therefore, the contribution-based system with K1 = e¯ gives the population a strictly
higher welfare than the premium-based system. Recall that welfare is increasing in K1.
Thus, for sufficiently high K1 the contribution-based system is welfare-dominant.
Proof of (ii). Consider the income redistribution scheme that is defined by the transfer
τ(e) to agent with income e, where
τ(e) = α∗ E[min(K2, e)] − α∗min(K2, e).
By definition, the premium-based system together with this income redistribution
scheme gives the population the same welfare as the welfare-optimal contribution-
based system, i.e., the system with K1 = e¯. Furthermore, (40) implies that the income
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redistribution scheme is budget-balanced.
4.A.5.2 Proofs for Welfare-Optimal Fees
Proof of Proposition 9. Let A := E [min(c(h), L)] be the aggregate health benefits of
the population. Formally, we consider the problem
max
p(h,e)
E [u(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(h, e))] , (41)
s.t. A ≤ E [p(h, e)] . (42)
The Lagrangian
E [u(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(h, e)) + λ(p(h, e) − A)]
yields the first-order condition
u′(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(h, e)) = λ. (43)
Note that u′(·) is strictly decreasing. Solving for p(h, e) and inserting into the constraint,
(42), gives
A = E
−u′−1(λ) + min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e .
Using the definition of A, we obtain
λ = u′ (E [e − c(h)]) . (44)
Equating (43) and (44) yields
u′(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(h, e)) = u′ (E [e − c(h)]) . (45)
Again exploiting that u′(·) is strictly decreasing and after rearranging terms we obtain
popt(h, e) = min(c(h), L) + e − c(h) − E [e − c(h)] .
Proof of Proposition 10.We start by rewriting (41) to account for the fact that the fee











p(e) f (e) de. (47)
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u(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(e)) f (h|e) dh + λ(p(e) − A) f (e) de.
Using Leibniz’s integral rule, we obtain the first-order condition∫
H
u′(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p(e)) f (h|e) dh − λ = 0. (48)






−u′′(min(c(h), L) − c(h) + e − p) f (h|e) dh > 0, (49)
where the last inequality follows from strict concavity of u(·). Furthermore,












Rewrite the second term on the right side of inequality (50) as∫
H




1. By affiliation ∂ log f (h|e)∂ e is increasing in h. Indeed, we have
0 ≤ ∂
2 log f (h, e)
∂ e ∂ h
=
∂ 2 log( f (h|e) f (e))









2. −u′(min(c(h), L)− c(h)+ e− p) is increasing in h because min(c(h), L)− c(h) is
increasing and −u′(·) is increasing by concavity.
Neglecting the argument of −u′(·) for convenience and applying the FKG inequality, we
get ∫
H
−u′(·) ∂ log f (h|e)
∂ e
f (h|e) dh ≥
∫
H
−u′(·) f (h|e) dh
∫
H
∂ log f (h|e)
∂ e
f (h|e) dh. (51)
Rewriting the second term on the right hand side of inequality (51) and using Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem, we see that∫
H
∂ log f (h|e)
∂ e
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Consequently, note that∫
H
−u′(·) ∂ log f (h|e)
∂ e
f (h|e) dh ≥ 0. (52)


















where the inequality follows from (49) and (52).
